Mapping OCL as a Query and Constraint Language by Dania Flores, Carolina Inés
UNIVERSIDAD COMPLUTENSE DE MADRID 
FACULTAD DE INFORMÁTICA 
Departamento de Sistemas Informáticos y Computación 
 
 
  
 
 
TESIS DOCTORAL 
Mapping OCL as a Query and Constraint Language  
Traduciendo OCL como lenguaje de consultas y restricciones 
 
 
MEMORIA PARA OPTAR AL GRADO DE DOCTOR 
 
PRESENTADA POR 
 
Carolina Inés Dania Flores 
 
 
Directores 
 
Manuel García Clavel 
Marina Egea González 
 
 
Madrid, 2018 
 
 
 
 
 
© Carolina Inés Dania Flores, 2017 
Mapping OCL as a Query 
and Constraint Language
Carolina Inés Dania Flores
Traduciendo OCL como  
Lenguaje de Consultas y Restricciones
Supervisors: 
Manuel García Clavel  
Marina Egea González
Facultad de Informática 
Universidad Complutense de Madrid
Tesis Doctoral
© Joaquín S. Lavado, QUINO. Toda Mafalda, Penguin Random House, España.
Mapping OCL as a
Query and Constraint Language
Traduciendo OCL como
Lenguaje de Consultas y Restricciones
PhD Thesis
Carolina Ine´s Dania Flores
Advisors
Manuel Garc´ıa Clavel
Marina Egea Gonza´lez
Departamento de Sistemas Informa´ticos y Computacio´n
Facultad de Informa´tica
Universidad Complutense de Madrid
2017
A mi familia de alla´.
Mi mama´ Estela, mi papa´ He´ctor
y mis hermanos Flor, Marcos y Leila.
A mi familia de aca´.
Mi esposo Israel, mi perro Yiyo
y mis suegros Marinieves y Jacinto.
A mi gran amigo de alla´,
mi querido Julio.
A mi gran amigo de aca´,
mi querido Juli.
Acknowledgments
Undertaking this PhD has been a truly life-changing experience for me, and it would
not have been possible without the support and guidance that I received from many people.
I would like to express my sincere gratitude to my supervisors, Manuel Garc´ıa Clavel
and Marina Egea, for their support during these years. To Manuel, not only for being
my advisor, but mainly for believing in me. He is responsible for giving me this great
opportunity that is to pursue a PhD, letting me grow as a researcher and get to this final
point. To Marina, because she has been present in every hard stage of my journey, always
ready to help. It has also been an honor to be her first PhD student. Both are great
advisors and friends.
I would like to thank Martin Gogolla because he was (and remains to be) my best
role model of a scientist. He has been helpful in providing advice many times during my
career, being always available to talk and to o↵er guidance. Today, I am here thanks to
him.
My sincere appreciation and gratitude to Pedro R. D’Argenio for his guidance during
my research. His support and inspiring suggestions have been precious for the development
of this thesis.
A thank you to Nazareno Aguirre for teaching me how to become a researcher and
inducing me on this path.
Thanks to David Basin for those six-months in his team at ETH Zurich. It became
a very enriching experience and contributed tremendously towards my professional devel-
opment.
I thank Ce´sar Sa´nchez for adopting me as his PhD student in all those uncountable
times he stepped in the o ce, asking me how everything was going and encouraging me
to move on.
A special thanks to the IMDEA Software Institute. In particular, to Maria Alcaraz,
Manuel Hermegildo, Manuel Carro and Begonia Moreno for all their support. To Juan
Ce´spedes, Roberto Lumbreras and Gabriel Trujillo for their technical support, and to
Paola Huerta, Tania Rodriguez, Carlota Gill, Andrea Iannetta, and Silvia Dı´az-Plaza for
all their day-to-day support in administrative tasks. Finally, to my colleagues Miriam
Garc´ıa, Germa´n del Bianco, Joaqu´ın Arias, Goran Doychev, Juan Manuel Crespo and
Platon Kotzias for all those great and enjoyable lunches we had together.
Thanks to the Universidad Complutense de Madrid. In special, to Narciso Mart´ı Oliet
and Miguel Palomino Tarjuelo for their advice and for their support in all administrative
tasks related to the doctoral process.
I would like to say thank to my thesis committee members for all of their guidance
through this process; your discussion, ideas, and feedback have been absolutely invaluable.
iv
I am very grateful to all the people I have met along the way and have contributed to
the development of my research.
Por u´ltimo, y no por ello menos importante, a todas esas personas que han estado
junto a mı´ durante todo este tiempo:
A mı´ familia de alla´, por quienes yo soy lo que soy. A mis viejos, por su apoyo
incondicional, consejos, comprensio´n y amor. Me han dado todo lo que soy como persona,
mis valores, mis principios, mi perseverancia y mi coraje para conseguir mis objetivos. A
Marcos, Flor y a mi cun˜ada Leila, por estar siempre. Han estado en cada momento que
los necesite´ y siempre me han apoyado en todas mis decisiones.
A mi familia de aca´. A mi esposo Israel, que es la persona con quien comparto mi d´ıa
a d´ıa, me hace fel´ız al despertar cada d´ıa a su lado, quien aguanta todos mis malhumores
y me apoya incondicionalmente. A mis suegros, por adoptarme como un hija ma´s, o mejor
au´n, como la hija que nunca hab´ıan tenido. A mi perro Yiyo quien en este u´litmo an˜o
ha estado junto a mı´, hora tras hora, sentado a mi lado terminando la tesis. A mis otros
suegros (por las dudas dos no fueran suficientes), Carlos y Marimar, porque ellos tambie´n
me han adoptado como a una hija y esta´n siempre alenta´ndome con todas las decisiones
que he tomado.
Al resto de la familia de alla´: mi abuela Negrita, mis t´ıos Laly, Ricardo, Amalia,
Vivian, Cacho y Cristina; mis primos hermanos Stefi, Maxi, Nico, Mili, Cande, Guillermo
y Diego, porque siempre preguntan como va todo y ¡cua´ndo voy a terminar esta tesis! ¡He
aqu´ı la tesis! =)
A toda la familia Marguatti, por estar siempre!
A Olga y Osvaldo, los vecinos de mis abuelos; dos personas que me criaron da´ndome
todo lo que ten´ıan a su alcance. Su amor incondicional no se puede describir.
A Pedro y su familia, porque jugaron un rol muy importante en mi vida por mucho
tiempo y sin su ayuda no hubiese comenzado esta tesis.
A mis amigos de alla´. Los de la universidad: Julio, Caro G., el Flaco, Caro M., Waldo,
Guille K. y Juli I. Mi gran amiga de la infancia: la Juli. A mis amigos que vienieron ma´s
de una vez a visitarme, Naty y Mati. Gracias a todos por estar cada vez que anduve por
alla´ y estar siempre disponible via Skype y/o whatsapp.
A mis amigas de aca´: Andie, Paola, Bego, Tania y Carlota. ¡Gracias a todas! Gracias
por todos esos momentos que compartimos.
Ni de aca´ y ni de alla´. A Javi, gracias por esos an˜os compartidos en el equipo, todos
esos viajes por Suiza, y por tantas horas de charla. A Ale (yo si te cito [86]), gracias por
aguantarme en la oficina y en casa sin quejarte. A Ce´sar K. por las espora´dicas cenas
de viernes y esas largas horas de reflexio´n. A Bele´n, mi guardavidas favorita, gracias por
compartir el verano del 2011 conmigo y, de ah´ı en adelante, tu vida. Finalmente, a Juli,
simplemente gracias. Gracias por estar siempre, en los buenos, en los malos, en los mejores
y en los peores momentos.
Carolina Dania.
Amsterdam, Netherlands, 2017.
© Joaquı´n S. Lavado, QUINO.
Toda Mafalda, Penguin Random House, Espan˜a.
vContents
Contents v
List of Figures vii
List of Tables ix
Abstract xi
Resumen xv
1 Introduction 1
1.1 Model Driven Architecture (MDA) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
1.2 Unified Modeling Language (UML) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
1.2.1 Data models . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
1.2.2 Object models . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
1.3 Object Constraint Language (OCL) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
1.4 Outline . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
2 Mapping OCL as a query language 7
2.1 Procedural extensions of SQL . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
2.2 From OCL to SQL-PL . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
2.2.1 Mapping data models . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
2.2.2 Mapping OCL expressions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
2.2.3 The SQL-PL4OCL tool . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30
2.3 Benchmark . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31
2.3.1 Description . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31
2.3.2 Results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32
3 Mapping OCL as a constraint language 35
3.1 From OCL to many-sorted first-order logic . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35
3.1.1 Mapping data models . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36
3.1.2 Mapping OCL expressions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39
3.1.3 Checking satisfiability . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 54
3.1.4 The OCL2MSFOL tool . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 54
3.2 Benchmark . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 58
3.2.1 Description . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 58
3.2.2 Results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 61
vi CONTENTS
4 Application domains 67
4.1 Checking model satisfiability . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 67
4.1.1 The eHealth record management system . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 67
4.1.2 Checking data model satisfiability . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 71
4.1.3 Concluding remarks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 72
4.2 Validating and instantiating metamodels . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 72
4.2.1 The Core Security Metamodel (CSM) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 72
4.2.2 Validating the Core Security metamodel . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 75
4.2.3 Security enhanced CSM instances . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 76
4.2.4 Concluding remarks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 78
4.3 Analyzing security models . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 78
4.3.1 SecureUML . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 78
4.3.2 A running example . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 80
4.3.3 Analyzing fine-grained access control policies . . . . . . . . . . . . . 83
4.3.4 Concluding remarks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 87
4.4 Analyzing privacy models . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 87
4.4.1 Facebook: posting and tagging . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 87
4.4.2 Modeling Facebook privacy policy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 90
4.4.3 Analyzing Facebook privacy policy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 98
4.4.4 Concluding remarks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 99
4.5 Checking data invariants preservation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 99
4.5.1 Modeling sequences of states . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 100
4.5.2 Modeling sequences of data actions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 103
4.5.3 Checking data invariants preservation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 105
4.5.4 Concluding remarks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 108
5 Related work 109
5.1 Mapping OCL as a query language . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 109
5.2 Mapping OCL as a constraint language . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 111
5.3 Analizing security models . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 113
5.4 Checking data invariants preservation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 114
6 Conclusions and future work 115
Bibliography 119
vii
List of Figures
1.1 MDA: Models and languages . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
1.2 Overview of the basic structure of MDA . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
2.1 Car-Company: A data model for a car company . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
2.2 (a) Simple Car company model. (b) Car company table. . . . . . . . . . . . 12
2.3 Nested blocks structure in Stored Procedures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
2.4 Sequential blocks structure in Stored Procedures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
2.5 SQL-PL4OCL tool component architecture . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30
2.6 SQL-PL4OCL tool: screen-shots . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31
3.1 BasicSocNet: A data model for a basic social network. . . . . . . . . . . . . 37
3.2 OCL2MSFOL tool component architecture . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 55
3.3 OCL2MSFOL tool: screenshots . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 56
3.4 CivilStatus: A civil status model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 58
3.5 WritesReviews: A writes reviews model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 59
3.6 DisjointSubclasses: A disjoint subclasses datamodel . . . . . . . . . . . . . 61
4.1 EHR: a data model for a basic eHealth Record Management System. . . . . 68
4.2 Automatically generated instance of the case study’s data model satisfying
all the invariants. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 71
4.3 Core Security Metamodel . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 73
4.4 Automatically generated instance of the security metamodel presented in
the Figure 4.3. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 76
4.5 Domain Security Metamodel . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 77
4.6 EmplBasic: a data model for employees’ information. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 80
4.7 Two instances of EmplBasic . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 81
4.8 Empl: a SecureUML model for accessing employees’ information. . . . . . . 82
4.9 Modeling Facebook’s data model (partial). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 91
4.10 Modeling a Facebook scenario. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 92
4.11 EHR: a sample data model. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 100
4.12 Inst EHR: a sample object model. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 101
4.13 Film(EHR,3): a filmstrip model of length 3 of EHR. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 102
4.14 Three instances of EHR. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 103
4.15 An instance of Film(EHR, 3). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 104
4.16 EHRM case study: summary. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 107

ix
List of Tables
2.1 SQL-PL4OCL. Evaluation times. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32
3.1 Checking satisfiability of OCL constraints. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 57
3.2 Analyzing CivilStatus with OCL2MSFOL . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 62
3.3 Analyzing WritesReviews with OCL2MSFOL . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 64
3.4 Analyzing DisjointSubclasses with OCL2MSFOL . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 64
4.1 Automatic reasoning over the examples 21-29 introduced in Section 4.3.3. . 88
5.1 Support of OCL2SQL for primitive operators . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 110
5.2 Support of OCL2FOL for operators over collections . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 111
5.3 Other mappings from UML/OCL to other formalism. . . . . . . . . . . . . 112

xi
Abstract
This doctoral dissertation owes a great deal of its initial motivation and final focus
to the very lively and insightful discussion that took place during the Dagstuhl Seminar
“Automated Reasoning on Conceptual Schemas” (19-24 May, 2013) [18], which we have
the fortune to participate in.
Even before attending the seminar, based on our own experience applying the model-
driven development methodology within the ActionGUI project [1], we were already con-
vinced of the truthfulness and importance of three key statements contained in the semi-
nar’s presentation, which summarize very well this dissertation’s ultimate motivations:
“The quality of an information system is largely determined early in the development
cycle, i.e., during requirements specification and conceptual modeling, since errors
introduced at these stages are usually much more expensive to correct than errors
made during design or implementation.”
“Thus, it is desirable to prevent, detect, and correct errors as early as possible in the
development process by assessing the correctness of the conceptual schemas built.”
“The high expressivity of conceptual schemas requires to adopt automated reasoning
techniques to support the designer in this important task.”
Among the research questions that were pursued during the seminar, we were partic-
ularly intrigued —based again on our experience within the ActionGUI project— by the
following one:
“Are the existing techniques and tools ready to be used in an industrial environ-
ment?”
The question was specifically addressed by a working group, which we were invited to join,
focused “on the practical applicability of current techniques for reasoning on the structural
schema”. The other research questions discussed during the seminar included:
“Does it make sense to renounce to decidability to be able to handle the full expres-
sive power of the language used with and without textual integrity constraints?”
“Which is the current state of the achievements as far as reasoning on the behavioral
part is concerned?”
“Which are the new challenges for automated reasoning on conceptual schemas?”
All these questions, but specially the first one, have had also an impact, in one way or
another, on the shaping of our own research agenda.
The conclusions of the aforementioned working group were clear-cut: “there is still a
lot of things to do for convincing the industry about the practical applicability of current
xii
techniques for reasoning on the structural schema. (...) Having practical tools to show that
all of this works was agreed to be a necessary condition for this purpose.” The conclusions
ended with an optimistic view about the future: “the promising results achieved so far
and the existence of several prototype tools that can be applied in practice allow us to be
optimistic about the achievement of this ambitious goal.” Unfortunately, this view has so
far proven to be overoptimistic. As it has been recently reported [76]: “Although a variety
of tools exists for this purpose [model verification], the majority are academic —used as
a proof of concept for the theory behind it. (...) implementations are mostly applicable
to subsets of model verification tasks only. (...) the model under verification has to be
manually prepared for each tool. (...) the manual work requires expert knowledge and is
a source for errors.” Thus, [76] continues: “most [of the tools are] far too often poorly
maintained and updated (...) are using only strategies resulting in a feasibility only for
few classes of problems (...) this may leave the user with a very unpleasant tool-chain.
(...) additionally, most verification tools su↵er from certain limitations, due to a limited
focus, and out-dated underlying modeling language version or simply bugs.” Finally, [76]
also reports that “the long duration of the solving process remains a limiting factor in
most cases.”
In many ways, this doctoral dissertation is an attempt to address, the best we could
and within our limited resources, the “things to do for convincing the industry about
the practical applicability of current techniques for reasoning on the structural schemas”,
which, according to the aforementioned Dagstuhl seminar’s working group, included:
Explanations: “In addition to being able to check these properties, these tools should
also explain the results of performing automated reasoning on the conceptual schema.
(...) explanations should abstract away from whatever logic is used underneath and
they should be given regarding to the model the user is referred to.”
Benchmarks: “Benchmarks are very important for industry. However, little atten-
tion has been paid to them in the area.”
Scalability : “There was a clear agreement that scalability has to be necessarily ad-
dressed to convince the industry.”
In this attempt, our focus has been on creating well-founded, rigorous tools that (i)
could be used by the ordinary model-driven software developers (with knowledge of UML
and OCL), (ii) could seamlessly integrate with their usual modeling activities and environ-
ments, and (iii) could e↵ectively contribute to their development of high-quality models.
Notice that (i) rules out, as valid solutions in this case, tools that would require, on the
part of the users, learning a new modeling languages or a new logical formalism to interact
with the tool. Secondly, (ii) rules out also tools that would require, on the part of the
users, manually creating new artifacts (e.g., input models, proofs, tactics) to interact with
the tools. Finally, (iii) rules out as well tools that would not provide: universal (or, at
least, very wide) coverage of the class of problems the tools are designed for; immediate
(or, at least, very quick) response time; and clear and useful responses.
More constructively, as for the challenges of explanations and scalability highlighted
by the Dagstuhl seminar’s working group, this doctoral dissertation provides tools that
cover a very wide class of the problems they were designed for. The greatest challenge
here was to define an SMT-based automated reasoning tool that could handle the OCL
4-valued logic. Secondly, it provides tools with very quick response time. The challenge
here was to understand su ciently well the heuristics of the di↵erent SMT solvers so
as to define a translation from OCL to first-order logic that would benefit the most,
xiii
in terms of response time, from the heuristics implemented in each solver. Thirdly, it
provides tools with clear and useful responses for the users. The challenge here was
to understand su ciently well the finite model finding capabilities of the di↵erent SMT
solvers so as to define a translation from OCL to first-order logic that would authorize us to
use these capabilities when reasoning about models, avoiding in this way useless responses
of the type “unknown” from the part of the SMT solvers. Finally, as for the challenge
of benchmark, this doctoral dissertation passes the aforementioned tools from di↵erent
benchmarking exercises, using whenever possible available benchmarks, or creating new
benchmarks when they were not available.
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Resumen
Esta tesis doctoral debe gran parte de su motivacio´n inicial y enfoque final a la discusio´n
muy animada y perspicaz que tuvo lugar durante el seminario “Automated Reasoning on
Conceptual Schemas” en Dagstuhl (19-24 Mayo, 2013) [18], en el cual tuvimos la fortuna
de participar.
Incluso antes de asistir al seminario, sobre la base de nuestra propia experiencia apli-
cando la metodolog´ıa de desarrollo dirigida por modelos en el proyecto ActionGUI [1],
ya esta´bamos convencidos de la veracidad y la importancia de tres declaraciones claves
contenidas en la presentacio´n del mismo, que resumen muy bien las motivaciones finales
de esta tesis:
“La calidad de un sistema de informacio´n se determina en gran medida a princi-
pios del ciclo de desarrollo, es decir, durante la especificacio´n de los requisitos y
el modelado conceptual, ya que los errores introducidos en estas etapas suelen ser
mucho ma´s costosos de corregir que los errores cometidos durante el disen˜o o la
implementacio´n.”
“Por lo tanto, es deseable prevenir, detectar y corregir errores tan pronto como sea
posible en el proceso de desarrollo evaluando la correccio´n de los esquemas concep-
tuales construidos.”
“La alta expresividad de los esquemas conceptuales requiere adoptar te´cnicas de
razonamiento automatizadas para apoyar al disen˜ador en esta importante tarea.”
Entre las preguntas de investigacio´n que se siguieron durante el seminario, nos quedamos
particularmente intrigados, basados nuevamente en nuestra experiencia dentro del proyecto
ActionGUI, por la siguiente:
“Las te´cnicas existentes y herramienta disponibles, esta´n preparadas para ser uti-
lizadas en un entorno industrial?”
La pregunta fue abordada espec´ıficamente por un grupo de trabajo al que se nos invito´ a
unirnos. Este se centro´ en la aplicacio´n pra´ctica de las te´cnicas actuales de razonamiento
sobre el esquema estructural”. Las otras preguntas de investigacio´n discutidas durante el
seminario incluyeron:
“Tiene sentido renunciar a la capacidad de decisio´n para ]manejar todo el poder
expresivo del lenguaje utilizado con y sin restricciones de integridad textual?”
“Cua´l es el estado actual de los logros en lo que concierne aL razonamiento sobre el
comportamiento”
“Cua´les son los nuevos desaf´ıos para el razonamiento automatizado en esquemas
conceptuales?”
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Todas estas cuestiones, pero especialmente la primera, han tenido tambie´n un impacto,
de una manera u otra, en la configuracio´n de nuestra propia agenda de investigacio´n.
Las conclusiones del mencionado grupo de trabajo fueron claras: “todav´ıa hay muchas
cosas por hacer para convencer a la industria sobre la aplicacio´n pra´ctica de las te´cnicas
actuales para el razonamiento sobre esquemas estructurales. (...) Se concluyo´ que tener
herramientas pra´cticas es una condicio´n necesaria para demostrar que todo esto funciona.”
Las conclusiones finalizaron con una visio´n optimista acerca del futuro: “Los promete-
dores resultados alcanzados hasta la fecha y la existencia de varios prototipos que pueden
ser aplicados en la pra´ctica nos permiten ser optimistas sobre la posibilidad de alcanzar
este objetivo tan ambicioso”. Desafortunadamente, esta visio´n ha demostrado hasta ahora
ser demasiado optimista. Como recientemente ha sido reportado [76]: “Aunque existe una
variedad de herramientas para este propo´sito [verificacio´n de modelos], la mayor´ıa son
acade´micas —utilizado como prueba de concepto para la teor´ıa detra´s de ella. (...) En
general estas implementaciones se aplican principalmente a un subconjunto de las tareas
llevadas a cabo de la verificacio´n de modelos. (...) el modelo a verificar debe ser manual-
mente preparado para cada herramienta. (...) el trabajo manual requiere conocimiento
experto y es fuente de errores ”. Por tanto, citegogolla-student continu´a: ”la mayor´ıa
de las herramientas no suelen ser mantenidas ni actualizadas (...) so´lo utilizan estrategias
que resultan en la viabilidad en un nu´mero reducido de clases de problemas (...) esto
puede dejar al usuario con un poco conveniente cadena de herramientas. (...) Adema´s, la
mayor´ıa de las herramientas de verificacio´n sufren ciertas limitaciones, debido a un enfoque
limitado, y versio´n de lenguaje de modelado subyacente desactualizado o simplemente con
errores.” Por u´ltimo, [76] tambie´n informa que “la larga duracio´n del proceso de resolucio´n
sigue siendo un factor limitante en la mayor´ıa de los casos”.
En muchos sentidos, esta tesis doctoral es un intento para tratar, lo mejor posible
y dentro de nuestros limitados recursos, las “cosas que hay que hacer para convencer a
la industria sobre la aplicacio´n pra´ctica de las te´cnicas actuales de razonamiento sobre
esquemas estructurales”, que segu´n el grupo de trabajo del seminario Dagstuhl, incluyen:
Explicaciones:
“Adema´s de poder comprobar estas propiedades, estas herramientas tambie´n deben
explicar los resultados de realizar el razonamiento automatizado sobre esquemas
conceptuales. (...) Las explicaciones deben abstraerse de cualquier lo´gica que se
utilice por debajo y deben darse relacionadas con ell modelo al que el usuario es
referido”.
Puntos de referencia: “Los esta´ndates comparativos son muy importantes para la
industria. Sin embargo, se ha prestado muy poca atencio´n en esta a´rea.”
Escalabilidad : “Hubo un claro acuerdo de que la escalabilidad debe ser necesaria-
mente dirigida a convencer a la industria.”
En este intento, nuestro enfoque ha sido crear herramientas bien fundamentadas y rig-
urosas que: (i) que puede ser utilizado por desarrolladores de software guiado por modelos
(con conocimientos de UML and OCL) , (ii) que pueda integrarse perfectamente con sus
actividades habituales de modelado y entornos, y (iii) que puedan contribuir eficazmente al
desarrollo de modelos de alta calidad. Observemos que: (i) esto descarta, como soluciones
va´lidad en este caso, herramientas que requiriesen , por parte del usuario, el aprendiza-
jelearning de nuevos lenguajes de modelado o un nuevo formalismo lo´gico con el fin de
interactuar con la herramienta. Segundo, (ii) esto descarta tambie´n herramientas que
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requiriesen, por parte del usuario, la construccio´n manual de nuevos artefactos (por ejem-
plo., modelos de entrada, demostraciones, ta´cticas) para interactuar con las herramientas.
Finalmente, (iii) esto descarta tambie´n herramientas que no provean: cobertura universal
de las clases de problemas para los cuales las herramientas esta´n disen˜adas; tiempos de
respuesta ra´pido; y respuestas claras y u´tiles.
De manera ma´s constructiva, en cuanto a los desaf´ıos de explicaciones y escalabilidad
destacados por el grupo de trabajo del seminario Dagstuhl, esta tesis doctoral propor-
ciona herramientas que cubren una clase muy amplia de los problemas para los que fueron
disen˜ados. El mayor reto aqu´ı fue definir una herramienta de razonamiento automati-
zado basada en SMT que pudiera manejar la lo´gica OCL de 4 valores. En segundo lugar,
provee herramientas con tiempo de respuesta ra´pidos. El reto aqu´ı fue comprender sufi-
cientemente bien la heur´ıstica de los diferentes SMT solvers para definir una traduccio´n
de OCL a lo´gica de primer orden que pudiese beneficiarse lo ma´ximo posible, en te´rminos
de tiempo de respuesta, de las heur´ısticas implementadas en cada resolutor. En tercer
lugar, era proporcionar herramientas con respuestas claras y u´tiles para los usuarios. El
reto aqu´ı fue entender suficientemente bien la capacidad de encontrar modelos finitos en
los diferentes resolutores SMT para definir una traduccio´n de OCL a lo´gica de primer
orden que nos permitiese utilizar estas capacidades al razonar sobre modelos, evitando
as´ı respuestas inu´tiles del tipo ”desconocido” por parte de los SMT solvers. Por u´ltimo,
en cuanto al desaf´ıo de los puntos de referencia, esta tesis doctoral evalu´a las herramien-
tas anteriormente citadas con diferentes puntos de referencia, utilizando siempre que sea
posible puntos de referencia existentes, y creando nuevos cuando no estaban disponibles.
xviii
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Model building is at the heart of system design. This is true in many engineering
disciplines and is increasingly the case in software engineering. Model Driven Architec-
ture (MDA) is a methodology for software development. It supports the development of
complex software systems by generating software from models.
Software modeling has traditionally been synonymous with producing diagrams, con-
sisting of “arrows and bubbles” with some explanatory text. But a diagram simply can
not express the statements that should be part of a detailed specification. To provide
the Unified Modeling Language (UML) —the ‘de facto’ industrial standard for software
and system modeling— with the level of conciseness and expressiveness that are needed
for certain aspects of system design, the UML language was extended with the Object
Constraint Language (OCL).
Experience shows that even when using powerful, high-level modeling languages, like
UML/OCL, it is easy to make logical errors and omissions. It is then critical not only
that the modeling language has a well-defined semantics, so one can know what one is
doing, but also that there is tool support for analyzing the modeled systems’ properties.
Within the MDA methodology, if the models do not properly specify the system’s intended
behavior, one should not expect the generated system to do so either.
Our research focuses on providing tool support for building complex system following
the MDA methodology. In this line, the doctoral dissertation presented here provides
two novel mappings for dealing with UML models (or UML-like models) that use OCL.
Moreover, it discusses the applicability and benefits of these mappings with a number
of non-trivial benchmarks and case studies. In a nutshell, the first mapping is a code-
generator from OCL queries to the procedural language extensions of SQL (SQL-PL),
which generates code that can be e ciently executed in the target language. The second
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Figure 1.1: MDA: Models and languages
mapping is a translation from OCL constraints to many-sorted first-order logic, which
generates theories whose satisfiability can be e ciently checked using Satisfiability Module
Theories (SMT) solvers.
Next we provide the background and discuss the outline for this doctoral dissertion.
1.1 Model Driven Architecture (MDA)
Model Driven Architecture (MDA) [66] is a methodology for software development,
defined by the Object Management Group (OMG) [71]. The key to MDA is the importance
given to models in software development. MDA supports the development of complex
software systems by generating software from models.
The MDA specification [66, Chapter 2] defines a model of a system as:
A description or specification of both the system and its environment,
in a well-defined language (graphic and/or textual),
for a particular purpose.
Figure 1.1 describes the relationship between a model, the system that it describes,
and the language in which this model is written. For MDA, the software development
process consists, ultimately, in the successive transformation of models until reaching the
final product. Traditionally, this process distinguishes between PIM and PSM models:
A PIM is an independent platform model: that is, it is a model that describes a
system without reference to a final concrete platform for its deployment or implan-
tation.
A PSM is a platform-specific model: that is, it is a model that describes a system
taking into account its concrete final platform of deployment or implantation.
As in the case of models, MDA transformations between models are also written in a
well-defined language, typically supported by transformation tools. Figure 1.2 describes
the general process of model transformation in this methodology.
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Figure 1.2: Overview of the basic structure of MDA
1.2 Unified Modeling Language (UML)
The Unified Modeling Language (UML) [67] is a visual, general-purpose language for
specifying, constructing, and documenting a system’s models. UML o↵ers di↵erent types
of diagrams to model di↵erent aspects or views of a system. Here we will only deal with
two types of UML diagrams, namely: class diagrams, to specify data models, and object
diagrams to specify object models.
1.2.1 Data models
Data models are used to model the structural view of a system. This view is static,
that is, it does not describe the behavior of the system. A data model is composed of:
Classes. They are used to model the objects having the same properties, relations
and methods. Objects belonging to a class are caller their instances.
Attributes. They are used to model the structural properties of the objects of
a class. Each attribute has a name and a type, which specifies the domain of the
attribute values.
Associations. They are used to model the structural relationships between classes.
Each connection of an association is called an association-end.
Multiplicities. They are used to indicate how many instances of the class connected
to an association-end can be related to an instance of the class connected to the other
end of the association. In particular, multiplicity * means 0 or more instances; this
is the default multiplicity for an association-end. Multiplicities can also be defined
by intervals.
Generalizations. They are used to model a taxonomic relationship between two
classes. A generalization specializes one general class in a more specific one. Each
instance of the specific class is also an instance of the general class. Thus, it has the
characteristics of the general class in addition to those of its own class.
More formally,
Definition 1 A data model D is a tuple hC,CH ,AT ,AS ,ASO ,MU i such that:
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C is a set of class identifiers.
CH is a binary relation, CH ✓ C ⇥ C, where (c, c0) 2 CH represents that c is a
subclass of c0, also denoted as c   c0.
AT is a set of triples hat , c, ti, also denoted as at (c,t), where at is an attribute
identifier, c 2 C, t 2 C [ {Integer, String, Real}, and c and t are, respectively, the
class and the type of the attribute at.
AS is a set of tuples has, c, c0i, also denoted as as(c,c0), where as is an association-end
identifier, c, c0 2 C, and c and c0 are, respectively, the source and the target classes
of as.
ASO is a symmetric relation, ASO ✓ AS ⇥ AS, where (as(c,c0), as 0(c0,c)) 2 ASO
represents that as 0 is the association-end opposite to as, and vice versa.
MU is a set of tuples has(c,c0),mui, where as(c,c0) 2 AS, and mu 2 {0..1, ⇤} repre-
sents the multiplicity of the association-end as(c,c0).
We assume that data models satisfy the following properties: there is no class whose
identifier is Integer or String; attributes and associations-ends have di↵erent identifiers;
there are no cycles in the class hierarchy; and association-ends are related with exactly
another association-end and with exactly one multiplicity.
1.2.2 Object models
An object model specifies the state of a system at a particular time. The object models
are mainly used for the analysis and validation of the corresponding data model.
An object model is composed of:
Objects. They are instances of classes. They can have values assigned to their
attributes (both their own and ”inherited”).
Links. They are instances of associations between classes.
More formally,
Definition 2 Let D be a data model hC,CH ,AT ,AS ,ASO ,MU i. Then, a D-object
model is a tuple hO,VA,LK i, such that:
O is a set of pairs ho, ci, where o is an object identifier and c 2 C. Each pair ho, ci,
also represented as oc, denotes that the object o is of the class c.
VA is a set of triples hoc, at (c,t), vai, where at (c,t) 2 AT, oc 2 O, t 2 C[{Integer,Real,
String}, and va is a value of type t. Each triple hoc, at (c,t), vai denotes that va is the
value of the attribute at of the object o.
LK is a set of triples hoc, as(c,c0), o0c0i, where as(c,c0) 2 AS, and oc, o0c0 2 O. Each
tuple hoc, as(c,c0), o0c0i denotes that the object o0 is among the objects that are linked
to the object o through the association-end as.
Let D be a data model. In what follows, we denote by JDK the set of all instances of
D, i.e., the set of all the objects models of D.
To provide UML with the level of conciseness and expressiveness that are needed for
certain aspects of system design, the standard was extended with the specification of the
Object Constraint Language (OCL).
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1.3 Object Constraint Language (OCL)
Object Constraint Language (OCL) [68] is a textual language with a notational style
similar to that of object-oriented languages. In UML 1.1, OCL appears as the standard for
specifying invariants, preconditions, and postconditions. However, as of UML 2.0 the use
assigned to OCL is much broader: currently, OCL is used, for example, in the definition of
specific domain metamodels, model transformations, and testing and validation models.
OCL is a pure specification language: when an expression is evaluated, it simply re-
turns a value without changing anything in the model. It is also a contextualized language:
its expressions are written in a context provided by a (data) model, called the contextual
model. Finally, OCL is a strongly typed language. Every OCL expression has an associ-
ated type that describes the domain of the result of that expression. OCL types can be
organized into the following categories:
Primitive types. They are the basic types Integer, Real, String, Boolean.
Class types. They are the classes of the contextual model.
Types collection. They are the parametrized types Set, Bag, OrderedSet and
Sequence. Its parameters can be any other type, including collection types.
Special types. They are Invalid, Void and Any types. Invalid conforms to all types
except Void: the only instance of type Invalid is the value oclInvalid. Void represents
a type that conforms to all types: the only instance of Void is undefined (or null).
Any is the type that all other types make up.
OCL provides two constants, null and invalid, to represent undefinedness. Intuitively,
null represents an unknown or undefined value, whereas invalid represents an error or
exception. It also provides predefined operations on its di↵erent types. In particular,
OCL includes operations to manipulate collections, to check properties and to generate
new collections from existing collections.
Let exp be an OCL expression and I be an D-object model. In what follows, we denote
by JexprKI the result of evaluating expr in I. Also, let   be a set of data invariants over
D. Then, we denote by JD, K ✓ JDK the set of all the valid instances of D with respect
to  . More formally,
JD, K = {I 2 JDK | J KI = true, for every   2  }.
1.4 Outline
Chapter 2. We introduce a mapping from OCL to stored procedural SQL. In Section 2.1
we explain the basics about the target language of our mapping, namely, SQL and its
procedural language extension. In Section 2.2, we provide the definitions of the mappping
from OCL to SQL expressions and explain the architecture of the SQL-PL4OCL tool and
how syntactic variations among the DBMS are tackled. Finally, in Section 2.3 we introduce
a benchmark with the running-times obtained from evaluating examples on the di↵erent
engines, and we draw conclusions.
Chapter 3. We introduce a mapping from OCL to Many-Sorted First Order Logic. In
Section 3.1 we introduce our mapping from UML class diagrams and OCL constraints to
MSFOL theories. Also, we discuss how to check the satisfiability of OCL constraints using
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SMT solvers, present a tool, called OC2MSFOL, that supports our methodology, and
provide a preliminary benchmark. Finally, in Section 3.2 we use an existing benchmark to
assess OCL2MSFOL and to compare it with other tools for verifying UML/OCL models,
and we draw conclusions.
Chapter 4. We propose a set of application domains. In Section 4.1 we check model
satisfiability in an eHealth record management system, while in Section 4.2 we validate
and instantiate a Core Security Metamodel. In Section 4.3 we analyze security models
and, in Section 4.4, privacy models. In the first case we analyze fine-grained access control
policies and, in the second, we analyze Facebook posting and tagging privacy policies.
Finally, in Section 4.5 we check data invariants preservation, for which we introduce the
notions of sequences of states and sequences of data actions.
Chapter 5. We discuss the related work. In Section 5.1 we discuss related work related
to OCL as a query language while in Section 5.2 we discuss related work for OCL as a
constraint language.
Chapter 6. We draw conclusions and discuss future work.
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2.1 Procedural extensions of SQL
The Structured Query Language (SQL) is a special-purpose programming language
designed for managing data in relational database management systems (RDBMS). Orig-
inally based upon relational algebra and tuple relational calculus, its scope includes data
insert, query, update and delete, schema creation and modification, and data access con-
trol. Accordingly, SQL commands can be divided into two: the Data Definition Language
(DDL) that contains the commands used to create and destroy databases and database
objects; and the Data Manipulation Language (DML) that can be used to insert, delete,
retrieve and modify the data stored in databases.
Procedural extensions Although SQL is to a great extent a declarative language, it
also includes procedural elements. In particular, the procedural extensions to SQL support
stored procedures which are routines (like a subprogram in a regular computing language)
that are stored in the database.
Currently, SQL corresponds to an ISO standard [37]. However, issues of SQL code
portability between major RDBMS products still exist due to lack of full compliance with,
or di↵erent interpretations of, the standard. Among the reasons mentioned are the large
size and incomplete specification of the standard, as well as vendor lock-in. For our current
purposes, we use as target language a procedural extension of SQL originally developed
by Oracle Corporation in the early 90’s, but later adopted by other RDBMS with di↵erent
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realizations: PL/pgSQL in PostgreSQL, stored procedures in MySQL and MariaDB, or
TransactSQL (T-SQL) in SQL Server.
Stored procedures Stored procedures provide a special syntax for local variables, error
handling, loop control, if-conditions and cursors, and flow control which allow the definition
of iterative structures. Within stored programs, begin-end blocks are used to enclose
multiple SQL statements, namely, to write compound statements. A block consists of
various types of declarations (e.g., variables, cursors, handlers) and program code (e.g.,
assignments, conditional statements, loops). The order in which these can occur in a
routine body is the following:
variable and condition declarations;
cursor declarations;
handler declarations;
program code.
2.2 From OCL to SQL-PL
SQL is an ISO standard [37]. However, SQL full standard is divided into several parts
dealing with di↵erent aspects of the language or its processing. Also, di↵erent RDBMS
implement certain syntactic variations to the standard SQL notation. Therefore, we had
to adapt the implementation of our mapping to each of them. As implementation targets
we selected MariaDB [58], PostgreSQL [75], and MS SQL Server [60]. Also, we kept
MySQL [61] which was our first target. MariaDB and PostgreSQL were selected because
they are open source and widely used by developers. MS SQL server was selected to be
able to compare evaluation time from open source to commercial RDBMS. Yet, it is in
our road-map to implement our mapping into other commercial engines like Oracle 12c or
the Adaptive Server Enterprise/Anywhere RDBMS by Sybase, among others. Our code
generator is defined recursively over the structure of OCL expressions and it is implemented
in the SQL-PL4OCL tool that is publicly available at [28].
The seminal work of the mapping presented here can be found in [34, 25]. The key
idea that enables the mapping from OCL iterator expressions to iterative stored procedures
remains the same, but the work detailed in this chapter introduces a novel mapping from
OCL expressions to SQL-PL stored procedures. The most remarkable di↵erences are the
following:
i. Each OCL expression, both non-iterator and (nested) iterator expression, is mapped
into just one stored procedure.
ii. The evaluation of the source OCL expression once mapped is retrieved by executing
exactly one call-statement. This call-statement provokes the execution of the pro-
cedure and, in particular, the execution of an SQL query written in the last part
of the outermost block of the procedure that retrieves the evaluation of the OCL
expression.
iii. We use temporary tables for intermediate and final values’ storage. Final values’
tables hold the resulting value of a query execution.
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iv. We have adapted our mapping to deal with the three-valued semantics of OCL.
Decisions (i) and (ii) have facilitated the recursive definition of the code generator and
simplifies its definition. Decision (iii) has significantly decreased the time required for the
evaluation of the code generated. Feature (iv) enables to deal properly with the three-
valued evaluation semantics of OCL. In addition, our original work and implementation
was intended only for the procedural extension of MySQL, while our new definition eased
the implementation of the mapping into other relational database management systems.
In turn, we can now evaluate the resulting code using di↵erent RDBMS, which permits
us to widen our discussion regarding e ciency in terms of evaluation-time of the code
produced by SQL-PL4OCL tool.
2.2.1 Mapping data models
We will introduce first how we map OCL types to SQL-PL types. Second, we will
detail the definition of our code generator.
OCL and SQL type systems
OCL is a contextual language which takes syntactic constructs from its contextual
model. But, independently of the contextual model, the OCL type system contains the
primitive types Boolean, Integer, Real and String. Our code generator maps these types
to the following SQL types: Boolean, Int, Real, and Varchar(250), respectively. When
the contextual model for the OCL expressions is a structural model, like our data model,
the OCL type system also contains one class type for each class specified in the class
diagram.
Collection types are also present in OCL, for instance, Set, Bag, OrderedSet, and
Sequence that may take as a parameter a primitive type, or a class type, e.g., Set(Integer).
These types do not have a direct mapping to SQL since SQL type system does not have
collection types. However, the result of an OCL query may be a collection of elements, and
the execution of the code generated in SQL to translate this OCL query will also return
a collection of elements. Collection of collections are also possible in OCL. These are
collection types taking as parameter another collection type, for example, Bag(Set(Car)).
We decided not to map collection of collections to SQL since the complexity added to our
code generator would increase substantially. Also, we doubt about their utility since they
are not commonly used by designers or developers. Like collection types, OCL tuple types
cannot be mapped to SQL types, however, we could implement the evaluation semantics of
OCL tuples by expanding the strategy that we will apply for sequence types. Namely, we
could perform the evaluation of each of the n-tuples separately and ensure the allocation
of each tuple evaluation result in a di↵erent table’s column. Yet, we leave this discussion
out of the scope of this work. Last but not least, the OCL special types, i.e., Invalid, Void,
and Any do not have a counterpart in SQL either. Yet, the null value which is the unique
value of the Void type, is mapped to the null value of SQL.
A running example
Let us now introduce a Car-Company model that we will use as our guiding example.
The Car-Company model shown in Figure 3 is a data model that contains five classes:
the class Car, the class Company, the class Person, and two subclasses of the latter:
Employees and Customer, which are used, respectively, to distinguish among employees
and customers of the company. The class Company has an association, people, to the
10 Chapter 2. Mapping OCL as a query language
Figure 2.1: Car-Company: A data model for a car company
class Person to indicate that objects of type Company are related to objects of type
Person. The classes Car and Person are related by an association to reflect that cars sold
by the company may be owned by people, either customers or employees, who may also
buy a car. The association is called ownership, and its association ends are, respectively,
ownedCars and owner. The class Company has the attribute name of type String. The
class Car has the attributes model, and color of type String, and the attribute price, of
type Real. The class Person has the attributes name, surname, of type String, and age,
of type Int. The class Customer inherits the attributes specified in the class Person. In
addition to the attributes inherited from the class Person, the class Employee has the
attribute salary of type Real.
Mapping data models and object models
Our code generator maps the underlying data and object models (i.e., the ‘context’
and the evaluation scenario of the OCL queries) to SQL-PL tables and records (resp.)
following the next rules. Let D = hC,CH ,AT ,AS ,ASO ,MU i be a data model and let O
be a object D-object model. Then,
Classes. Each class c in C is mapped to a table nm(c)1, which contains, by default,
a column pk of type Int as its primary key. Then, each object o in O of class type
c is represented by a row in table nm(c) and is identified by a unique value placed
automatically in the column pk (> 0 and not null). This value is also automatically
incremented (+1) each time a new row is inserted.
Class attribute. Each attribute hat , c, ti 2 AT is mapped to a column nm(at)
of table nm(c), being the type t, according to the rules for mapping types that we
introduced at the beginning of this section. Then, the value of at for an object o,
instance of class c, is mapped to the value held by the column nm(at) for the record
that is identified by the pk value assigned to o in table nm(c).
Association. Each association has, c, c0i 2 AS is mapped to a junction table
nm(as), which contains two columns nm(rl c) and nm(rl c0), both of type Int.
Then, each link ho, as, o0i 2 LK is represented by a row in table nm(as), where
nm(rl c) holds the key denoting o and nm(rl c0) holds the key denoting o0 as for-
eign keys’ references.
1nm() generates unique names for classes, attributes, and associations.
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For one-to-many associations, we add a foreign key column on the table correspond-
ing to the class in the many-side of the relationship. This column holds the key
value referencing the object linked in the one-side of the association.
Inheritance. Each class c, subclass of a class c0, is mapped to a table nm(c)
together with its direct (i.e., not inherited) attributes and associations following the
definitions described above. But, in addition, a foreign key column, fk, is added to
nm(c) referencing the primary key column of the table nm(c0) that maps class c0.
Although it is not completely obvious, this definition is controlling how tables which
correspond to classes related by inheritance are populated. We avoid discussing
it further here since it would add a complexity that is not of direct value to the
presentation of our code generator. Yet, we provide examples next that will help to
understand the rationale behind our definition. The interested reader can find the
details in [25].
Mapping our running example
From now on we will choose MariaDB (fully compatible with MySQL) syntax to illus-
trate the code generated by our mapping, both for the definitions and the examples.
The command that is automatically generated to map the class Person to a SQL table
is:
create table Person (
pk int not null primary key auto increment,
name varchar(250),
surname varchar(250),
age int);
Similarly, the classes Car and Company are mapped to tables.
The command that is automatically generated to map the class Employee to a SQL
table is:
create table Employee (
pk int not null primary key auto increment,
salary int,
fkPerson int,
foreign key (fkPerson) references Person(pk));
Similarly, the class Customer is mapped to a table.
The command that is automatically generated to map the association ownership to a
SQL table is:
create table ownership (
owner int,
ownedCars int,
foreign key (owner) references Person(pk),
foreign key (ownedCar) references Car(pk));
Similarly, the association people is mapped to a table.
Please, notice that in the structure of the tables that we create for the subclasses
Employee (and Customer), the subclasses hold an additional column fkPerson as a foreign
key to the primary key of the table Person that corresponds to their parent class.
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(a)
pk model
(b)
Figure 2.2: (a) Simple Car company model. (b) Car company table.
2.2.2 Mapping OCL expressions
In what follow, we briefly introduce the novel structure of the code produced by our
SQL-PL generator for OCL expressions. This section is intended to help the understanding
of our mapping definition in the following section. For any input OCL expression, our code
generator always produces a stored procedure that can be invoked using a call statement,
as we explain next.
Given an OCL expression exp, our code generator patternproc(exp) generates the fol-
lowing pattern.
1create procedure nm(exp)()
2begin
3codegenb(exp)
4codegenq(exp);
5end;//
6call nm(exp)//
The generated code contains the declaration of the stored procedure (lines 2-5), headed
by its creation command and name (line 1). The main block is enclosed by the delimiters
begin-end. The code contained by the main block is generated by the auxiliary functions
codegenb(exp) and codegenq(exp) (lines 3-4). These functions generate code that mirrors
the structure of the OCL expressions. Finally, the function patternproc(exp) also generates
a call-statement to execute the stored procedure (line 6).2
In what follow, we will explain two kind of expressions: Simple and Complex. Simple
expressions are the expressions that does not need any auxiliary block definition within
the stored procedure to be mapped. While complex expressions need an auxiliary block
definition within the stored procedure to be mapped.
In particular, begin-end blocks have the features that are particularly useful for our
work:
begin-end blocks can be nested;
variables declared in outer begin-end blocks are visible in the inner blocks at any
level of depth.
Both of these features are crucial in our mapping to easily and recursively map OCL
expressions that contain nested operators expressions. Figure 2.3 gives an idea of the
structure that nested blocks adopt within stored procedures. Another case is OCL se-
quential operators; in such case, these are mapped into sequential blocks. Figure 2.4 gives
an idea of the structure that sequential blocks adopt within stored procedures. Further-
more, we can have a combination of sequential and nested operators, in that case, the
stored procedure will have a combination of sequential and nested blocks. Finally, to
invoke a stored procedure, we use the call statement; i.e. the routines showed in the
Figure 2.3 or Figure 2.4, are invoked by the following statement:
2Please, note that our delimiter in SQL-PL is set to ‘//’.
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call program name
Simple expressions. In this case, the function codegenb(exp) does not generate any
code. Examples of this kind of expressions are operators over classes, operators between
sets or bags, math operators, etc.
Example 1 The code generated by patternproc(exp) for the expression exp = Car.allInstan-
ces() is:
create procedure carallinstances()
begin
codegenq(exp);
end;//
call carallinstances//
Where codegenq(exp) generates the following specific code:
select Car.pk as val from Car
Note that when the stored procedure is executed, the result is a table containing a column
called val, which holds all the values of the column pk (primary key) from the records of
table Car. ut
Example 2 Consider now the expression exp = Car.allInstances().model. The code gen-
erated by patternproc(exp) is:
create procedure modelallinstances()
begin
codegenq(exp);
end;//
call modelallinstances//
Where codegenq(exp) generates the following specific code:
select Car.model as val
from (select pk as val from Car) as t0
left join Car on Car.pk = t0.val
create procedure program name()
begin
begin
begin
...
end;
end;
...
end;
Figure 2.3: Nested blocks structure in Stored Procedures
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Note that when the stored procedure is executed, the result is a table containing a
column called val, which holds all values of the column model from the records of the Car
table. ut
Example 3 Consider the following OCL expression exp, exp = exp1 >notEmpty(), where
exp1 is an expression which does not contain any operator subexpression that requires a
block definition, then patternproc(exp) generates the following code:
create procedure exp1notEmpty()
begin
select count(*) > 0 as val from (codegenq(exp1 )) as t1;
end;//
call exp1notEmpty//
ut
In what follows, we will see how our code generator can recursively deal with the
recursive structure of OCL expressions.
Complex expressions. For the other cases which the function codegenb(exp) does gen-
erate code because mapping a given expression, exp, needs of an auxiliary block definition.
This auxiliary block is required either for the expression to be properly mapped or because
we have noticed that it brings e ciency to the execution. For example, in some cases we
noticed that executing a given sequence of operations within a block required less time
than executing a given SQL query, and we tailored our mapping accordingly. We consider
occurrences of complex expressions to operators over sequences, iterators, etc. Next, we
sketch the idea of our mapping in these cases and provide examples.
Sequence Operators. Let exp be a sequence expression. Let the shape of this
expression be op(exp1 , . . . , expn) and consider that the subexpressions exp1 ,. . . ,expn need
to be mapped into blocks too. Then, codegenb(exp) generates the SQL-PL blocks:
begin
codegenb(exp1 )
. . .
codegenb(expn)
create procedure program name()
begin
begin
...
end;
...
begin
...
end;
...
end;
Figure 2.4: Sequential blocks structure in Stored Procedures
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drop table if exists nm(codegenb(exp));
create temporary table nm(codegenb(exp))
(pos int not null auto increment, val basictype(exp), primary key(pos));
insert into nm(codegenb(exp))(val) (codegenq(exp1 ));
. . .
insert into nm(codegenb(exp))(val) (codegenq(expn));
end;
while, codegenq(exp) generates:
select * from nm(codegenb(exp));
Note that basictype(tp) is the SQL type associated to the UML type tp.
Example 4 Consider now the expression exp = ’hi’.characters().union(’ho’.characters()).
Then, the code generated by patternproc(exp) is:
create procedure unionLits()
begin
codegenb(exp)
codegenq(exp);
end;//
call unionLits//
Where codegenb(exp) generates the following specific code:
begin
   sub block ’hi’.sequence()
begin
drop table if exists wchars;
create temporary table wchars
(pos int not null auto increment, val varchar(250), primary key(pos));
insert into wchars(val) (select ’h’ as val);
insert into wchars(val) (select ’i’ as val);
end;
   sub block ’ho’.sequence()
begin
drop table if exists w1chars;
create temporary table w1chars
(pos int not null auto increment, val varchar(250), primary key(pos));
insert into w1chars(val) (select ’h’ as val);
insert into w1chars(val) (select ’o’ as val);
end;
   code for operator union
drop table if exists unionLits;
create temporary table unionLits(val varchar(250));
insert into unionLits(val)
(select wchars.val as val from wchars as t1 order by wchars.pos asc);
insert into unionLits(val)
(select w1chars.val as val from w1chars as t2 order by w1chars.pos asc);
end;
While codegenq(exp) generates the following specific code:
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select * from unionLits
ut
Note that when a stored procedure is executed to evaluate an expression of Sequence
type, the result is stored in a table containing two columns called pos and val, which
holds all values (in the column val) ordered by the position given in the column pos.
Iterator expressions. These expressions are of the form src >iterOp(v |body) whose
top-operator is an iterator operator.3 For each iterator expression exp, our code generator
produces a stored procedure composed of an iterative block and a query following the
structure introduced at the beginning of the section.
When the stored procedure is called, it
1. creates a temporary table;
2. executes, for each element in the src-collection that is instantiating the iterator
variable v the body of the iterator expression;
3. processes and stores in the temporary table, created in Step 1, the result of the query
codegenq(body), according to the semantics of the iterator operator.
The function codegenq(exp) generates a query that retrieves the values corresponding
to the evaluation of exp from the table that has been created and filled in during the
execution of the iterative block of the stored procedure. Finally, as we shown before,
the function patternproc(exp) also generates a call-statement to actually execute the
procedure patternproc(exp).
Example 5 Iterator expressions. Consider the expression exp = Car.allInstances() >se-
lect(u|u.model=’BMW’). The code generated by patternproc(exp) is:
create procedure selectproc()
begin
codegenb(exp)
codegenq(exp);
end;//
call selectproc//
Where codegenb(exp), generates the following specific code:
begin
2declare done int default 0;
declare var int;
4declare crs cursor for (select pk as val from Car);
declare continue handler for sqlstate ’02000’ set done = 1;
6drop table if exists selectproc;
create temporary table selectproc(val int);
8open crs;
repeat
3For the sake of simplicity, we will consider here that the top-operator of src is a simple expression.
The case when the iterator expressions are nested deserve, however, a particular attention.
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10fetch crs into var;
if not done then
12if exists
(select True from
14(select model = ’BMW’ as val
from Car where pk = var) as t1) as t2
16then
insert into selectproc(val) values (var);
18end if;
until done end repeat;
20close crs;
end;
The definition of the block (line 1-21) contains the following declarations: first some
variables are declared (lines 2-5); following Step 1, a new temporary table is created (note
that it is deleted if it exists) (lines 6-7); following Step 2, for each element of the source
(lines 9-10), the value of the result of the execution of the body is calculated; however,
following Step 3, this value is only inserted into the new table (line 17) if the condition of
the body is satisfied (lines 11-20), according to the semantics of the iterator operation.
Finally, codegenq(exp) generates the following specific code:
select val from selectproc
Note that, as it happened for Example 1, the result of the execution of the stored
procedure is a table containing a column called val, which holds all records of the table
Car whose model is ’BMW’. ut
To conclude, let us say that the potential complexity of the OCL expression is mirrored
within the stored procedure by using the function codegenb(exp). Within such procedure,
the general idea that drives the mapping of OCL complex expressions is that OCL sequen-
tial operators are mapped to sequential blocks, and OCL nested operators are mapped to
nested blocks. In addition, there will always be an outermost begin-end enclosing block
that contains the query to retrieve the evaluation result when the procedure is invoked.
Scope
We do not cover yet completely the whole OCL language. However, we cover most of
the operators listed in the OCL standard library [68, Chapter 11]. More concretely, we
cover operators on primitive types String, Boolean, Integer and Real; operators on Set,
Bag and Sequence types; and all iterator operators except orderBy and closure. Last but
not least, we do cover nested iterator expressions, i.e., iterator expressions whose body also
contains iterator expressions, for example, Person.allInstances() >forAll(p|Car.allInstan-
ces() >exists(c|p.ownedCars >includes(c))). We will deal in detail with this type of
expression in the following section. Yet, we do not support tuples or nested collections.
Finally, we neither support static collections of AnyType, and we have to refer the null
value explicitly, i.e. null::String.
In the following two subsections, we take advantage of the explanation about the
structure of the code generated in this subsection that will allow the reader to understand
more easily the definition of our mapping. Below, we provide the mapping definition for
those operations from the OCL standard library [68, Chapter 11] that we have considered
more illustrative. The exhaustive definition of the mapping for all the operations of the
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OCL standard library is provided in [28]. We start each definition with the name of the
operator, followed by a brief description of its semantics, and the definition of its mapping.
Mapping simple OCL expressions
In this section we show how we define our mapping for simple expressions. Recall
from the previous section that these are expressions for which the top operator is mapped
directly to a SQL query without the need of declaring auxiliary SQL-PL blocks. Fall
within this category model specific operators, boolean, numeric, and collection operators
for sets and bags.
Model specific operators There are operations in OCL that the language ‘borrows’
from the contextual model. These operations vary when the contextual model changes
and they refer to association ends, classes’ attributes and classes’ identifiers.
In the following, we consider exp1 to be an OCL expression of type class, or (not ordered)
set or bag.
allInstances(). It returns all the instances of the class that it receives as argument. Let
exp be an expression of the form C .allInstances(), where C is a class of the contextual
model. Then, codegenq(exp) is the following SQL query:
select nm(C ).pk as val from nm(C )
Attribute Expression. It retrieves an attribute’s values of the instances returned by the
source expression.
Let exp be an expression of the form exp1 .attr where attr is an attribute of a class A.
Then, codegenq(exp) is the following SQL query:
select nm(A).nm(attr) as val
from (codegenq(exp1 )) as al(codegenq(exp1 ))
left join nm(A) on al(codegenq(exp1 )).val = nm(A).pk
Note that al() generates a unique alias names for tables.
Association-End Expression. It retrieves the instances linked to the objects returned by
the source expression through the association end.
Let exp be an expression of the form exp1.rl A (resp. exp1.rl B), where rl A (resp.
rl B) is the A-end (resp. B-end) of an association as between two classes A and B. Then,
codegenq(exp) is the following SQL query:
select nm(at).nm(rl A) as val
from (codegenq(exp1 )) as al(codegenq(exp1 ))
left join nm(as) on al(codegenq(exp1 )).val = nm(as).nm(rl B)
where nm(as).nm(rl A) is not null
In all cases previously described, the top expression exp does not require any block
definition. Thus codegenb(exp) consists only of the blocks that might be required by its
subexpression:
codegenb(exp1 )
Example 6 Model specific operators The following examples do only generate SQL queries.
None of them need blocks for their definition, i.e., codegenb(exp) is empty in all cases.
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Q1. Query the ages of all employees. Employee.allInstances().age
select Person.age as val
from (
select fkEmployee as val
from (select pk as val from Employee) as t0
left join Employee on t0.val = Employee.pk) as t1
left join Person on t1.val = Person.pk
Notice that since Employee is a subclass of Person that inherits from it the attribute
age, we recover with the SQL query the column age of the table Person, but only for the
rows contained by the table Employee. This is enforced by the left join used to align the
foreign keys contained by the table Employee with the keys contained by the table Person.
Q2. Query the cars owned by all persons. Person.allInstances().ownedCars
select ownership.ownedCars as val
from (select pk as val from Person) as t0
left join ownership on t0.val = ownership.owner
where ownership.ownedCars is not null
ut
Boolean Operators In all cases described below, the top expression exp does not re-
quire any block definition. Thus codegenb(exp) consists only of the blocks that might be
required by its sub-expression:
codegenb(exp1 )
isEmpty(). It returns ‘true’ if the source collection is empty, and ‘false’ otherwise. Let exp
be an expression of the form exp1 >isEmpty(). Then, codegenq(exp) is the following SQL
query:
select count(*) = 0 as val
from (codegenq(exp1 )) as al(codegenq(exp1 ))
The operator isEmpty does not require any block definition, thus codegenb(exp) is com-
posed by the blocks of its subexpression (if any):
codegenb(exp1 )
For the operator notEmpty, ‘>’ replaces ‘=’ in the above SQL query.
includes. It returns ‘true’ if the source collection exp1 contains the element exp.
Let exp be an expression of the form exp1 >includes(exp2 ). Then, codegenq(exp) is
the following SQL query:
select codegenq(exp2 ) in codegenq(exp1 ) as val
The operator includes does not require any block definition, thus codegenb(exp) is com-
posed by the blocks of its subexpressions (if any):
codegenb(exp1 )
codegenb(exp2 )
For the operator excludes, ‘not in’ replaces ‘in’ in the above SQL query.
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Example 7 Boolean operators. The following examples only need to generate SQL queries.
None of them require any block definition, i.e., codegenb(exp), in all cases, is empty.
Q3. Query whether there are ‘BMW’ cars in the company.
Car.allInstances().model >includes(‘BMW’)
select (select ’BMW’ as val) in
(select Car.model as val
from (select Car.pk as val from Car) as t0
left join Car on t0.val = Car.pk) as val
ut
Numeric operators Again, for all cases described below, the top expression exp does
not require any block definition. Thus codegenb(exp) consists only of the blocks that might
be required by its sub-expression:
codegenb(exp1 )
size. It returns the size of the source collection. Let exp be an expression of the form
exp1 >size(). Then, codegenq(exp) is the following SQL query:
select count(*) as val
from (codegenq(exp1 )) as al(codegenq(exp1 ))
sum. It returns the sum of the elements in the source collection that must be of numeric
type. Let exp be an expression of the form exp1 >sum(). Then, codegenq(exp) is the
following SQL query:
select sum(*) as val
from (codegenq(exp1 )) as al(codegenq(exp1 ))
Example 8 Numeric operators. The following examples do only generate SQL queries.
None of them need blocks for their definition, i.e., codegenb(exp) is empty in all cases.
Q4. Count the number of customers. Customer.allInstances() >size()
select count(*) as val
from (select Customer.pk as val from Customer) as t0
ut
Collection operators for Set and Bag types asSet. The set containing all the
elements from the source collection, with duplicates removed (if any). Let exp be an
expression of the form exp1 >asSet(). Then, codegenq(exp) is the following SQL query:
select distinct al(codegenq(exp1 )).val as val
from (codegenq(exp1 )) as al(codegenq(exp1 ))
union. It returns the set union (resp. multiset union) of both sets (resp. bags) passed
as arguments to the operation. Let exp be an expression of the form exp1 >union(exp2 ),
where both exp1 and exp2 are sets. Then, codegenq(exp) is the following SQL query:
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select al(codegenq(exp1 )).val
from (codegenq(exp2 ) union codegenq(exp1 )) as al(codegenq(exp1 ))
When exp1 or exp2 are bags, then ‘union all’ will replace ‘union’ in the above SQL
query. The operator including that returns the bag containing all elements of the source
collection exp1 plus the element exp2 passed as argument is mapped exactly as the operator
union is.
excluding. It returns the bag that results from removing the element exp2 from the source
collection exp1 . Let exp be an expression of the form exp1 >excluding(exp2 ). Then,
codegenq(exp) is the following SQL query:
select al(codegenq(exp1 )).val
from (codegenq(exp1 )) as al(codegenq(exp1 ))
where al(codegenq(exp1 )).val not in codegenq(exp2 )
includesAll. It returns ‘true’ if the collection exp1 contains all the elements in the collection
exp2 , and ‘false’ otherwise. Let exp be an expression of the form
exp1 >includesAll(exp2 ). Then, codegenq(exp) is the following SQL query:
select count(al(codegenq(exp2 )).val) = 0 as val
from (codegenq(exp2 )) as al(codegenq(exp2 ))
where al(codegenq(exp2 )).val in (codegenq(exp1 ))
The operator excludesAll returns ‘true’ if the collection exp1 does not contain all the
elements in the collection exp2 , and ‘false’ otherwise. For the operator excludesAll, ‘
not in’ replaces ‘in’ in the above SQL-PL statement.
In all cases previously described, the expression exp does not require any block def-
inition. Thus codegenb(exp) consists only of the blocks that might be required by its
subexpressions:
codegenb(exp1 )
codegenb(exp2 )
Example 9 Collection Operators. The following examples do only generate SQL queries.
None of them need blocks for their definition, i.e., codegenb(exp) is empty in all cases.
Q5. Query the surnames of all customers but those whose surname is ‘Smith’.
Customer.allInstances().surname >excluding(’Smith’)
select t2.val
from
(select Person.surname as val
from
(select fkCustomer as val
from (select pk as val from Customer) as t0
left join Customer on t0.val = Customer.pk) as t1
left join Person on t1.val = Person.pk) as t2
where t2.val not in (select ’Smith’ as val)
ut
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Mapping complex OCL expressions.
In this section we introduce the mapping definition for those top operators whose
definition needs to generate both SQL queries and blocks. Namely, sequence and iterator
operators.
Sequence Operators In OCL there is an operation for building a sequence from a set or
a bag of elements. This operation is asSequence(). Remember that, when we talk about
a sequence in OCL we talk about a collection of elements that are assigned a position in
a list. Sequences allow for duplicated elements.
asSequence(). Let exp be an expression of the form exp1 .asSequence().
Then, codegenb(exp) generates the SQL-PL blocks:
begin
drop table if exists nm(codegenb(exp));
create temporary table nm(codegenb(exp)) (val varchar(250));
insert into nm(codegenb(exp))(val)
select al(codegenq(exp1 )).val as val as
from (codegenq(exp1 )) as al(codegenq(exp1 ));
end;
while, codegenq(exp) generates:
select pos, val from nm(codegenb(exp))
Example 10 Sequence Operators.
Q6. Query the length of a sequence that contains all instances of Person. Person.allInstan-
ces() >asSequence() >size()
begin
drop table if exists personAsSequence;
create temporary table personAsSequence
(pos int not null auto increment, val int, primary key(pos));
insert into personAsSequence(val)
select t0.val as val as from (select pk as val from Person) as t0;
end;
select count(*) as val from (select * from personAsSequence) as t1;
ut
Mapping OCL iterator expressions Since the semantics of each OCL iterator op-
erator can be defined through a mapping from the iterator to the iterate construct, we
could have decided to translate the iterate expressions resulting from those mappings in
order to generate code for the iterator operations like reject, select, forAll, exists, collect,
one, sortedBy, isUnique and any by applying the iterate pattern. In fact, this was the
decision made for the definition of the SQL-PL4OCL code generator in [87], however they
did not succeed in finding a pattern to map the iterate expressions and therefore the itera-
tor expressions were not mapped either. Instead, we decided to generate code specifically
for each iterator operator according to its semantics. In this way, we can generate code
that is less complex and more tailored to the semantics of each iterator operator. Also
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this decision allows us, as we explain below, to end a block at an intermediate iteration
step once the evaluation result of the translated iterator is clear. For instance, when the
execution of the code generated to map the body of a forAll expression returns false at one
iteration step, the procedure is terminated returning false.
The basic idea is therefore that, for each iterator expression exp, our code generator
produces a SQL-PL block that, when it is called creates a temporary table, denoted by
nm(codegenb(exp)), from which we obtain using a simple select-statement the values
corresponding to the evaluation of exp. For now, we assume that the types of the src-
subexpressions are either sets or bags of primitive or class types.
Let exp = src  >iter op(var |body) be an iterator expression. Then, codegenq(exp) is
the following SQL query:
select * from nm(codegenb(exp));
While, codegenb(exp) generates the following scheme of SQL-PL blocks:
codegenb(src)
2begin
declare done int default 0;
4declare var cursor-specific type ;
declare crs cursor for (codegenq(src));
6declare continue handler for sqlstate ’02000’ set done = 1;
drop table if exists nm(codegenb(exp));
8create temporary table nm(codegenb(exp)) (val value-specific type );
Initialization-specific code (only for forAll, one, exists and sortedBy)
10open crs;
repeat
12fetch crs into var;
codegenb(body)
14if not done then
Iterator-specific processing code
16end if;
until done end repeat;
18close crs;
End-specific code (only for isUnique)
20end;
Basically, codegenb(exp) generates a block [lines 2–20] which creates the temporary
table nm(codegenb(exp)) [line 8] and execute, for each element in the src-collection [lines
5,10-12], the body [line 13] of the iterator expression exp. More concretely, until all elements
in the src-collection have been considered, codegenb(exp) repeats the following process:
(i) it instantiates the iterator variable var in the body-subexpression, each time with a
di↵erent element of the src-collection, which it fetches from codegenq(src) using a cursor
[lines 12–14]; and (ii) using the so called “iterator-specific processing code”, it processes in
nm(codegenb(exp)) the result of the query codegenq(body), according to the semantics of
the iterator iter op [line 15]. In addition, in the case of the four iterators: forAll, one, exists
and sortedBy, the table nm(codegenb(exp)) is initialized, using the so called “initialization-
specific code” [line 9], and in the case of the iterator isUnique, an “end-specific code”
is required. Moreover, for the iterators forAll and exists, the process described above
will also be finished when, for any element in the src-collection, the result of the query
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codegenq(body) contains the corresponding value, in the case of the iterator forAll, to False
or, in the case of the iterator exists, to True.
In the remaining of this subsection, we specify, for each case of iterator expression, the
corresponding “value-specific type”, “initialization-specific code”, “iterator-specific pro-
cessing code”, and “end-specific code” produced by our code generator when instantiating
the general schema. Again, for all cases, the “cursor-specific type” is the SQL-PL type
which represents, according to our mapping (see section 2.2.1), the type of the elements
in the src.
forAll-iterator. Let exp be an expression of the form src >forAll(var |body). This op-
eration returns ‘true’ if body is ‘true’ for all elements in the source collection src. The
“holes” in the scheme codegenb(exp) will be filled as follows:
value-specific type: boolean.
Initialization code:
insert into nm(codegenb(exp)) (val) values (True);
Iteration-processing code:
update nm(codegenb(exp)) set val = False
where (codegenq(body)) = False;
if exists
(select True from nm(codegenb(exp)) where val = False)
then set done = 1;
end if;
exists-iterator. Let exp be an expression of the form src >exists(var |body). This
operation returns ‘true’ if body is ‘true’ for at least one element in the source collection
src. The “holes” in the scheme codegenb(exp) will be filled as follows:
value-specific type: boolean.
Initialization code:
insert into nm(codegenb(exp)) (val) values (False);
Iteration-processing code:
update nm(codegenb(exp)) set val = True where (codegenq(body)) = True;
if exists (select True from nm(codegenb(exp)) where val = True)
then set done = 1;
end if;
one-iterator. Let exp be an expression of the form src  >one(var |body). This operation
returns ‘true’ if body is ‘true’ for exactly one element in the source collection src. The
“holes” in the scheme codegenb(exp) will be filled as follows:
value-specific type: boolean.
Initialization code:
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insert into nm(codegenb(exp))(val) values (False);
set @counter = 0;
Iteration-processing code:
if exists
(select nm(codegenb(body)).val
from (codegenq(body)) as nm(codegenb(body))
where nm(codegenb(body)).val = True)
then
set @counter = @counter+1;
update nm(codegenb(exp)) set val = True;
end if;
if @counter = 2 then
update nm(codegenb(exp)) set val = False;
set done = 1;
end if;
sortedBy-iterator. According to [68], it results in the OrderedSet containing all elements
of the source collection ordered in descending order according to the values returned by
the evaluation of the body expression. The order considered is given by the operation <
that should be defined on the type of the body expression. We consider instead the order
given by the operation  in order to be able to include in the resulting ordered set those
elements for which the evaluation of the body returns exactly the same value.
Let exp be an expression of the form src >sortedBy (var |body). This operation returns
the collection of elements in the src expression ordered by the criterion specified by body .
The “holes” in the scheme codegenb(exp) will be filled as follows:
value-specific type: the SQL type which represents, according to our mapping, the
type of the body .
Initialization code:
create temporary table nmseq(codegenb(exp))
(pos int not null auto increment, val value-specific type );
Iteration-processing code:
insert into nm(codegenb(exp))(val) codegenq(body);
insert into nmseq(codegenb(exp))(val)
(select val from nm(codegenb(exp)) order by val desc);
collect-iterator. Let exp be an expression of the form src >collect(var |body). This ex-
pression returns the collection of objects that result from evaluating body for each element
in the source collection src. The “holes” in the scheme codegenb(exp) will be filled as
follows:
value-specific type: the SQL-PL type which represents, according to our mapping,
the type of the body .
Iteration-processing code:
insert into nm(codegenb(exp))(val) codegenq(body);
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select-iterator. Let exp be an expression of the form src >select(var |body). This ex-
pression returns a subcollection of the source collection src containing all elements for
which body evaluates to ‘true’. The “holes” in the scheme codegenb(exp) will be filled as
follows:
value-specific type: the SQL-PL type which represents, according to our mapping,
the type of the elements in the src.
Iteration-processing code:
if exists
(select al(codegenq(body)).val
from (codegenq(body)) as al(codegenq(body))
where al(codegenq(body)).val = True)
then
insert into nm(codegenb(exp))(val) values (var);
end if;
reject-iterator. Let exp be an expression of the form source >reject(var |body). This
expression returns a subcollection of the source collection src containing all elements for
which body evaluates to false. The “holes” in the scheme codegenb(exp) will be filled as
follows:
value-specific type: the SQL-PL type which represents, according to our mapping,
the type of the elements in the src.
Iteration-processing code:
if exists
(select True
from (codegenq(body)) as al(codegenq(body))
where val = False)
then
insert into nm(codegenb(exp))(val) values (var);
end if;
isUnique-iterator. Let exp be an expression of the form source >isUnique(var | body).
This expression returns True if all elements of the collection of objects that result from
evaluating body for each element in the source collection src, are di↵erent. The “holes” in
the scheme codegenb(exp) will be filled as follows:
value-specific type: boolean
Initialization code:
create temporary table nmacc(codegenb(exp)) (val value-specific type );
where value-specific type: the SQL-PL type which represents, according to our map-
ping, the type of the elements in the body .
Iteration-processing code:
insert into nmacc(codegenb(exp))(val) codegenq(body);
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End code:
insert into nm(codegenb(exp))(val)
(select al1(codegenq(exp)).val = al(codegenq(exp)).val
from
(select count(*) as val
from
(select distinct val from nmacc(codegenq(exp))) as al(codegenq(body)))
as al1(codegenq(body)),
(select count(*) as val
from nmacc(codegenb(exp))) as al(codegenq(body));
cl2sql
Example 11 Nested and sequential iterator expressions
Q7. Check whether there is a car owner whose surname is Perez.
Car.allInstances() >select(c|c.owner >exists(p|p.surname=’Perez’))
begin
declare done int default 0;
declare body Boolean default false;
declare var0 int;
declare crs cursor for select pk as val from Car;
declare continue handler for sqlstate ’02000’ set done = 1;
drop table if exists select0;
create temporary table select0(val int);
open crs;
repeat
fetch crs into var0;
begin
declare done int default 0;
declare result boolean default false;
declare tResult int default 0;
declare var01 int;
declare crs cursor for
(select ownership.owner as val
from (select var0 as val) as t0
left join ownership on t0.val = ownership.ownedCars
where ownership.owner is not null);
declare continue handler for sqlstate ’02000’ set done = 1;
drop table if exists exists01;
create temporary table exists01(val int);
open crs;
repeat
fetch crs into var01;
if not done then
select val into tResult
from
(select (select Person.name as val
from (select var01 as val) as t1
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left join Person on t1.val = Person.pk) = (select ’Perez’ as val) as val) as t;
if tResult then
set done = 1;
set result = 1;
end if;
end if;
until done end repeat;
insert into exists01(val) values (result);
close crs;
end;
if not done then
select val into body from (select * from exists01) as t;
if body then
insert into select0(val) values (var0);
end if;
end if;
until done end repeat;
close crs;
end;
select * from select0;
Q8. Check whether exists a person, who owner a car, with surname Perez.
Car.allInstances() >collect(p|p.owner) >exists(q|q.surname=’Perez’)
begin
begin
declare done int default 0;
declare var1 int;
declare crs cursor for select pk as val from Car;
declare continue handler for sqlstate ’02000’ set done = 1;
drop table if exists collect0;
create temporary table collect0(val boolean);
open crs;
repeat
fetch crs into var1;
if not done then
insert into collect0(val)
(select ownership.owner as val
from (select var1 as val) as tbl1
left join ownership on tbl1.val = ownership.ownedCars
where ownership.owner is not null or tbl1.val is null);
end if;
until done end repeat;
close crs;
end;
begin
declare done int default 0 ;
declare result boolean default false;
declare tempResult boolean default false;
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declare var2 int;
declare crs cursor for select val from collect0;
declare continue handler for sqlstate ’02000’ set done = 1;
drop table if exists exists0;
create temporary table exists0(val bool);
open crs;
repeat
fetch crs into var2;
if not done then
select val into tempResult
from
(select tbl5.val = tbl6.val as val
from
(select Person.surname as val
from Person, (select var2 as val) as tbl4
where pk = tbl4.val) as tbl5,
(select ’Perez’ as val) as tbl6) as tbl8;
if tempResult then
set done = 1;
set result = True;
end if;
end if;
until done end repeat;
insert into exists0(val) (select result as val);
close crs;
end;
select val from exists0;
end;
ut
To conclude this section, we would like to remark, some general invariants in our
mappings:
nested operators, which requires blocks definitions, are mapped into nested blocks,
while sequential operators are mapped into sequential blocks.
the results of expressions with simple types and sets are mapped into tables with
a column called val; while expressions with sequence types are mapped into tables
with two columns, one for the values (i.e. val) and the another for the positions
(i.e. pos).
when we talk about iterators, the statement:
declare crs cursor for (codegenq(src));
defined when the src-collection is a set or bag, is changed to:
declare crs cursor for
(select al(codegenq(src)).val
from (codegenq(src))) as al(codegenq(src))
order by al(codegenq(src)).pos;
to deal with src-collection ordered.
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Figure 2.5: SQL-PL4OCL tool component architecture
2.2.3 The SQL-PL4OCL tool
The SQL-PL4OCL tool rewrites the tool introduced in [34] to target not just MySQL
(or MariaDB) but also PostgreSQL and SQL Server DBMS. The new implementation does
not comply to the mapping we introduced in [25, 34] but to the one defined in section
2.2.2.
Essentially, SQL-PL4OCL is a Java Web Application tool that using as input a data
model (as specified in Section 2.2.1), a list of OCL queries, and a vendor identifier, it
generates a set of statements ready to create the database with the tables that correspond
to the data model (following the mapping introduced in Section 2.2.1), and a list of
stored procedures (one per OCL query, following the definition specified in Section 2.2.2).
Figure 2.6 shows two screen-shots of the tool interface. Of course, the resulting code is
produced adapted to the syntax of each target RDBMS. ec Figure 2.5 shows the main
components of the tool architecture. These are:
DM validator: This component checks whether the input data model fulfills the
restrictions about well-formedness that we explain in Section 2.2.1, so as to serve as
a valid context for OCL queries.
OCL validator: This component parses each OCL query of input in the context of
the data model. Only if a query parses correctly (and our mapping covers it), it is
used as input to produce code.
DB engine selector: This component receives as input the vendor identifier so as the
code generated is syntactically adapted to the selected RDBMS.
DB model generator: This component generates the engine-specific statements to
create the database and corresponding tables.
SQL-PL generator: This component generates the engine-specific statements to cre-
ate the SQL-PL stored procedures corresponding to the input OCL queries.
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The complexity of supporting multiple RDBMS is brought by their implementation dif-
ferences. Perhaps the most noticeable di↵erence is the language they parse. Even though
all engines use some flavor of SQL, these all di↵er in how variables, stored procedures, and
built-in functions are declared in their procedural extensions. Also, PostgreSQL supports
di↵erent procedural languages (we targeted at PL/pgSQL), MS SQL Server uses Transact
SQL and MySQL uses yet another dialect (fully compatible with MariaDB’s).
As implementation strategy, we avoided the burden of dealing with the subtleties of
each SQL dialect within the mapping algorithm by defining a plugin-based architecture.
In this architecture, each plugin component is responsible for performing the appropriate
translation for the RDBMS it targets. In [98], the reader can find a comparison that gives
idea of the variations among the di↵erent SQL dialects. We do not discuss the di↵erences
here since, in our view, they do not add to our discussion. Instead, we encourage the
interested reader to use our tool, which is available at [28].
Figure 2.6: SQL-PL4OCL tool: screen-shots
2.3 Benchmark
2.3.1 Description
The data model for our benchmark is the Car-Company model shown in Figure 2.1.
The expressions that we consider in our benchmark are the following:
Q1. Car.allInstances() >size()
Q2. Car.allInstances().model >size()
Q3. Car.allInstances().owner >size()
Q4. Employee.allInstances().company >size()
Q5. Car.allInstances().owner.name >size()
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MySQL MariaDB PostgreSQL MSSQL
Q1 0.19s 0.13s 0.10s 0.12s
Q2 0.25s 0.20s 0.33s 0.28s
Q3 0.36s 0.35s 0.27s 0.26s
Q4 0.04s 0.04s 0.04s 0.05s
Q5 0.55s 0.40s 0.40s 0.42s
Q6 1.05s 0.55s 1.06s 1.03s
Q7 2.07s 1.56s 1.99s 2.08s
Q8 50.02s 43.08s 57.04s 53.47s
Q9 9.14s 8.00s 8.18s 8.89s
Q10 0.05s 0.04s 0.07s 0.05s
Q11 49.56s 40.02s 40.10s 43.46s
Q12 59.58s 51.23s 51.25s 54.82s
Q13 1.67s 1.98s 2.35s 1.90s
Q14 59.52s 54.33s 63.35s 58.33s
Table 2.1: SQL-PL4OCL. Evaluation times.
Q6. Car.allInstances().owner >oclAsType(Employee).salary >size()
Q7. Car.allInstances().owner >oclAsType(Employee).ownedCars >size()
Q8. Car.allInstances() >select(c|c.color<>”black”) >size()
Q9. Car.allInstances() >forAll(c|c.color<>”black”)
Q10. Car.allInstances() >exists(c|c.color<>’black”)
Q11. Car.allInstances() >collect(x|x.color) >size()
Q12. Car.allInstances() >collect(x|x.owner.ownedCars) >size()
Q13. Car.allInstances().model >asSequence() >size()
Q14. Car.allInstances() >asSequence() >select(c|c.color<>”black”) >size()
2.3.2 Results
Table 2.1 shows a benchmark to test the performance (in terms of the evaluation
time) of a sample of OCL queries mapped into the di↵erent DBMS. In this sample, we
included both simple expressions (Q1-Q7), and complex expressions (Q8-Q14), including
iterator and sequence operators. All the expressions in the benchmark were evaluated on
an artificial scenario that we created. The scenario is an instance of the Car-Company
data model depicted in 2.1. This instance contains 106 instances of class Car, 105 instances
of class Person (all of them are Employees), and 102 instances of class Company, where
each company is associated to 102 instances of Person, and each person owns 10 di↵erent
cars. All car instances have a color di↵erent from black.
We used bold font to highlight the lowest evaluation time of each query in Table 2.1.
By just taking a look, it is clear that MariaDB, an open source database, achieves the
fastest evaluation times for the majority of the queries and, most importantly, for almost
the totality of complex expressions.4
Based on our experiments, we can identify three parameters which seem to correlate
4We ran the benchmark in a laptop with an Intel Core m7, 1.3 GHz, 8 GB RAM, and 500 GB Flash
Storage. The RDBMS versions used were MySQL 5.7, MariaDB 10.1, SQL Server 2016 Express, and
PostgreSQL 9.6.1.
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directly to the increase in the evaluation time of an expression translated by our mapping.
More concretely,
i. The OCL expression contains access to attributes or association-ends. Their trans-
lation into left joins (of size n ⇥ m) makes them expensive in time. Also, the
materialization of a left join performed between di↵erent tables (i.e., for translating
an association, as in Q3 and Q7) is more expensive than one performed by a table
with itself (i.e., for translating access to an attribute, as in Q2 and Q6). The time
gets worse when the source table is larger, i.e., with a high n. For example, com-
pare evaluation times for queries Q3 and Q4 where the size of the source collection
is 106 and 105 (resp.), or queries Q2 and Q12 for which the size of the left join
(owner.ownedCars) is 106 ⇥ 10 and 1⇥ 10 (resp.).
ii. The size of the outermost source collection in an OCL iterator expression (if there
is no stop criterion applied). For example, to evaluate Q9 the cursor has to fetch
values from a table of size 106, however, to evaluate Q10 the cursor only fetches one
value and the procedure stops. Notice also the di↵erent evaluation time between Q2
and Q11 (which are similar expressions in semantics) since the last is shaped as an
iterator expression.
iii. The number of insertions to a table when this is required by the mapping to trans-
late a query. In particular, insertions to a table are always required for evaluating
sequence expressions. As an example we compare queries Q8 and Q9. The size of the
source expression for both queries is the same (106). However, the evaluation of Q8
requires the insertion of intermediate values into a table while Q9 evaluation does
not. Similarly happens with Q2 and Q13. The di↵erent evaluation time between Q8
and Q14 seems to be due to the generation of the auto-incremented position value
for the latter.
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Mapping OCL as a constraint language
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3.1 From OCL to many-sorted first-order logic
We introduce here a mapping from OCL to MSFOL, which supports the use of Satis-
fiability Modulo Theories (SMT) solvers for checking UML/OCL satisfiability problems.1
This mapping is the result of an evolution of di↵erent mappings, which we briefly discussed
below.
In [20] we proposed a first mapping from UML/OCL to first-order logic, called OCL2-
FOL, which did not support UML generalization or OCL undefinedness. In [26] we pro-
posed a second mapping, called OCL2FOL+, which did take into account OCL undefined-
ness, but did not support UML generalization. Moreover, OCL2FOL+ turned out to be
rather ine cient in practice, since SMT solvers would often return unknown, as a conse-
quence of two facts: first, that non-trivial OCL constraints contain expressions that are
naturally mapped to quantified formulas (since they refer to all the objects in a class, for
example), and, secondly, that techniques for dealing with quantified formulas in SMT are
generally incomplete.
To overcome this limitation, we decided to use SMT solvers along with finite model
finding methods for checking the satisfiability of the formulas resulting from our mapping.
In particular, we opted for using the SMT solver CVC4 [10], which has a finite model find-
ing method [81] fully integrated with its SMT solver architecture. The finite model finding
1SMT solvers generalize Boolean satisfiability (SAT) by incorporating equality reasoning, arithmetic,
fixed-size bit-vectors, arrays, quantifiers, and other first-order theories.
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method implemented in CVC4 requires, however, that quantified variables in the input
problem always range over finite domains. OCL2FOL+ could not satisfy this requirement,
since its target formalism was unsorted FOL: variables in quantified formulas generated
by OCL2FOL+ range over a single, infinite domain that includes the integer numbers. By
switching to many-sorted FOL (MSFOL), we were able to satisfy the aforementioned re-
quirement: variables in quantified formulas range now over the domain of a distinguished
sort, called Classifier, which essentially contains the objects in an object diagram and
the undefined values (but not the integer numbers or the strings), and which, for the
purpose of UML/OCL verification, can be considered as finite (object diagrams can be
assumed to contain only a finite number of objects). Finally, many-sorted FOL provides
a more adequate target formalism than unsorted FOL for mapping UML generalization
and generalization-related OCL operations.
Hence, we propose here a mapping from OCL to many-sorted first-order logic [27]
which successfully overcomes the limitations of our previous mappings. First, it accepts
as input a significantly larger subset of the UML/OCL language; in particular, it supports
UML generalization, along with the generalization-related OCL operators. Secondly, it
generates as output a class of satisfiability problems that are amenable to checking by
using SMT solvers with finite model finding capabilities.
3.1.1 Mapping data models
Our mapping from OCL to MSFOL builds upon a base mapping from data models to
MSFOL theories, called o2fdata.
Let D = hC,CH ,AT ,AS ,ASO ,MU i be a data model. In a nutshell, o2fdata(D) con-
tains:
The sorts Int and String, whose intended meaning is to represent the integer numbers
and the strings.
The constants nullInt, nullString, invalInt, and invalString, whose intended meaning
is to represent null and invalid for integers and strings.
The sort Classifier, whose intended meaning is to represent all the objects in an
instance of D, as well as null and invalid for objects.
The sort Type, whose intended meaning is to represent the type identifiers declared
in D.
For each class c 2 C, a unary predicate c, whose intended meaning is to define the
objects of the class c in an instance of D
For each attribute hat , c, ti 2 AT , a function at, whose intended meaning is to define
the values of the attribute at in the objects in an instance of D.
For each binary association, (as(c,c0), as(c0,c)) 2 ASO , with multiplicity, has(c,c0), ⇤i,
has(c0,c), ⇤i 2 ASO . A binary predicate as as 0, whose intended meaning is to define
the links through the association has(c,c0), as(c0,c)i between the objects.2
2 For associations with both association-ends with multiplicities 0..1, our mapping declares a function for
each association-end, instead of a predicate for the association. Then, for associations with one association-
end with multiplicity * and the other with multiplicity 0..1, our mapping declares a binary predicate for
the association-end with multiplicity * and a function for the one with multiplicity 0..1.
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Figure 3.1: BasicSocNet: A data model for a basic social network.
The axioms that constrain the meaning of the aforementioned sorts, constants, pred-
icates, and functions.
Formally, o2fdata is defined as follow:
Definition 3 Let D = hC,CH ,AT ,AS ,ASO ,MU i be a data model. Then, o2fdata(D) is
an MSFOL theory, which is defined below.
It declares two sorts, Classifier and Type, to represent the OCL types Classifier and
Type. It also declares two sorts, Int and String, to represent the integer numbers
and the strings. 3
It declares two constants of sort Classifier, nullClassifier and invalClassifier, to rep-
resent, the values null and invalid of type Classifier. In addition, it includes the
following axiom: ysql
¬(nullClassifier = invalClassifier).
Similarly for the type Type.
It declares two constants of sort Int, nullInt and invalInt, to represent, respectively,
the values null and invalid of the primitive data-type Integer. In addition, it includes
the following axiom:
¬(nullInt = invalInt).
Similarly for the primitive data-type String.
For each class c 2 C, it declares a predicate c: Classifier ! Bool, to represent the
objects of type c. In addition, it includes the following axioms:
8(x:Classifier)(c(x)) ¬(Wc02(C\{c}) c0(x))).
¬(c(nullClassifier) _ c(invalClassifier)).
For each attribute at(c,Integer), it declares a function at : Classifier! Int. In addi-
tion, it includes the following axioms:
3We assume that Int and String are declared with the standard operations and semantics.
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8(x:Classifier)((Ws c(s(x)))) at(x) 6= InvalInt).
at(nullClassifier) = InvalInt.
at(invalClassifier) = InvalInt.
For each association between two classes c and c0, with association-ends as(c,c0) and
as 0(c0,c), such that has(c,c0), ⇤i, has 0(c0,c), ⇤i 2 MU, it declares a predicate as as 0:
Classifier⇥ Classifier! Bool. In addition, it includes the following axiom:
8(x:Classifier, y:Classifier)
(as as 0(x, y)) ((Ws c(s(x))) ^ (Ws0 c0(s0(y))))).
For each association as between two classes c and c0, with association-ends as(c,c0)
and as 0(c0,c), such that has, 0..1i, has 0, 0..1i 2 MU it declares two functions, as , as 0:
Classifier! Classifier. In addition, it includes the following axioms:
8(x:Classifier, y:Classifier)
(((as(x) = y) ^ (Ws c(s(x))) ^ (Ws0 c0(s0(y))))) as 0(y) = x).
8(x:Classifier)((Ws c(s(x)))) (as(x) = nullClassifier _ (Ws0 c0(s0(as(x)))))).
as(nullClassifier) = invalClassifier.
as(invalClassifier) = invalClassifier.
8(x:Classifier, y:Classifier)
(((as 0(y) = x) ^ (Ws c(s(x))) ^ (Ws0 c0(s0(y))))) as(x) = y).
8(y:Classifier)((Ws0 c0(s0(y)))) (as 0(y) = nullClassifier _ (Ws c(s(as 0(y)))))).
as 0(nullClassifier) = invalClassifier.
as 0(invalClassifier) = invalClassifier.
For each association as between two classes c and c0, with association-ends as(c,c0)
and as 0(c0,c), such that has, 0..1i, has 0, ⇤i 2 MU, it declares a function as: Classifier
! Classifier and a predicate as 0: Classifier ⇥Classifier ! Bool. In addition, it
includes the following axioms:
8(x:Classifier, y:Classifier)
(((as(x) = y) ^ (Ws c(s(x))) ^ (Ws0 c0(s0(y))))) as 0(y, x)).
8(x:Classifier)((Ws c(s(x)))) (as(x) = nullClassifier _ (Ws0 c0(s0(as(x)))))).
as(nullClassifier) = invalClassifier.
as(invalClassifier) = invalClassifier.
8(x:Classifier, y:Classifier)(as 0(y, x)) as(x) = y).
8(x:Classifier, y:Classifier)(as 0(y, x)) ((Ws c(s(x))) ^ (Ws0 c0(s0(y))))).
For each class c 2 C, it declares a constant ctype of sort Type. In addition, it includes
the following axiom:V
c02C\{c} ¬(ctype = c0type).
It declares two predicates OclIsTypeOf, OclIsKindOf: Classifier ⇥ Type >Bool. In
addition, for each class c 2 C, it includes the following axioms:
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8(x:Classifier)(OclIsTypeOf(x, ctype), c(x)).
8(x:Classifier)(OclIsKindOf(x, ctype),
W
s c(s(x))).
In the following example we illustrate the mapping o2fdata.
Example 12 Consider the data model SSN shown in Figure 3.1, which models a basic
social network. Then, the MSFOL theory o2fdata(SSN) contains, among other elements:
The constants nullClassifier and invalClassifier of sort Classifier, along with the
axiom:
¬(nullClassifier = invalClassifier).
The constants nullInt and invalInt of sort Int, along with the axiom:
¬(nullInt = invalInt).
The predicate Profile:Classifier! Bool, along with the axioms:
8(x)(Profile(x)) ¬(Photo(x) _ Status(x) _ Timeline(x) _ Post(x))).
¬(Profile(nullClassifier) _ Profile(invalClassifier)).
The function age: Classifier! Int, along with the axioms:
age(nullClassifier) = invalInt.
age(invalClassifier) = invalInt.
8(x)(Profile(x)) ¬(age(x) = invalInt)).
The predicate myFriends friendsOf:Classifier ⇥ Classifier ! Bool, along with the
axioms:
8(x, y)(myFriends friendsOf(x, y), (Profile(x) ^ Profile(y))).
The constants Posttype, Phototype, and Statustype of sort Type, along with the axioms:
¬(Posttype = Phototype).
¬(Posttype = Statustype).
¬(Phototype = Statustype).
The predicate oclIsKindOf : Classifier⇥ Type! Bool, along with the axioms:
8(x)(oclIsKindOf(x,Posttype), (Post(x) _ Photo(x) _ Status(x))).
8(x)(oclIsKindOf(x,Phototype), Photo(x)).
8(x)(oclIsKindOf(x,Statustype), Status(x)).
3.1.2 Mapping OCL expressions
OCL2MSFOL is designed for checking the satisfiability of OCL constraints: it accepts
as input OCL Boolean expressions, and only deals with non-Boolean expressions inasmuch
as they appear as subexpressions of Boolean expressions.
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The mappings o2ftrue, o2f false, o2fnull, and o2f inval
In the presence of undefinedness, OCL Boolean expressions can evaluate not only to
true and false but also to null or invalid. To cope with four Boolean values in a two-valued
logic like MSFOL, we define four mappings, namely, o2ftrue, o2f false, o2fnull, and o2f inval,
which formalize when a Boolean expression evaluates to true, when to false, when to null,
and when to invalid. We define these mappings by structural recursion. In the recursive
case, when the subexpression is a non-Boolean type, we call an auxiliary mapping, o2feval,
which we will discuss below. For now, it is su cient to know that o2feval returns a term
when its argument is an expression of a class type or of type Integer or String, and that
it returns a predicate when its argument is an expression of a set type.4
Let expr be an expression we assume, without loss of generality, that each itera-
tor in expr introduces a di↵erent iterator variable. Moreover, we denote by fVars(expr)
the sequence formed by the free variables in expr , sorted alphabetically. Finally, we
denote by App(P, (x1, . . . , xn), y) the atomic formula P (x1, ..., xn, y), and we denote by
App(f, (x1, . . . , xn)) the term f(x1, ..., xn).
Definition 4 Let expr, expr1, expr2 be boolean expressions, and src be expression of the
appropriate type, we define the mappings o2ftrue, o2f false , o2fnull, and o2f inval as follow:
oclIsUndefined-expressions:
o2ftrue(expr .oclIsUndefined()) = o2fnull(expr) _ o2f inval(expr).
o2f false(expr .oclIsUndefined()) = ¬(o2fnull(expr) _ o2f inval(expr)).
o2fnull(expr .oclIsUndefined()) = ?.
o2f inval(expr .oclIsUndefined()) = ?.
oclIsInvalid-expressions:
o2ftrue(expr .oclIsInvalid()) = o2f inval(expr).
o2f false(expr .oclIsInvalid()) = ¬(o2f inval(expr)).
o2fnull(expr .oclIsInvalid()) = ?.
o2f inval(expr .oclIsInvalid()) = ?.
oclIsTypeOf-expressions:
o2ftrue(expr .oclIsTypeOf(c)) = OclIsTypeOf(o2feval(expr), c).
o2f false(expr .oclIsTypeOf(c)) = ¬(OclIsTypeOf(o2feval(expr), c)).
o2fnull(expr .oclIsTypeOf(c)) = ?.
o2f inval(expr .oclIsTypeOf(c)) = ?.
4We assume that all non-Boolean subexpressions have either a class type, a primitive type (either
Integer or String), or a set type.
3.1. From OCL to many-sorted first-order logic 41
oclIsKindOf-expressions:
o2ftrue(expr .OclIsKindOf(c)) = OclIsKindOf(o2feval(expr), c).
o2f false(expr .OclIsKindOf(c)) = ¬(OclIsKindOf(o2feval(expr), c)).
o2fnull(expr .OclIsKindOf(c)) = ?.
o2f inval(expr .OclIsKindOf(c)) = ?.
equality-expressions:
o2ftrue(expr1 = expr2) = (o2fnull(expr1) ^ o2fnull(expr2)) _
(o2feval(expr1) = o2feval(expr2)
^ ¬(o2fnull(expr1) _ o2f inval(expr1) _ o2fnull(expr2) _ o2f inval(expr2))).
o2f false(expr1 = expr2) = (¬(o2feval(expr1) = o2feval(expr2))
^ ¬(o2fnull(expr1) _ o2f inval(expr1) _ o2fnull(expr2) _ o2f inval(expr2))).
o2fnull(expr1=expr2) = ?.
o2f inval(expr1=expr2) = o2f inval(expr1) _ o2f inval(expr2)
_ (o2fnull(expr1) ^ ¬o2fnull(expr2)) _ (¬o2fnull(expr1) ^ o2fnull(expr2)).
inequality-expressions:
o2ftrue(expr1 <> expr2) = (¬(o2feval(expr1) = o2feval(expr2))
^ ¬(o2fnull(expr1) _ o2f inval(expr1) _ o2fnull(expr2) _ o2f inval(expr2))).
o2f false(expr1 <> expr2) = (o2fnull(expr1) ^ o2fnull(expr2)) _
(o2feval(expr1) = o2feval(expr2)
^ ¬(o2fnull(expr1) _ o2f inval(expr1) _ o2fnull(expr2) _ o2f inval(expr2))).
o2fnull(expr1 <> expr2) = ?.
o2f inval(expr1 <> expr2) = o2f inval(expr1) _ o2f inval(expr2)
_ (o2fnull(expr1) ^ ¬o2fnull(expr2)) _ (¬o2fnull(expr1) ^ o2fnull(expr2)).
not-expressions:
o2ftrue(not(expr)) = o2f false(expr).
o2f false(not(expr)) = o2ftrue(expr).
o2fnull(not(expr)) = o2fnull(expr).
o2f inval(not(expr)) = o2f inval(expr).
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and-expressions:
o2ftrue((expr1 and expr2)) = o2ftrue(expr1) ^ o2ftrue(expr2).
o2f false((expr1 and expr2)) = o2f false(expr1) _ o2f false(expr2).
o2fnull(expr1 and expr2) = o2fnull(expr1) ^ o2fnull(expr2)
_ (o2fnull(expr1) ^ o2ftrue(expr2)) _ (o2ftrue(expr1) ^ o2fnull(expr2)).
o2f inval(expr1 and expr2) =
(o2f inval(expr1) ^ (o2ftrue(expr2) _ o2fnull(expr2) _ o2f inval(expr2)))
_ (o2f inval(expr2) ^ (o2ftrue(expr1) _ o2fnull(expr1) _ o2f inval(expr1))).
or-expressions:
o2ftrue((expr1 or expr2)) = o2ftrue(expr1) _ o2ftrue(expr2).
o2f false((expr1 or expr2)) = o2f false(expr1) ^ o2f false(expr2).
o2fnull((expr1 or expr2) = o2fnull(expr1)) ^ o2fnull(expr2)
_ (o2fnull(expr1) ^ o2f false(expr2)) _ (o2f false(expr1) ^ o2fnull(expr2)).
o2f inval(expr1 or expr2) =
(o2f inval(expr1) ^ (o2f false(expr2) _ o2fnull(expr2) _ o2f inval(expr2)))
_ (o2f inval(expr2) ^ (o2f false(expr1) _ o2fnull(expr1) _ o2f inval(expr1))).
implies-expressions:
o2ftrue((expr1 implies expr2)) = o2f false(expr1) _ o2ftrue(expr2).
o2f false((expr1 implies expr2)) = o2ftrue(expr1) ^ o2f false(expr2).
o2fnull(expr1 implies expr2) =
(o2fnull(expr1) ^ (o2ftrue(expr2) _ o2fnull(expr2) _ o2f false(expr2)))
_ (o2fnull(expr2) ^ (o2ftrue(expr1) _ o2fnull(expr1) _ o2f false(expr1))).
o2f inval(expr1 implies expr2) = (o2f inval(expr1) _ o2f inval(expr1)).
isEmpty-expressions:
o2ftrue(expr >isEmpty()) =
8(x)(¬(App(o2feval(expr), fVars(expr), x)) ^ ¬(o2f inval(expr))).
o2f false(expr >isEmpty()) =
9(x)(App(o2feval(expr), fVars(expr), x)) ^ ¬(o2f inval(expr)).
o2fnull(expr >isEmpty()) = ?.
o2f inval(expr >isEmpty()) = o2f inval(expr).
3.1. From OCL to many-sorted first-order logic 43
notEmpty-expressions:
o2ftrue(expr >notEmpty()) =
9(x)(App(o2feval(expr), fVars(expr), x)) ^ ¬(o2f inval(expr)).
o2f false(expr >notEmpty()) =
8(x)(¬(App(o2feval(expr), fVars(expr), x)) ^ ¬(o2f inval(expr)).
o2fnull(expr >notEmpty()) = ?.
o2f inval(expr >notEmpty()) = o2f inval(expr).
forAll-expressions:
o2ftrue(src >forall(x | body)) =
8(x)(App(o2feval(src), fVars(src), x)) o2ftrue(body)) ^ ¬(o2f inval(src)).
o2f false(src >forall(x | body)) =
9(x)(App(o2feval(src), fVars(src), x) ^ o2f false(body)) ^ ¬(o2f inval(src)).
o2fnull(src >forAll(x | body)) = ¬ o2f inval(src)
^ 9(x)(App(o2feval(src), fVars(src), x) ^ o2fnull(body))
^ 8(x)(App(o2feval(src), fVars(src), x)) (o2ftrue(body) _ o2fnull(body).
o2f inval(src >forAll(x | body),~v) =
o2f inval(src,~v) _ 9(x)([src][(~v, x) ^ o2f inval(body [x 7! x],~v))
^ 8(x)([src][(~v, x)) (o2ftrue(body [x 7! x],~v)_
o2fnull(body [x 7! x],~v) _ o2f inval(body [x 7! x],~v))).
exists-expressions:
o2ftrue(src >exists(x | body)) =
9(x)(App(o2feval(src), fVars(src), x) ^ o2ftrue(body)) ^ ¬(o2f inval(src)).
o2f false(src >exists(x | body)) =
8(x)(App(o2feval(src), fVars(src), x)) o2f false(body)) ^ ¬(o2f inval(src)).
o2fnull(src >exists(x | body)) = ¬(o2f inval(src))
^ 9(x)(App(o2feval(src), fVars(src), x) ^ o2fnull(body))
^ 8(x)(App(o2feval(src), fVars(src), x)) (o2f false(body) _ o2fnull(body).
o2f inval(src >exists(x | body)) = o2f inval(src)
_ 9(x)(App(o2feval(src), fVars(src), x) ^ o2f inval(body))
^ 8(x)(App(o2feval(src), fVars(src), x)
) (o2f false(body) _ o2fnull(body) _ o2f inval(body))).
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excludes-expressions:
o2ftrue(expr1 >excludes(expr2)) =
8(x)(App(o2feval(expr1), fVars(expr1), x)) x 6= App(o2feval(expr2), fVars(expr2), []))
^ ¬o2f inval(expr1) ^ ¬o2f inval(expr2).
o2f false(expr1 >excludes(expr2)) =
9(x)(App(o2feval(expr1), fVars(expr1), x) ^ x = App(o2feval(expr2), fVars(expr2), []))
^ ¬o2f inval(expr1) ^ ¬o2f inval(expr2).
o2fnull(expr1 >excludes(expr2)) = ?.
o2f inval(expr1 >excludes(expr2))) = o2f inval(expr1) _ o2f inval(expr2).
includes-expressions:
o2ftrue(expr1 >includes(expr2)) =
9(x)(App(o2feval(expr1), fVars(expr1), x) ^ x = App(o2feval(expr2), fVars(expr2), []))
^ ¬o2f inval(expr1) ^ ¬o2f inval(expr2).
o2f false(expr1 >includes(expr2)) =
8(x)(App(o2feval(expr1), fVars(expr1), x)) x 6= App(o2feval(expr2), fVars(expr2), []))
^ ¬o2f inval(expr1) ^ ¬o2f inval(expr2).
o2fnull(expr1 >includes(expr2)) = ?.
o2f inval(expr1 >includes(expr2)) = o2f inval(expr1) _ o2f inval(expr2).
=-expressions (between sets):
o2ftrue((expr1 = expr2)) =
8(x)(App(o2feval(expr1), fVars(expr1), x), App(o2feval(expr2), fVars(expr2), x))
^ ¬o2f inval(expr1) ^ ¬o2f inval(expr2).
o2f false((expr1 = expr2)) =
9(x)((App(o2feval(expr1), fVars(expr1), x) ^ ¬(App(o2feval(expr2), fVars(expr2), x)))
_ (¬(App(o2feval(expr1), fVars(expr1), x) ^App(o2feval(expr2), fVars(expr2), x))))
^ ¬o2f inval(expr1) ^ ¬o2f inval(expr2)).
o2fnull((expr1 = expr2)) = ?.
o2f inval((expr1 = expr2)) = o2f inval(expr1) _ o2f inval(expr2).
<>-expressions (between sets):
o2ftrue((expr1 <> expr2)) =
9(x)((App(o2feval(expr1), fVars(expr1), x) ^ ¬(App(o2feval(expr2), fVars(expr2), x)))
_ (¬(App(o2feval(expr1), fVars(expr1), x) ^App(o2feval(expr2), fVars(expr2), x))))
^ ¬o2f inval(expr1) ^ ¬o2f inval(expr2)).
o2f false((expr1 <> expr2)) =
8(x)(App(o2feval(expr1), fVars(expr1), x), App(o2feval(expr2), fVars(expr2), x))
^ ¬o2f inval(expr1) ^ ¬o2f inval(expr2).
o2fnull((expr1 <> expr2)) = ?.
o2f inval((expr1 <> expr2)) = o2f inval(expr1) _ o2f inval(expr2).
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includesAll-expressions:
o2ftrue(expr1 >includesAll(expr2)) =
8(x)(App(o2feval(expr2), fVars(expr2), x)) App(o2feval(expr1), fVars(expr1), x))
^ ¬o2f inval(expr1) ^ ¬o2f inval(expr2).
o2f false(expr1 >includesAll(expr2)) =
9(x)(App([expr2][, fVars(expr2), x) ^ ¬(App(o2feval(expr1), fVars(expr1), x)))
^ ¬o2f inval(expr1) ^ ¬o2f inval(expr2).
o2fnull(expr1 >includesAll(expr2)) = ?.
o2f inval(expr1 >includesAll(expr2)) = o2f inval(expr1) _ o2f inval(expr2).
excludesAll-expressions:
o2ftrue(expr1 >excludesAll(expr2)) =
8(x)(App(o2feval(expr2), fVars(expr2), x)) ¬(App(o2feval(expr1), fVars(expr1), x)))
^ ¬o2f inval(expr1) ^ ¬o2f inval(expr2).
o2f false(expr1 >excludesAll(expr2)) =
9(x)(App(o2feval(expr2), fVars(expr2), x) ^App(o2feval(expr1), fVars(expr1), x))
^ ¬o2f inval(expr1) ^ ¬o2f inval(expr2).
o2fnull(expr1 >excludesAll(expr2)) = ?.
o2f inval(expr1 >excludesAll(expr2)) = o2f inval(expr1) _ o2f inval(expr2).
oclIsUndefined-expressions (over sets):
o2ftrue(src >oclIsUndefined()) = ?.
o2f false(src >oclIsUndefined()) = >.
o2fnull(expr >oclIsUndefined()) = ?.
o2f inval(expr >oclIsUndefined()) = ?.
oclIsInvalid-expressions (over sets):
o2ftrue(src >oclIsInvalid()) = o2f inval(src).
o2f false(src >oclIsInvalid()) = ¬(o2f inval(src)).
o2fnull(expr >oclIsInvalid()) = ?.
o2f inval(expr >oclIsInvalid()) = ?.
Now, consider expr, expr1, expr2 be non boolean expressions, and src be expression
of the appropriate type. We define the mappings o2ftrue, o2f false to evaluate always to
> (because these expressions are non-Boolean expressions), and o2fnull, and o2f inval as
follow:
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integer-expressions (literals):
o2fnull(i) = ?.
o2f inval(i) = ?.
variable-expressions:
o2fnull(vt) = (vt = nullt).
o2f inval(vt) = (vt = invalt).
--expressions (unary):
o2fnull(-(expr)) = ?.
o2f inval(-(expr)) = o2f inval(expr) _ o2fnull(expr).
op 2 {+, -, *, div, concat, indexOf, at}-expressions:
o2fnull(expr1 op expr2,~v) = ?.
o2f inval(expr op expr 0,~v) =
o2fnull(expr1,~v) _ o2f inval(expr1,~v) _ o2fnull(expr2,~v) _ o2f inval(expr2,~v).
for op 2 {+, -, *, div}.
size-expressions:
o2fnull(expr .size(),~v) = ?.
o2f inval(expr .size(),~v) = o2fnull(expr ,~v) _ o2f inval(expr).
substring-expressions:
o2fnull(expr1.substring(expr2, expr3)),~v) = ?.
o2f inval(expr .substring(expr 0, expr 00),~v) = o2fnull(expr1,~v) _ o2f inval(expr1,~v)
_ o2fnull(expr2,~v) _ o2f inval(expr2,~v) _ o2fnull(expr3,~v) _ o2f inval(expr3,~v).
allInstances-expressions:
o2fnull(c.allInstances()) = ?.
o2f inval(c.allInstances()) = ?.
attribute-expressions:
o2fnull(expr .at) = (o2feval(expr .at) = nullt).
where t 2 Integer, String or t is a class type.
o2f inval(expr .at) = o2fnull(expr) _ o2f inval(expr).
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association-end-expressions (arity 0..1):
o2fnull(expr .as) = (o2feval(expr .as) = nullt).
o2f inval(expr .as) = o2fnull(expr) _ o2f inval(expr).
where t 2 Integer, String or t is a class type.
o2fnull(expr .as()) = ?.
o2f inval(expr .as()) = o2f inval(exp) _ o2fnull(exp).
max-expressions:
o2fnull(src >max()) = (App(o2feval(src >max()), fVars(src), []) = nullInt).
o2f inval(src >max()) = (App(o2feval(src >max()), fVars(src), []) = invalInt)).
min-expressions:
o2fnull(src >min()) = (App(o2feval(src >min()), fVars(src), []) = nullInt).
o2f inval(src >min()) = (App(o2feval(src >min()), fVars(src), []) = invalInt).
any-expressions:
o2fnull(src >any(xt|body)) =
(App(o2feval(src >any(xt|body)), fVars(src), xt) = null(t)).
o2f inval(src >any(xt|body)) =
(App(o2feval(src >any(xt|body)), fVars(src), xt) = inval(t)).
op 2 {select, reject}-expressions:
o2fnull(src >op(p | body)) = ?.
o2f inval(src >op(p | body)) = o2f inval(src).
op 2 {including, excluding, union}-expressions:
o2fnull(expr1) >op(expr2) = o2fnull(expr1) _ o2fnull(expr2).
o2f inval(expr1) >op(expr2) = o2f inval(expr1) _ o2f inval(expr2).
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collect-expressions:
o2fnull(src >collect(x|body)) = ?.
o2f inval(src >collect(x|body)) =
o2f inval(src) _ 9(x)(App(o2feval(src), fVars(src), x) ^ o2f inval(body)).
Finally, we illustrate the recursive definitions of the mappings o2ftrue, o2f false, o2fnull,
and o2f inval with some examples:
Example 13 Consider the Boolean expression:
Profile.allInstances() >notEmpty().
Then,
o2ftrue(Profile.allInstances() >notEmpty())
= 9(x:Classifier)(o2feval(Profile.allInstances())(x)) ^ ¬(o2f inval(Profile.allInstances()))
= 9(x:Classifier)(o2feval(Profile.allInstances())(x)) ^ ¬(?).
Example 14 Consider the Boolean expression:
Profile.allInstances() >forAll(p|not(p.age.oclIsUndefined())).
Then,
o2f false(Profile.allInstances() >forAll(p|not(p.age.oclIsUndefined())))
= 9(p:Classifier)(o2feval(Profile.allInstances())(p)
^ o2f false(not(p.age.oclIsUndefined()))
^ ¬(o2f inval(Profile.allInstances()))),
where
o2f false(not(p.age.oclIsUndefined()))
= o2ftrue(p.age.oclIsUndefined())
= o2fnull(p.age) _ o2f inval(p.age)
= o2feval(p.age) = nullClassifier _ (o2fnull(p) _ o2f inval(p))
= o2feval(p.age) = nullClassifier _ (p = nullClassifier _ p = invalClassifier).
Example 15 Consider the Boolean expression:
Profile.allInstances() >select(p|p.age.oclIsUndefined()) >notEmpty().
Then,
o2ftrue(Profile.allInstances() >select(p|p.age.oclIsUndefined()) >notEmpty())
= 9(x:Classifier)(o2feval(Profile.allInstances() >select(p|p.age.oclIsUndefined()))(x))
^ ¬(o2f inval(Profile.allInstances() >select(p|p.age.oclIsUndefined())))
= 9(x:Classifier)(o2feval(Profile.allInstances() >select(p|p.age.oclIsUndefined()))(x))
^ ¬(o2f inval(Profile.allInstances()))
= 9(x:Classifier)(o2feval(Profile.allInstances() >select(p|p.age.oclIsUndefined()))(x))
^ ¬(?).
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The mapping o2feval, o2fdef c, and o2fdef o
In the definition of the mapping o2feval we distinguish three classes of non-Boolean
expressions. In a nutshell, the di↵erences between these classes are the followings:
The first class is formed by variables and by expressions that denote primitive values
and objects. Expressions denoting primitive values and objects are basically the
literals (integers or strings), the arithmetic expressions, the expressions denoting
operations on strings, and the dot-expressions for attributes or association-ends with
multiplicity 0..1. Variables are mapped to MSFOL variables of the appropriate sort.
Expressions denoting primitive values and objects are mapped by o2feval following
the definition of the mapping o2fdata. The output of the mapping o2feval for this
first class of non-Boolean expressions is always an MSFOL term.
The second class of non-Boolean expressions is formed by the expressions that de-
fine sets. These expressions are basically the allInstances-expressions, the select
and reject-expressions, the including and excluding-expressions, the intersection and
union-expressions, and the collect-expressions. Each expression expr in this class is
mapped by o2feval to a new predicate, denoted as [expr ]. This predicate formal-
izes the set defined by the expression expr and its definition is generated by calling
another mapping, o2fdef c, over the expression expr .
Finally, the third class of non-Boolean expressions is formed by the expressions that
distinguish an element from a set. These expressions are, basically, the any, max,
and min-expressions. Each expression expr in this class is mapped by o2feval to a
new function, denoted as [expr ], which represents the element referred to by expr .
To generate the axioms defining [expr ], we call another mapping, o2fdef o, over expr .
Definition 5 Let expr, expr1, expr2, and src be expression of the appropriate type, we
define the mappings o2feval, as follow:
integer-expressions (literals):
o2feval(i) = i.
variable-expressions:
o2feval(vt) = vt.
allInstances-expressions:
o2feval(c.allInstances()) = [c].
association-end-expressions (multiplicity 0..1 or 1):
o2feval(expr .as) = as(o2feval(expr), as).
attribute-expressions:
o2feval(expr .at) = at(o2feval(expr), at).
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it 2 {select, reject, collect}-expressions:
o2feval(src >it(x|body)) = [src >it(x|body)].
op 2 {including, excluding, union, intersection, set-di↵erence, symmetricDifference}-
expressions:
o2feval(expr1 >op(expr2)) = [src >op()].
op 2 {max, min}-expressions:
o2feval(src >op()) = [src >op()].
any-expressions:
o2feval(src >any(x|body)) = [src >any(x|body)].
--expressions (unary):
o2feval(-(expr)) =  (o2feval(expr)).
op 2 {+, -, *, div}-expressions:
o2feval(expr1 op expr2) = o2feval(expr1) op o2feval(expr2).
op 2 {+, concat}-expressions:
o2feval(expr1 op expr2) = str.concat o2feval(expr1) o2feval(expr2).
op 2 {size}-expressions:
o2feval(expr >size()) = str.len o2feval(expr1) o2feval(expr2).
op 2 {at}-expressions:
o2feval(expr1.at(expr2)) = str.at o2feval(expr1) o2feval(expr2).
op 2 {indexOf}-expressions:
o2feval(expr1 op expr2) = str.indexOf o2feval(expr1) o2feval(expr2) 0.
substring-expressions:
o2feval(expr1.substring(expr2, expr3)) =
str.substr o2feval(expr1) o2feval(expr2)(o2feval(expr2) + o2feval(expr3)).
Example 16 Consider the non-Boolean expression: p.age, where p is a variable of type
Profile. Then,
o2feval(p.age) = (age(o2feval(p)) = age(p)),
where p is a variable of sort Classifier. ut
Definition 6 Let expr, expr1, expr2, and src be expression of the appropriate type, we
define the mappings o2fdef c, as follow:
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allInstances-expressions:
o2fdef c(c.allInstances()) = {8(x)(App([c], ;, x), (
W
s c(s(x))))}.
association-end-expressions (multiplicity *):
o2fdfn c(expr .as()) = {8(Y )8(x)(App(o2feval(expr .as()), Y, x), as(o2feval(expr), x))}.
where Y = fVars(expr) and x 62 Y .
select-expressions:
o2fdfn c(src >select(x | body)) =
{8(Y )8(x)(App(o2feval(src >select(x | body)), Y, x)
, (App(o2feval(src), fVars(src), x) ^ o2ftrue(body)))}.
where Y = fVars(src >select(x | body)).
reject-expressions:
o2fdfn c(src >reject(x | body)) =
{8(Y )8(x)(App(o2feval(src >reject(x | body)), Y, x)
, (App(o2feval(src), fVars(src), x) ^ o2f false(body)))}.
where Y = fVars(src >reject(x | body)).
including-expressions:
o2fdfn c(src >including(expr)) =
{8(Y )8(x)(App([src >including(expr)], Y, x)
, (App(o2feval(src), fVars(src), x) _ o2feval(expr) = x))}.
where Y = fVars(src >including(expr)).
excluding-expressions:
o2fdfn c(src >excluding(expr)) =
{8(Y )8(x)(App(o2feval(src >excluding(expr)), Y, x)
, (App(o2feval(src), fVars(src), x) ^ o2feval(expr) 6= x))}.
where Y = fVars(src >excluding(expr)).
union-expressions:
o2fdfn c(expr1 >union(expr2)) =
{8(Y )8(x)(App(o2feval(expr1 >union(expr2)), Y, x)
, (App(o2feval(expr1), fVars(expr1), x) _ App(o2feval(expr2), fVars(expr2), x)))}.
where Y = fVars(expr1 >union(expr2)).
intersection-expressions:
o2fdfn c(expr1 >intersection(expr2)) =
{8(Y )8(x)(App(o2feval(expr1 >intersection(expr2)), Y, x)
, (App(o2feval(expr1), fVars(expr1), x) ^ App(o2feval(expr2), fVars(expr2), x)))}.
where Y = fVars(expr1 >intersection(expr2)).
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set-di↵erence-expressions:
o2fdfn c(expr1 >-(expr2)) =
{8(Y )8(x)(App(o2feval(expr1 >-(expr2)), Y, x)
, (App(o2feval(expr1), fVars(expr1), x) ^ ¬(App(o2feval(expr2), fVars(expr2), x))))}.
where Y = fVars(expr1 >-(expr2)).
symmetricDifference-expressions:
o2fdfn c(expr1 >symmetricDifference(expr2)) =
{8(Y )8(x)(App(o2feval(expr1 >symmetricDifference(expr2)), Y, x)
, (App(o2feval(expr1), fVars(expr1), x) ^ ¬(App(o2feval(expr2), fVars(expr2), x))
_ App(o2feval(expr2), fVars(expr2), x) ^ ¬(App(o2feval(expr1), fVars(expr1), x))))}.
where Y = fVars(expr1 >symmetricDifference(expr2)).
collect-expressions (with body of type set):
o2fdfn c(src >collect(x |body) >asSet(),~v) =
{8(Y )8(x)(App([src >collect(x |body) >asSet()], Y, x)
, 9(z)(App(o2feval(src), fVars(src), z) ^App(o2feval(body [x 7! z]), fVars(body), x)))}.
where Y = fVars(src >collect(x |body) >asSet()) and z 62 Y .
collect-expressions (with body of class or primitive type):
o2fdfn c(src >collect(x |body) >asSet()) =
{8(Y )8(x)(App(o2feval(src >collect(x |body) >asSet()), Y, x)
, 9(z)(App(o2feval(src), fVars(src), z) ^ o2feval(body [x 7! z]) = x))}.
where Y = fVars(src >collect(x |body) >asSet()) and z 62 Y .
Example 17 Consider the non-Boolean expression:
Post.allInstances().
Then, o2feval(Post.allInstances()) = [Post.allInstances()], where the new predicate
[Post.allInstances()] is defined by o2fdef c as follows:
8(x:Classifier)([Post.allInstances()], (Post(x) _ Photo(x) _ Status(x))).
ut
Example 18 Consider the non-Boolean expression:
Profile.allInstances() >select(p|p.age.oclIsUndefined).
Then,
o2feval(Profile.allInstances() >select(p|p.age.oclIsUndefined())) =
[Profile.allInstances() >select(p|p.age.oclIsUndefined())],
where the new predicate
[Profile.allInstances() >select(p|p.age.oclIsUndefined())]
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is defined by o2fdef c as follows:
8(p:Classifier)([Profile.allInstances() >select(p|p.age.oclIsUndefined())](p)
, (o2feval(Profile.allInstances())(p) ^ o2ftrue(p.age.oclIsUndefined())))
= 8(p:Classifier)([Profile.allInstances() >select(p|p.age.oclIsUndefined())](p)
, [Profile.allInstances()](p) ^ (o2feval(p.age) = nullClassifier
_(p = nullClassifier _ p = invalClassifier))
= 8(p:Classifier)([Profile.allInstances() >select(p|p.age.oclIsUndefined())](p)
, [Profile.allInstances()](p) ^ (age(p) = nullClassifier
_(p = nullClassifier _ p = invalClassifier)).
and where the new predicate [Profile.allInstances()] is defined by o2fdef c as follows:
8(x:Classifier)([Profile.allInstances()], Profile(x)).
ut
Definition 7 Let expr, expr1, expr2, and src be expression of the appropriate type, we
define the mappings o2fdef o, as follow:
max-expressions:
o2fdfn o(src >max()) =
{App(o2feval(src >max()), fVars(src)) = invalInt), o2f inval(src),
App(o2feval(src >max()), fVars(src)) = nullInt
, (¬(o2f inval(src)) ^ 8(x)(App(o2feval(src), fVars(src), x)) x = nullInt)),
((App(o2feval(src >max()), fVars(src)) 6= nullInt
^ App(o2feval(src >max()), fVars(src)) 6= invalInt))
, (¬(o2f inval(src))
^ App(o2feval(src), fVars(src),App(o2feval(src >max()), fVars(src)))
^ 8(y)(App(o2feval(src), fVars(src), y)
) App(o2feval(src >max()), fVars(src))   y)))}.
min-expressions:
o2fdfn o(src >min()) =
{App(o2feval(src >min()), fVars(src)) = invalInt), o2f inval(src),
App(o2feval(src >min()), fVars(src)) = nullInt
, (¬(o2f inval(src))
^ 8(x)(App(o2feval(src), fVars(src), x)) x = nullInt)),
((App(o2feval(src >min()), fVars(src)) 6= nullInt
^ App(o2feval(src >min()), fVars(src)) 6= invalInt))
, (¬(o2f inval(src))
^ App(o2feval(src), fVars(src),App(o2feval(src >min()), fVars(src)))
^ 8(y)(App(o2feval(src), fVars(src), y)
) App(o2feval(src >min()), fVars(src))  y)))}.
any-expressions:
o2fdfn o(src >any(xt|body)) =
{App(o2feval(src >any(x|body)), Y ) = invalt, o2f inval(src),
App(o2feval(src >any(x|body)), fVars(src)) = nullOf(t), (¬(o2f inval(src))
^ 8(x)(App(o2feval(src), fVars(src), x)) ¬(o2ftrue(body)))),
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((App(o2feval(src >any(x|body)), Y ) 6= nullt
^ App(o2feval(src >any(x|body)), Y ) 6= invalt)
, (¬(o2f inval(src))
^ App(o2feval(src), fVars(src),App(o2feval(src >any(x|body)), Y ))
^ o2ftrue(body [x 7! x]App(o2feval(src >any(x|body)), Y )))))}.
where Y = fVars(src >any(x|body)), and invalt is the invalid value for the type t.
In what follows we denote by o2fdef(expr) the set of axioms that result from applying
o2fdef c and o2fdef o to the corresponding non-Boolean subexpression in expr . Notice that,
in particular, for each literal integer i and literal string st in expr , o2fdef o generates the
following axioms:
o2fdfn o(i) = {¬(i = nullInt) ^ ¬(i = invalInt)}.
o2fdfn o(st) = {¬(i = nullString) ^ ¬(i = invalString)}
3.1.3 Checking satisfiability
The mapping from OCL into MSFOL generates as output a class of satisfiability prob-
lems that can be e ciently handled by SMT solvers with finite model finding capabilities.
The following remark formalizes the main property of our mapping from OCL to many-
sorted first-order logic.
Remark 1 Let D be a data model, let and I be a set of D-constraints, and let expr be
a Boolean OCL expression. Then, expr evaluates to true in every valid instance of D if
and only if
o2fdata(D) [
 [
inv2I
o2fdef(inv)
!
[
 [
inv2I
{o2ftrue(inv)}
!
[ o2fdef(expr) [ {o2f false(expr)}.
is unsatisfiable.
3.1.4 The OCL2MSFOL tool
OCL2MSFOL [70] is a Java Web Application that implements the mapping. More
specifically, it takes as input a data model D, a set of D-constraints I. Also, the user can
introduce a D-expression expr and request to OCL2MSFOL to map expr to MSFOL using
either o2ftrue, o2f false, o2fnull, or o2f inval. The result will be a file containing the MSFOL
theory, described before.
Figure 3.2 shows the main components of the tool architecture. These are:
DM validator: This component checks whether the input data model fulfills the
restrictions about well-formedness that we explain in Section 2.2.1, so as to serve as
a valid context for OCL queries.
OCL validator: This component parses each OCL query of input in the context of
the data model. Only if a constraint parses correctly (and our mapping covers it),
it is used as input to produce code.
SMT engine selector: This component receives as input the vendor identifier so as
the code generated is syntactically adapted to the selected SMT solver.
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Figure 3.2: OCL2MSFOL tool component architecture
MSFOL model generator: This component generates the engine-specific statements
to create the MSFOL theory.
MSFOL generator: This component generates the SMT solver-specific statements to
create the MSFOL contraints (hypothesis and assertion) corresponding to the input
OCL.
The typical use case for OCLMSFOL is as follows. Suppose a data-model D, with
invariants I, and a Boolean D-expression expr . Then, to check whether there exists a
valid instance of D in which expr evaluates to true, we do the following: i) we input in
OCL2MSFOL the data model D, the set of invariants I, and the expression expr ; ii) we
select the option true; and iii) we input the file generated by OCL2MSFOL into our SMT
solver of choice.
Figure 3.3 shows two screen-shots of the tool interface. If the SMT solver returns sat,
then we know that such an instance of D exists; if the SMT solver returns unsat then
we know that no such an instance of D exists; and, finally, if the SMT solver returns
unknown, then we know that it remains unknown whether such an instance of D exists.
The process is entirely similar if we want to know whether there exists a valid instance of
D in which an expression expr evaluates to false, null, or inval; the only di↵erence is that,
instead of true, we will select, respectively, false, null, or inval.
We introduce below a benchmark for checking the satisfiability of OCL constraints,
and report on our results. All checks are ran on a laptop computer, with an Intel Core
i7 processor running at 3.1GHz with 8Gb of RAM. As back-end theorem-provers, we use
Z3 [30] (version 4.4.1), and CVC4 [10] (version 1.5-prerelease). In the case of Z3, we use
its default setting, but in the case of CVC4, we use two di↵erent settings, namely, with
and without the option finite-model-find. In what follows, we refer to the latter as CVC4
Finite Model (or CVC4fm, for short).
The data model for our benchmark is the basic social network model shown in Fig-
ure 3.1. The Boolean expressions that we consider in our benchmark are the following:
1. Profile.allInstances() >forAll(p|p.age>18)
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Figure 3.3: OCL2MSFOL tool: screenshots
2. Profile.allInstances() >exists(p|p.age<=18)
3. Profile.allInstances() >exists(p|p.age.oclIsUndefined())
4. Profile.allInstances() >exists(p|p.oclIsUndefined())
5. Profile.allInstances() >forAll(p|p.oclIsUndefined())
6. Profile.allInstances() >notEmpty()
7. Profile.allInstances() >collect(p|p.age) >asSet() >exists(a|a.oclIsUndefined())
8. Profile.allInstances() >any(p|p.age>16).oclIsUndefined()
9. Profile.allInstances() >any(p|p.age>16).age.oclIsInvalid()
10. not(Profile.allInstances() >any(p|p.age<16).age.oclIsInvalid())
11. Status.allInstances() >notEmpty()
12. Post.allInstances() >forAll(p|Photo.allInstances() >exists(q|p.id=q.id))
13. Post.allInstances() >forAll(p|not(p.id.oclIsUndefined()))
14. Status.allInstances() >notEmpty()
15. Status.allInstances() >isEmpty()
16. Photo.allInstances() >notEmpty()
17. Photo.allInstances() >isEmpty()
18. Post.allInstances() >notEmpty()
19. Post.allInstances() >isEmpty()
20. Post.allInstances() >forAll(p|Photo.allInstances() >exists(q|p.id=q.id))
21. Photo.allInstances() >forAll(p|p.oclIsKindOf(Post))
22. Photo.allInstances() >forAll(p|p.oclIsKindOf(Timeline))
23. Post.allInstances() >forAll(p|p.oclIsTypeOf(Timeline))
24. Post.allInstances() >forAll(p|not(p.oclIsTypeOf(Post)))
25. 2.oclIsUndefined()
26. Post.allInstances() >forAll(p| Post.allInstances() >forAll(q|p<>q implies p.id<>q.id)
27. Profile.allInstances() >forAll(p|p.myFriends >notEmpty())
In Table 3.1 we show the result of checking, using OCL2MSFOL, the satisfiability of
di↵erent subsets of our benchmark’s Boolean expressions.
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CVC4 Z3 CVC4fm
{1,2} unsat 161 24 48
{1,3} unsat 173 13 22
{2,3} sat — 16 25
{4} unsat 138 15 27
{5} sat — 17 22
{5,6} unsat 172 13 30
{1,7} unsat 237 14 30
{1,8} sat — 18 25
{1,6,8} unsat 198 16 26
{1,9} sat — 18 25
{1,6,9} unsat 200 19 29
{1,10} unsat 203 18 30
{12} sat — 169 27
{11,12,13} sat — 24 174
(a) Undefinedness-related (times in ms)
CVC4 Z3 CVC4fm
{14,20} sat — 105 28
{16,20} sat — 466 32
{17,20} sat — 14 22
{14,17,20} unsat 239 13 26
{16,19} unsat 168 16 28
{21} sat — 17 27
{22} sat — 199 24
{16,22} unsat 149 18 25
{16,23} unsat 148 16 26
{15,17,18,24} unsat 250 15 35
{25} unsat 63 58 24
{11,12,13,18} sat — — 27
{6,27} sat — — 26
{11,12,13,18,26} unsat 352 13 25
(b) Generalization-related (times in ms)
Table 3.1: Checking satisfiability of OCL constraints.
We have grouped all our checks in two tables: (3.1a) contains the checks related to
undefinedness, while (3.1b) contains the checks related to UML generalization. In both
cases, the first column indicates the set of Boolean expressions to be checked for satisfia-
bility; the second column indicates the expected result, according to our understanding of
the semantics of OCL; and the third, fourth, and fifth column indicate, respectively, the
time (in milliseconds) taken by CVC4, Z3, and CVC4 Finite Model to return the expected
result, or ‘—’, in the case they return unknown. Notice that CVC4 Finite Model is able
to return the expected result in all cases, while Z3 and CVC4 return unknown in some
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Figure 3.4: CivilStatus: A civil status model
cases.
3.2 Benchmark
With the intention of helping developers to choose the UML/OCL tool more appro-
priate for their projects, [38] has proposed a benchmark for assessing validation and ver-
ification techniques on UML/OCL models. It includes four models each posing di↵erent
computational challenges. We use this benchmark to assess OCL2MSFOL and to compare
it with other tools for verifying UML/OCL models.
3.2.1 Description
The benchmark proposed in [38] includes four UML/OCL models, namely, CivilStatus,
WritesReviews, DisjointSubclasses, and ObjectsAsIntegers, together with a set of questions
for each of these models. It is su cient for our purpose to consider only the first three
models: CivilStatus, WritesReviews, and DisjointSubclasses.5
CivilStatus
Figure 3.4 shows the first UML class diagram considered in the benchmark. Basically,
it models that a person has a name, a gender (either female or male), a civil status (either
single, married, divorced, or widowed), and possibly a spouse, and that a person has a
husband or a wife or none. The following OCL invariants further constrain this model.6
attributesDefined: A person has a defined name, civil status and gender.
Person.allInstances() >forAll(p|not(p.name.oclIsUndefined()
and not(p.civStat.oclIsUndefined())
and not(p.gender.oclIsUndefined())).
nameIsUnique: A person has a unique name.
Person.allInstances() >forAll(p1|Person.allInstances()
 >forAll(p2|p1 <> p2 implies p1.name <> p2.name)).
5The fourth model, ObjectAsIntegers, is definitely more “artificial”; furthermore, it requires inductive
reasoning, which is out of the scope of both our analysis tool and the tools we are comparing to in this
benchmarking exercise.
6 The benchmark includes an additional constraint about the format of a person’s name, which for our
present purpose we omit here since it plays no significant role in answering the questions later posed about
the model.
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Figure 3.5: WritesReviews: A writes reviews model
femaleHasNoWife: A female person does not possess a wife.
Person.allInstances() >forAll(p|p.gender = Gender::female
implies p.wife.oclIsUndefined()).
maleHasNoHusband: A male person does not possess a husband.
Person.allInstances() >forAll(p|p.gender = Gender::male
implies p.husband.oclIsUndefined()).
hasSpouse EQ civstatMarried: A person has a spouse, if and only if his/her
civil status is married.
Person.allInstances() >forAll(p|
(not(p.spouse.oclIsUndefined()) implies p.civStat = CivilStatus::married)
and (p.civStat = CivilStatus::married implies not(p.spouse.oclIsUndefined()))).
In the benchmark the following questions are posed about this model:
1. Consisten tInvariants: Is the model consistent? That is, is there at least one
instance of the model satisfying all the stated invariants?
2. Independence: Are all the invariants independent? Or, on the contrary, is there at
least one invariant which is a consequence of the conditions imposed by the model
and the other invariants?
3. Consequences: Is the model bigamy-free? Or, on the contrary, is it possible for a
person to have both a wife and a husband?
WritesReviews
Figure 3.5 shows the second UML class diagram considered in the benchmark. Basi-
cally, it models a simple conference review system. There are papers and researchers. A
paper has a title and a number of words, and can be a studentPaper. A researcher has
a name and can be a student. A researcher can be assigned at most one submission to
review it and can submit at most one manuscript. A paper can have one or two authors
and must be assigned exactly three referees. The following invariants further constrain
this model:
oneManuscript: A researcher must submit one manuscript.
Researcher.allInstances() >forAll(r| not(r.manuscript.oclIsUndefined())).
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oneSubmission: A research must be assigned one submission.
Researcher.allInstances() >forAll(r|not(r.submission.oclIsUndefined())).
noSelfReviews: A paper cannot be refereed by one of its authors.
Researcher.allInstances() >forAll(r| not(r.submission.oclIsUndefined())
r.submission.author >forAll(a|a<>r))).
paperLength: A paper must have at most 10000 words.
Paper.allInstances() >forAll(p|p.wordCount < 10000).
authorsOfStudentPaper: One of the authors of a student paper must be a student.
Paper.allInstances() >forAll(p|(p.studentPaper = 1)
p.author >exists(x|x.isStudent = 1))).
Paper.allInstances() >forAll(p| (p.author >exists(x|x.isStudent = 1))
p.studentPaper = 1)).
noStudentReviewers: Students are not allowed to review any paper.
Paper.allInstances() >forAll(p|p.referee >forAll(r|r.isStudent <> 1)).
limitsOnStudentPapers: There must be at least one student paper.7
Paper.allInstances() >exists(p|p.studentPaper = 1).
In the benchmark the following questions are posed about this model:
1. InstantiateNonemptyClass: Can the model be instantiated with non-empty pop-
ulations for all classes? That is, is there at least one instance of this model with at
least one paper and one researcher?
2. InstantiateNonemptyAssoc: Can the model be instantiated with non-empty
populations for all classes and all associations? That is, is there at least one in-
stance of this model with at least one paper, one researcher, one instance of the
manuscript-author association, and one instance of the submission-referee associa-
tion?
3. InstantiateInvariantIgnore: Can the model be instantiated if the invariants one-
Manuscript and oneSubmission are ignored?
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Figure 3.6: DisjointSubclasses: A disjoint subclasses datamodel
DisjointSubclasses
Figure 3.6 shows the third UML class diagram considered in the benchmark. There
are four classes: A, B, C, and D. Class B and C inherit from class A, while class D inherits
from both class B and class C. The following invariant further constrains this model:
disjointBC: Class B and class C are disjoint.
C.allInstances() >forAll(x|B.allInstances() >forAll(y|x<>y))
In the benchmark the following questions are posed about this model:
1. InstantiateDisjointInheritance: Can all classes be populated? That is, is there
at least one instance of this model with at least one element of each class? In
particular, is there at least one instance of this model with at least one element of
class D?
2. InstantiateMultipleInheritance: Can class D be populated if the constraint dis-
jointBC is ignored?
3.2.2 Results
Comparison with USE and EMFtoCSP
USE [39] and EMFtoCSP [41] are two di↵erent tools for automatically verifying and
validating UML/OCL models. While USE checks UML/OCL consistency using enumera-
tion and SAT-based techniques, EMFtoCSP turns a UML/OCL consistency problem into
a constraint satisfaction problem (CSP) and uses constraint solvers to solve it. In both
cases, the user is required to specify ranges for the class and association extents and for
the attribute domains. The fact that both USE and OCL2MSFOL operate on bounded
search state spaces implies, on the one hand, that, when there is a valid instance of a
7The benchmark requires also that the number of student papers should be less than 5. For the sake of
simplicity, we only consider here the first part of the constraint since the second one plays no significant
role in answering the questions later posed about the model.
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Question Answer Time (in secs) Remarks
ConsistentInvariants sat 0.08
Independence sat
0.29 For invariant 1
0.40 For invariant 2
0.32 For invariant 3
0.34 For invariant 4
0.16 For invariant 5
Consequences unsat 0.24
Table 3.2: Analyzing CivilStatus with OCL2MSFOL
given UML/OCL model within the selected range, both USE and EMFtoCSP will find
it —assuming that the selected range is su ciently small, of course. But, on the other
hand, it also means that, when either USE or EMFtoCSP communicates to the user that
no valid instance of a model has been found, this answer is inconclusive, since a valid
instance may still exist outside of the the selected range.
In what follows we use the benchmark to assess OCL2MSFOL. The results of USE and
EMFtoCSP on this same benchmark were reported in [38]. For the sake of comparison
with OCL2MSFOL, the results obtained by USE and EMFtoCSP are entirely analogous,
and we will draw explicit comparisons only with the former.
All OCL2MSFOL checks were run on a laptop computer, with an Intel Core i7 processor
running at 1.8GHz with 4Gb of RAM. As back-end SMT solver, we use CVC4 (version
1.5-prerelease) with the option finite-model-find. We denote this configuration as
CVC4fmf .
CivilStatus
In Table 3.2 we show the results of analysing, using OCL2MSFOL, the questions posed
in the benchmark about CivilStatus. In particular,
ConsistentInvariants:. CVC4fmf finds a valid instance of CivilStatus and returns
sat. Thus, we can conclude that the model is consistent.
Independence: For each of the five invariants, CVC4fmf finds a valid instance of
a modified version of CivilStatus, where the given invariant is negated while the
other are still a rmed, returning sat in each case. Thus, we can conclude that the
invariants are independent.
Consequences: CVC4fmf returns unsat when the following invariant is added to
CivilStatus:
Person.allInstances() >exists(p|
not(p.husband.oclIsUndefined()) and not(p.wife.oclIsUndefined())).
Thus, we can conclude that the model is bigamy-free.
We can now compare these results with the ones obtained by analyzing CivilStatus
using USE, as reported in [38]. In particular,
ConsistentInvariants: Selecting as search state space the instances of CivilStatus
with exactly one male person and one female person, USE finds a valid instance
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of CivilStatus. Thus, as with OCL2MSFOL, we can conclude that the model is
consistent.
Independence: Selecting as search state space the instances of CivilStatus with
exactly one male person and one female person, for each of the five invariants,
USE finds an instance of CivilStatus such that this invariant is not satisfied while
the others are satisfied. Thus, as with OCL2MSFOL, we can conclude that the
invariants are independent.
Consequences: Selecting as search state space the instances of CivilStatus with
at most three persons, USE is not able to find an instance of CivilStatus which
is bigamy-free. Notice that this answer is inconclusive, since a bigamy instance of
CivilStatus may still exist outside of the selected range. On the contrary, the answer
provided by OCL2MSFOL guarantees that CivilStatus is bigamy-free.
WritesReviews
In Table 3.3 we show the results of analysing, using OCL2MSFOL, the questions posed
in the benchmark about WritesReviews. In particular,
InstantiateNonemptyClass: CVC4fmf returns unsat when the following invari-
ants are added to WritesReviews:
Paper.allInstances() >notEmpty().
Researcher.allInstances() >notEmpty().
Thus, we can conclude that there is no valid instance of WritesReviews with at least
one paper and one researcher.
InstantiateNonemptyAssoc: As expected, CVC4fmf also returns unsat when the
following invariants are added to WritesReviews:
Paper.allInstances() >notEmpty().
Researcher.allInstances() >notEmpty().
Paper.allInstances() >exists(p|p.author >notEmpty()).
Paper.allInstances() >exists(p|p.referee >notEmpty()).
Thus, we can conclude that there is no valid instance of WritesReviews with at least
one paper, one researcher, one instance of the manuscript-author association, and
one instance of the submission-referee association.
InstantiateInvariantIgnore: CVC4fmf returns sat when the invariants oneMa-
nuscript and oneSubmission are removed from WritesReviews. Thus, we can
conclude that, if the invariants oneManuscript and oneSubmission are ignored,
there exists at least one valid instance of WritesReviews.
We can now compare these results with the ones obtained by analyzing WritesReviews
using USE, as reported in [38]. In particular,
InstantiateNonemptyClass: Selecting as search state space the instances of Writes-
Reviews with at most four researchers and four papers, USE is not able to find a
valid instance of WritesReviews with at least one researcher and one paper. Again,
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Question Answer Time (in secs) Remarks
InstantiateNonemptyClass unsat 0.66
InstantiateNonemptyAssoc unsat 1.70
InstantiateInvariantIgnore sat 0.22
Table 3.3: Analyzing WritesReviews with OCL2MSFOL
Question Answer Time (in secs) Remarks
InstantiateDisjointInheritance unsat 0.08
InstantiateMultipleInheritance sat 0.06
Table 3.4: Analyzing DisjointSubclasses with OCL2MSFOL
notice that this answer is inconclusive, since a valid instance of WritesReviews with
at least one researcher and one paper may still exist outside the selected range. On
the contrary, the answer provided by OCL2MSFOL guarantees that no valid instance
of WritesReviews exists with at least one researcher and one paper.
InstantiateNonemptyAssoc: The result is exactly as in the case of Instanti-
ateNonemptyClass.
InstantiateInvariantIgnore: Having removed fromWritesReviews the constraints
oneManuscript and oneSubmission, and selecting as search state space the in-
stances of WritesReviews with exactly one paper and at most four researchers, USE
finds a valid instance of WritesReviews. Thus, as with OCL2MSFOL, we can con-
clude that, if the constraints oneManuscript and oneSubmission are ignored,
there is at least one valid instance of WritesReviews.
DisjointSubclasses
In Table 3.4 we show the results of analysing, using OCL2MSFOL, the questions posed
in the benchmark about DisjointSubclasses. In particular,
InstantiateDisjointInheritance: CVC4fmf returns unsat when the following in-
variant is added to DisjointSubclasses:
D.allInstances() >notEmpty()
Thus, we can conclude that there is no valid instance of DisjointSubclasses with at
least one element of class D.
InstantiateMultipleInheritance: CVC4fmf returns sat when the following invari-
ant is added to DisjointSubclasses
D.allInstances() >notEmpty()
and at the same time the invariant disjointBC is removed from DisjointSubclasses.
Thus, we can conclude that, if the constraint disjointBC is ignored, there is at least
one instance of DisjointSubclasses with at least one element of class D.
We can now compare these results with the ones obtained by analyzing DisjointSub-
classes using USE, as reported in [38]. In particular,
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InstantiateDisjointInheritance: Selecting as search state space the instances of
DisjointSubclasses with exactly one element of class A, one of class B, one of class
C, and one of class D, USE is not able to find a valid instance of DisjointSubclasses.
Notice that this answer is again inconclusive, since a valid instance of DisjointSub-
classes may still exist outside of the selected range. On the contrary, the answer
provided by OCL2MSFOL guarantees that no valid instance of DisjointSubclasses
exists at all with at least one element of class D.
InstantiateMultipleInheritance: Having eliminated from DisjointSubclasses the
constraint disjointBC, and selecting as search state space the instances of Dis-
jointSubclasses with exactly one element of class A, one of class B, one of class C, and
one of class D, and removing from DisjointSubclasses the constraint DisjointBC,
USE finds an instance of DisjointSubclasses. Therefore, as with OCL2MSFOL, we
can conclude that, if the constraint DisjointBC is ignored, there is at least one
instance of DisjointSubclasses with at least one element of class D.
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In this chapter we report on a number of non-trivial case studies that we carried out, at
di↵erent stages in our work, in order to validate the applicability (e ciency, usability) of
our mapping(s) from OCL to (many-sorted) first-order logic. Following the evolution of our
research, and, in particular, of our growing understanding of the di↵erent available SMT
solvers and of their heuristics, each case study used a di↵erent version of our mapping and
(in some cases also) a di↵erent SMT solver. In this regard, the actual figures reported here
regarding execution times are not as relevant as the fact that the case studies cover a wide
range of di↵erent application domains of practical interest, and that they were successfully
completed even using (in some cases) rather preliminary versions of our mapping and SMT
solvers.
4.1 Checking model satisfiability
4.1.1 The eHealth record management system
This case study was proposed within NESSoS, the European Network of Excellence
on Engineering Secure Future Internet Software Services and Systems [62]. It consists of
a electronic health record management (EHRM). Electronic health records (EHR) record
information created by, or on behalf of, a health professional in the context of the care of
a patient. Electronic health records are highly sensitive. Here we check satisfiability over
data model and a set of OCL invariants, using OCL2MSFOL.
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Figure 4.1: EHR: a data model for a basic eHealth Record Management System.
Data model
The data model for our case study, shown in Figure 4.1, models a basic eHealth man-
agement system. It contains 9 classes, 3 generalizations, 24 attributes, and 10 associations.
We discuss below just the entities, attributes, and association-ends that are required
for our case study.
Professional. This class represents the EHRM’s users. The medical centers where a
user works are linked to the user through the association-end worksIn.
MedicalCenter. This class represents medical centers. The departments belonging to a
medical center are linked to the medical center through the association-end departments.
The professionals working for a medical center are linked to the medical center through
the association-end employees.
Doctor. This class represents doctor information. Doctor is a subclass of Professional.
The departments where a doctor works are linked to the doctor’s information through the
association-end departments. The patients treated by a doctor are linked to the doctor’s
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information through the association-end patients. Doctors can be substituted by another
doctor through the association-end substitutedby.
Director. This class represents director information. Director is a subclass of Professional.
Nurse. This class represents nurse information. Nurse is a subclass of Professional.
The departments where a nurse works are linked to the nurse’s information through the
association-end departments.
Department. This class represents departments. The medical center to which a de-
partment belongs is linked to the department through the association-end belongsTo. The
doctors working in a department are linked to the department through the association-end
doctors. The patients treated in a department are linked to the department through the
association-end patients.
Patient. This class represents patients. The doctor treating a patient is linked to the
patient through the association-end doctor. The department where a patient is treated is
linked to the patient through the association-end department.
Referral. This class represents referrals. The doctor can by referred by a referral
through the association-end referredBy. And a patient can be also referred by a referral
through the association-end patient.
ContactInfo. This class contain the contact information.
OCL invariants
The data model for our case study also contains 38 invariants, which can be grouped
in the 5 categories:1
G1. Invariants stating the non-emptiness of certain classes. For example, There must be
at least one medical center.
MedicalCenter.allInstances() >notEmpty().
There are 9 invariants in this category, one for each class in the data model: namely,
MedicalCenter, Department, Professional, Director, Doctor, Nurse, Referral, Patient,
and ContactInfo.
G2. Invariants stating the definedness of certain attributes. For example, The name of a
professional cannot be undefined.
Professional.allInstances() >forAll(p|not(p.name.oclIsUndefined())).
There are 11 invariants in this category, stating the definedness of the attributes
name (MedicalCenter), city (MedicalCenter), country (MedicalCenter), director
(MedicalCenter), name (Department), name (Professional), surname (Professional),
login (Professional), password (Professional), contactInfo (Patient), and license
(Nurse),
1Notice that the given set of invariants is not intended to be complete.
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G3. Invariants stating the uniqueness of certain data with respect to certain attributes.
For example, There cannot be two di↵erent doctors with the same medical license
number.
Doctor.allInstances() >forAll(d1|Doctor.allInstances() >forAll(d2|
not(d1=d2) implies not(d1.license=d2.license)).
There are 5 invariants in this category, stating the uniqueness of certain data with
respect to di↵erent attributes. In particular, data of the class MedicalCenter,
when considering together address, zipCode, city, and country; data of the class
Professional, with respect to login; data of the class Doctor, with respect to license;
data of the class Nurse, with respect to license; and data of the class Referral, when
considering together patient, referringTo, and referredBy.
G4. Invariants stating the non-emptiness of certain association-ends. For example, Every
medical center should have at least one employee.
MedicalCenter.allInstances() >forAll(m|m.employees >notEmpty()).
There are in total 6 invariants in this category, stating the non-emptiness of the
association-ends employees (MedicalCenter), belongsTo (Department), doctors (Depart-
ment), nurses (Department), patient (Referral), referredBy (Referral), doctor (Patient),
and department (Patient).
G5. Other invariants: namely,
A patient should be treated in a department where his/her doctor works.
Patient.allInstances() >forAll(p|
p.doctor.departments >exists(d|d=p.department))
A professional cannot have an empty string as password.
Professional.allInstances() >forAll(p|not(p.password = ‘’))
A professional cannot have an empty string as login.
Professional.allInstances() >forAll(p|not(p.login = ‘’))
If a doctor’s status is ‘unavailable’, then he/she should have a substitute di↵erent
from him/herself.
Doctor.allInstances() >forAll(d|d.status=‘unavailable’ implies
(not(d.substitutedBy.oclIsUndefined() or d.substitutedBy = d)))
If doctor’s status is ‘available’, then he/she should not have any substitute.
Doctor.allInstances() >forAll(d|
d.status=‘available’ implies d.substitutedBy.oclIsUndefined())
If a doctor is a substitute of other doctors, his/her status should be ‘available’.
Doctor.allInstances() >forAll(d|
d.substitutions >notEmpty() implies d.status=“available”)
If a referral indicates both the patient and the doctor whom the patient is referred
to, then the doctor who is referring the patient cannot be the same than the doctor
whom the patient is referred to.
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Referral.allInstances() >forAll(r|
not(r.patient.oclIsUndefined() and r.referringTo.oclIsUndefined())
implies not(r.referringTo = r.referredBy))
4.1.2 Checking data model satisfiability
In what follows we report on the results obtained in our case study. We use our map-
ping OCL2MSFOL, and we check the generated theories using the SMT solver CVC4fmf .
Finally, we ran the code generated on a machine with an Intel Core2 processor running at
2.83 GHz with 8GB of RAM. The code generated by the mapping is available in [70].
The first experiment we carried out was to check whether there exists an instance of
the case study’s data model satisfying all the given invariants. Using CVC4fmf we obtained
the answer in 6 seconds. In particular, we show in Figure 4.2 the valid instance of the case
study’s data-model automatically generated by CVC4fmf .
The second experiment consisted in checking whether there exists a valid instance of
the case study’s data model for which the following also holds:
There exists only one doctor and his/her status is “unavailable”.
Doctor.allInstances() >exists(d1|
d1.status=’unavailable’ and Doctor.allInstances() >forAll(d1|d1=d2)).
Figure 4.2: Automatically generated instance of the case study’s data model satisfying all
the invariants.
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Using CVC4fmf we obtained unsat in about 4 seconds. This is the expected result,
since there is an invariant stating that “if a doctor’s status is ‘unavailable’, then he/she
should have a substitute di↵erent from him/herself.”
Finally, the third experiment consisted in checking whether there exists a valid instance
of the case study’s data model for which the following holds:
There exists only one doctor
Doctor.allInstances >exists(d1|Doctor.allInstances >forAll(d2|d1=d2)).
In this experiment, we obtained sat in 6 seconds. This may be an unexpected result,
since there is an invariant stating that “that there must be at least one referral” and there
is another invariant stating that “if a referral has defined both the patient and the doctor
to whom the patient is referred to, then the doctor referring the patient cannot be the
same than the doctor the patient is referred to”. However, the result returned by CVC4fmf
is correct, since there is no invariant stating that every referral has defined the doctor to
whom the patient is referred to. Therefore, it is certainly possibly a valid instance of the
case study’s data model basically containing only one doctor and only one referral in which
the doctor to whom the patient is referred to is not defined. This is in fact the instance
automatically generated by CVC4fmf when returning sat in this experiment. Of course, if
we want to “correct” this, we can simply add to the case study’s data model the following
invariant:
Referral.allInstances() >forAll(r|not(r.referringTo.oclIsUndefined()))
Then, if we run again the experiment, the answer returned by CVC4fmf , in about 4 seconds,
is unsat.
4.1.3 Concluding remarks
We have reported here on a non-trivial case study, which shows that our mapping can
be used for e ciently checking the satisfiability of non-trivial UML/OCL models using
SMT solvers with finite model finding capabilities.
However, the reader should not forget that our results ultimately depend on the (hard-
won) positive logical interaction between (i) our formalization of UML/OCL in MSFOL,
and (ii) the heuristics implemented in the SMT solver.
This means, in particular, that changes in the SMT solver’s heuristics may have con-
sequences (hopefully positive) in the applicability of OCL2MSFOL. It also means that a
deeper understanding from our part of the SMT solver’s heuristics may lead us to redefine
OCL2MSFOL.
4.2 Validating and instantiating metamodels
4.2.1 The Core Security Metamodel (CSM)
Development of secure applications is a challenging task due to the evolvable risks
that threaten any system under design. Nowadays, the exposure of systems to cloud en-
vironments claims for a stronger development approach able to support a large number of
complex security requirements and interplay in the creation of cloud applications. Most
of the proposed approaches agree in the necessity to sit a solid and a↵ordable engineer-
ing process that can prevent, from design time, non-secure states due to wrong security
4.2. Validating and instantiating metamodels 73
«Metaclass»
CP_RM_Application_Sec_Requirement
+URI : String
+xml : String
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Figure 4.3: Core Security Metamodel
mechanisms used as a late solution [43]. In line with this approach, the CluUMULUS [23]
and the PARIS [74] EU projects have proposed a security engineering process to develop
secure applications. It includes a complete Model Based System Engineering (MBSE)
methodology to address the di↵erent stages involved in the development of secure and
privacy preserving applications. We focus here on the first stage of the corresponding
work flow: the Core Security metamodel (CSM), designed to gather and represent the
security knowledge. The CSM and the OCL validation rules imposed on it establish a
language that supports, validates and drives instance creation and subsequent steps of the
engineering process.
Data model
Reflecting the complexity of the security field, the CSM is a composition of 6 sub-
models that address di↵erent security expertise sub-areas. Thus, CSM instantiation is
facilitated by these groups of related elements which are displayed in the metamodel with
di↵erent colors, as shown in Figure 4.3.2 Next we describe these sub-models, also to
understand how they fit together.
Requirement sub-model (green): it is used to qualify security and certification re-
quirements by means of security valuators, mechanisms and certified services.
Property sub-model (yellow): it is used to describe abstract security properties in-
volved in a security requirement, specifying its attributes and values.
2CSM has been already proved its use for real applications to integrate security mechanisms in high
risk environments [83, 84], but using a di↵erent security engineering process in the context of the SecFutur
Project [88].
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Domain sub-model (brown): it is used to describe the domain or context of the CSM
instance, identifying the assets to be protected.
Solution sub-model (pink): it is used to show how the security requirements will be
achieved by means of solutions and security mechanisms.
Assurance sub-model (blue): it is used to specify the assurance profile and the
certification-related elements that would fulfill the certification requirements.
Service Level Agreement sub-model (light blue): it is used to specify SLA agreements
that may a↵ect the security properties.
The CUMULUS engineering process aims not only at supporting experts to express
their expertise into a model, but also to orchestrate an automated sorting and processing of
that information to make it accessible and useful for non security experts. The e↵ectiveness
of this approach heavily relies on the OCL validation system which supports three goals
in the CSM instantiation activity:
1. Perform an active validation of the modeling process. This validation raises a warn-
ing if the instance does not conform to the metamodel. It also highlights the pieces
of information that are missing or wrong. This validation helps experts to avoid
wrong specifications that would impact the run time of the system.
2. Check that required information is present. It validates whether a valid CSM in-
stance lacks information that is needed by the engineering activities. E.g., transitive
association between specific components, empty attributes, etc..
3. Guide experts during the creation of the CSM instance. They are guided towards
the next piece of information that is needed and its goal in the engineering process.
Therefore the list of OCL constraints is expected to be consistent and reactive enough
to support constant interaction with it. Our rules drive an incremental validation system
that is gradually triggered within the MagicDraw modelling framework [55].
OCL Invariants.
The OCL validation package is composed of 33 invariants. Out of these, 27 are struc-
tural constraints restraining metamodel associations. Next, we introduce those OCL in-
variants that do not deal directly with multiplicities.
1. A domain instance must exist and be unique.
CP DM Domain.allInstances() >size() = 1
2. A certification requirement needs to be associated with a service assurance profile.
CP RM Certification Requirement.allInstances() >forAll(c|
(not c.URI.oclIsUndefined()) implies c.service assurance profile >notEmpty())
3. A certification requirement must be linked directly and through a security pattern
to a security requirement and a property
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CP PM Property.allInstances() >forAll(c|
c.certification requirement >notEmpty() implies
c.certification requirement.sec pattern.sec requirement
 >intersection(c.sec requirement) >notEmpty())
4. A certification requirement should be directly linked to a property and a security
pattern for that property
CP RM Certification Requirement >forAll(c|
c.property >intersection(c.sec pattern.property) >notEmpty())
5. An asset stereotype is set up over an asset element that must be considered by an
application security requirement of that asset stereotype domain
CP DM Asset Stereotype.allInstances() >forAll(c|
(not c.asset element.oclIsUndefined()) implies
c.domain sec requirement.application sec requirement.
asset element >includes(c.asset element))
6. A security pattern must display a security solution
CP SM Sec Pattern.allInstances() >forAll(c|
(not c.URI.oclIsUndefined()) implies (not c.sec solution.oclIsUndefined()))
4.2.2 Validating the Core Security metamodel
We explain now the analysis that we perform on the OCL constrained CSM metamodel
once it is translated to FOL. We use the mapping OCL2FOL+ and we check the generated
theories using the SMT solver CVC4fmf . Finally, we ran the code generated on a machine
with an Intel Core2 processor running at 2.83 GHz with 8GB of RAM. The code generated
by the mapping is available in [69]. We first tried to check whether the OCL constraints
imposed on the CSM were or not unsatisfiable (and generate an example in the latter
case) by feeding them to the SMT solvers Z3 [30] and CVC4 [10]. However, after more
than 3 hours running, they did not return any result, and we decided to stop them. We
know that this lack of result from Z3 and CVC4 is due to the fact that current techniques
for dealing with quantified formulas in SMT are generally incomplete. In particular, they
usually have problems to prove the unsatisfiability of a formula with universal quantifiers.
Then, we decided to employ CVC4 as a finite model finder on our specification to check
its satisfiability because the input required by it is the same input for the SMT solvers.
CVC4 performed a bounded checking and succeeded by returning sat and automatically
producing finite instances that conform to the OCL constrained CSM. Let us note that
to work with the finite model finder CVC4, since the output of our tool [70] is SMT-LIB,
we only needed to change in our mapping the sorts Int by a finite sort U. CVC4 run less
than 30 seconds to answer SAT and return a simple CSM instance.
Then, we included additional OCL constraints to require a defined URI for all instances
of CP SM Sec Pattern, to contain a minimum of two CP RM Attack instances, and at least
one instance of each of the next classes: CP RM Attack Type, CP RM Certification Require-
ment, CP SM Sec Solution and CP SM Sec Mechanism.
They ensure that generated instances contain at least a minimum amount of information
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application_sec_requirement = AppRequirement_Ins
domain = Domain_Ins
«Metaclass»
AssetElement_Ins : CP_DM_Asset_Element
domain = Domain_Ins
domain_sec_requirement = DomRequirement_Ins
«Metaclass»
AssetStereotype_Ins : CP_DM_Asset_Stereotype
certification_requirement = CertificationReq_Ins
property = Property_Ins
sec_requirement = DomRequirement_Ins, 
AppRequirement_Ins
sec_solution = Solution_Ins
URI = "uri_to_repository"
«Metaclass»
SecPattern_Ins : CP_SM_Sec_Pattern
certification_requirement = CertificationReq_Ins
domain = Domain_Ins
sec_pattern = SecPattern_Ins
sec_requirement = DomRequirement_Ins, 
AppRequirement_Ins
«Metaclass»
Property_Ins : CP_PM_Property
attack = Attack_Ins1, Attack_Ins2
sec_requirement = DomRequirement_Ins, 
AppRequirement_Ins
«Metaclass»
Threat_Ins : CP_RM_Threat
asset_stereotype = AssetStereotype_Ins
property = Property_Ins
sec_pattern = SecPattern_Ins
threat = Threat_Ins
«Metaclass»
DomRequirement_Ins : 
CP_RM_Domain_Sec_Requirement
asset_element = AssetElement_Ins
asset_stereotype = AssetStereotype_Ins
property = Property_Ins
«Metaclass»
Domain_Ins : CP_DM_Domain
asset_element = AssetElement_Ins
property = Property_Ins
sec_pattern = SecPattern_Ins
threat = Threat_Ins
«Metaclass»
AppRequirement_Ins : 
CP_RM_Application_Sec_Requirement
sec_mechanism = Mechanism_Ins
«Metaclass»
Solution_Ins : CP_SM_Sec_Solution
property = Property_Ins
security_pattern = SecPattern_Ins
«Metaclass»
CertificationReq_Ins : 
CP_RM_Certification_Requirement
attacker_type = AttackerType_Ins
threat = Threat_Ins
«Metaclass»
Attack_Ins2 : CP_RM_Attack
attacker_type = AttackerType_Ins
threat = Threat_Ins
«Metaclass»
Attack_Ins1 : CP_RM_Attack
sec_solution = Solution_Ins
«Metaclass»
Mechanism_Ins : 
CP_SM_Sec_Mechanism
attack = Attack_Ins1, 
Attack_Ins2
«Metaclass»
AttackerType_Ins : 
CP_RM_Attacker_Type
 : implies : implies
 : susceptible
to
 : applies 
to
 : addressed
by
 : susceptible
to
 : includes
 : performed
by
 : performed
by
 : provided by
 : applies 
to
 : addressed
by
 : executed
by
 : executed
by
 : defined into
 : ensured by
 : realized by
Figure 4.4: Automatically generated instance of the security metamodel presented in the
Figure 4.3.
that makes them meaningful for a security expert. Then, we run CVC4 again with these
additional constraints, and after less than 1 minute, the instance that we depict in Fig-
ure 4.4 was returned. The instances so obtained with CVC4 match structurally those
obtained following the security engineering process and would allow to skip some of its
steps (provided that we could automatically tailor the instances obtained by CVC4 to
serve as inputs for the modeling framework). As we show next, these instances can be
enhanced with knowledge (semantics) from the security domain so as they can serve as
input for subsequent steps of the security engineering process.
4.2.3 Security enhanced CSM instances
As we already mentioned, the CSM is part of an assisted methodology, supported by
the CUMULUS modelling tool [24], that has been initially conceived to take advantage
of the multiple capabilities provided by the MagicDraw framework [55], particularly of its
OCL validation engine. This methodology aims at supporting security experts to specify
and communicate to system engineers how to solve security issues for cloud applications.
When security experts design their models, i.e., CSM instances, the CUMULUS frame-
work guides the construction of these instances (Domain Security Metamodels-DSMs) with
the OCL rules that are continuously validated over them, raising warnings that claim for
mandatory elements that are not yet present or errors. This process establishes a com-
mon format for the knowledge modeled, ensuring its applicability later on. The resulting
instance (i.e., a DSM) is a validated artifact ready to transform security requirements into
certification requirements and links to the solutions and mechanisms able to assure local
system architectures and their interaction with cloud platforms [6].
For example, the rule 1 in Section 4.2.1 requires a unique domain instance. Experts
dealing with security knowledge in the EHealth domain in cloud environments may de-
scribe a model for non security experts so as to improve a health care process (we follow
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description = "The  cloud storage service, with or without support from the 
underlying operating system, must provide the means of protecting patient data 
from disclosure while data remains in the persistent medium."
«Metaclass»
Data protection in Storage : CP_SM_Sec_Solution
assumptions = "Transmitted message is send with authorization"
description = "Communication between two ends is monitored and 
modified by an unauthorized party"
«Metaclass»
Man in the middle : CP_RM_Attack
description = "An attacker discover the used password in the 
solutions mechanism through the use of common terms in a 
dictionary designed for that purpose or by using brute force "
«Metaclass»
Cracking : CP_RM_Attack
description = "It  represents any patient record(s) or personal 
data elements to be uploaded to remote locations"
type = "table, file"
«Metaclass»
patient Record : CP_DM_Asset_Element
description = "It  represents all the elements containing 
o referring private data about the patients"
«Metaclass»
private Data : CP_DM_Asset_Stereotype
impact = "High"
motivation = "Gain access to unauthorized patient data"
objective = "Expose sensitive data "
type = "Active"
«Metaclass»
Data Disclosure : CP_RM_Threat
abstractCategory = "Confidentiality"
context = "InStorage, InTransit"
description = "To  ensure that information is 
accessible only to those authorized to have access"
«Metaclass»
Data Confidentiality : CP_PM_Property
description = "It  describes means to locally 
enforce data protection with remote certification 
to securely enable data transmission."
security_solution = Data  protection in Storage
URI = "http://repo.uma.es/Conf.InStorage-1.1.xml"
«Metaclass»
SecPattern_Ins : CP_SM_Sec_Pattern
description = "High-grade symmetric encryption 
using standardized NIST approved algorithm 
AES with an allowed cryptographic key size (FIPS 
PUB 197)"
«Metaclass»
AES : CP_SM_Sec_Mechanism
description = "Providers  must to guarantee 
certified services for confidentiality and in 
compliance with data access level 3 or above"
«Metaclass»
Confidentiality data-access-level : 
CP_RM_Certification_Requirement
description = "All  output operations to send 
and store data in cloud servers should avoid 
the exposure of private patient information"
«Metaclass»
Secure cloud storage communications : 
CP_RM_Application_Sec_Requirement
description = "The  EHealth data laws and 
policies enforces the protection and non 
disclosure of all the patient accounts and 
private data in ICT systems"
«Metaclass»
EHealth data protection : 
CP_RM_Domain_Sec_Requirement
description = "eHealth  is the use of 
emerging information and 
communications technology (ICT), to 
improve or enable health and healthcare"
«Metaclass»
EHealth : CP_DM_Domain
capability = "Intercept Message 
transmission"
resources = "High"
type = "External"
«Metaclass»
Malicious User : 
CP_RM_Attacker_Type
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Figure 4.5: Domain Security Metamodel
Figure 4.5). Domain specification is critical to upload DSMs into the appropriate repos-
itory, to classify the DSM content adequately. Once a valid domain instance has been
created, the validation system triggers those rules that are not yet satisfied so as the
model has to be extended to fulfill them.
Here we do not describe in full the DSM creation process. But we further describe the
DSM instance in Figure 4.5. It contains as security requirements EHealth data protection
and Secure cloud storage communications, both associated to the threat Data Disclosure.
In addition, we have created an additional asset patient record, potential attacks as Crack-
ing or Man in the middle and, finally, a common attacker type Malicious User. Probably,
the most important part of a DSM is the selection of security patterns and certification
requirements. The issue to be solved is described in the pattern, in our example, means
to locally enforce data protection with remote certification to securely enable data trans-
mission. How it should be guaranteed is specified by the certification requirement, in our
example, the usage of certified services for confidentiality and in compliance with data ac-
cess level 3 or above. Both plain descriptions have consequences in the security engineering
process because they limit the solutions to be deployed for cloud applications. Recalling
subsection 4.2.1, the last constraint requires that for a security pattern and a solution to
be linked, the URI attribute of the pattern must be defined. This constraint demands
intervention of the security expert since they search and select from existing repositories,
through an API provided by the framework, a suitable pattern that also links a target
solution, e.g., Data protection in Storage and a security mechanism, e.g., AES. As a re-
sult of the modeling process, security experts provide a complete artifact ready to fulfill
security requirements addressing both the local mechanisms and the remote certification
requirements.
Finally, we remark that both instances shown in Figures 4.4 and 4.5 resp., are struc-
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turally identical. Thus, the engineering process receive a shortcut from the use of au-
tomatic finite model finders that ease the path and reduce the time required to build
instances since they can automatically generate them. Then, instances can be enhanced
with security domain specific knowledge and trigger subsequent engineering activities.
4.2.4 Concluding remarks
We have introduced here a security metamodel constrained by 33 OCL rules. We have
formally analyzed this metamodel, which is both complex and large, and its constraints,
using our mapping to automatically map the metamodel and its constraints to first order
logic. Then, we have successfully employed a finite model finder, CVC4, for checking the
satisfiability of the resulting specification. Moreover, we have illustrated how the instances
automatically generated by CVC4 conform to the aforementioned security metamodel and
its constraints.
4.3 Analyzing security models
Nowadays, most of the main database management systems o↵er, in one way or an-
other, the possibility of protecting data using fine-grained access control policies, i.e.,
policies that depend on dynamic properties of the system state. Reasoning about these
policies typically amounts to answering questions about whether a security-related prop-
erty holds in a (possibly infinite) set of system states.
In this section we discuss how to carry out formal reasoning about fine-grained access
control policies using our mapping OCL2MSFOL.
4.3.1 SecureUML
SecureUML [11] is a modeling language for specifying fine-grained access control poli-
cies (FGAC) for actions on protected resources.
Using SecureUML, one can then model access control decisions that depend on two
kinds of information:
1. static information, namely the assignments of users and permissions to roles, and
the role hierarchy, and
2. dynamic information, namely the satisfaction of authorization constraints in the
given system state.
Resources and Actions
In SecureUML the protected resources are the entities (classes), along with their at-
tributes and association-ends (but not the associations as such), and the actions that they
o↵er to the actors are those shown in the following table:
Resource Actions
Entity create, delete
Attribute read, update
Association-end read, create, delete
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Authorization Constraints
In SecureUML, authorization constraints specify the conditions that need to be satis-
fied for a permission being granted to an actor (user) who requests it to perform an action.
They are formalized using OCL, but they can also contain the following keywords:
self: it refers to the root resource upon which the action will be performed, if the
permission is granted. The root resource of an attribute or an association-end is the
entity to which it belongs.
caller: it refers to the actor that will perform the action, if the permission is granted.
value: it refers to the value that will be used to update an attribute, if the permission
is granted.
target: it refers to the object that will be linked at the end of an association, if the
permission is granted.
Permissions
SecureUML provides various syntactic sugar constructs for expressing FGAC policies
in a more compact way. Basically, in the ‘sweeter’ presentation of a model, some roles may
not have explicitly assigned any permission for some actions, while the following always
holds in the de-sugared presentation of the model: every role has assigned exactly one
permission for every action, and this permission has assigned exactly one authorization
constraint. The rules for de-sugaring a SecureUML model are the following:
Role hierarchies. Let act be an action and let r and r0 be two roles. Suppose that
r is a subrole of r0 in S, and that there is a permission in S for r0 to execute act
under the constraint auth. Then, when de-sugaring S, we add a new permission to
S for the role r to execute act under the same constraint auth.
Delete actions. Let entity be an entity. Let act be the action delete(entity). Suppose
that there is a permission in S for a role r to execute act under the constraint auth.
Then, when de-sugaring S, for every association-end assoc owned by entity , we add
to S a new permission for r to execute delete(assoc) under the same constraint auth.
Opposite association-ends. Let assoc and assoc0 be two opposite association-ends.
Let act be the action create(assoc). Suppose that there is a permission in S for a
role r to execute act under the constraint auth. Then, when de-sugaring S, we add
to S a new permission for the role r to execute create(assoc0) under the constraint
that results from replacing in auth the variable self by target and the variable target
by self. De-sugaring is done similarly when act is the action delete(assoc).
Denying by default. Let r be a role and let act be an action. Suppose that there is
no permission in S for the role r to execute act . When de-sugaring S, we add to S
a new permission for the role r to execute act under the constraint false.
Disjunction of authorization constraints. Let r be a role and let act be an action.
Suppose that there are n permissions in S for the role r to execute act . When de-
sugaring S, we replace these n permissions by a new permission and assign to it the
authorization constraint that results from disjoining together all the authorization
constraints of the original n individual permissions.
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Figure 4.6: EmplBasic: a data model for employees’ information.
In what follows, we will denote by Auth(S, r, act) the authorization constraint assigned,
in the de-sugared presentation of the SecureUML model S, to the role r’s permission for
performing the action act .
4.3.2 A running example
In Figure 4.6 we show a data model, named EmplBasic. This model specifies that
every employee may have a name, a surname, and a salary; that every employee may have
a supervisor and may in turn supervise other employees; and that every employee may
take one of two roles: Worker or Supervisor. Notice that the association-end supervises
has multiplicity 0..*, meaning that an employee may supervise zero or more employees,
while the association-end supervisedBy has multiplicity 0..1 meaning that an employee
may have at most one supervisor.
In Figure 4.7 we show two di↵erent instances of EmplBasic. In Instance 4.7a there
are three employees, e1, e2 and e3, and e1 is supervised by e2, e2 is supervised by e3, and
e3 has no supervisor at all. Moreover, e1 has role Worker and both e2 and e3 have role
Supervisor. Instance 4.7b has also three employees, e1, e2 and e3, but this time e1 is
supervised by e2, e2 is supervised by itself, and e3 has no supervisor at all. As before, e1
has role Worker and both e2 and e3 have role Supervisor.
We can refine the model EmplBasic (Figure 4.6) by adding invariants to this model.
In particular, consider the following constraints:
1. There is exactly one employee who has no supervisor.
2. Nobody is its own supervisor.
3. An employee has role Supervisor if and only if it has at least one supervisee.
4. Every employee has one role.
These constraints can be formalized in OCL as follows:
(1) Employee.allInstances() >one(e|e.supervisedBy.oclIsUndefined())
(2) Employee.allInstances() >forAll(e|not(e.supervisedBy = e))
(3) Employee.allInstances() >forAll(e|
(e.role = Supervisor implies e.supervises >notEmpty())
and (e.supervises >notEmpty() implies e.role = Supervisor))
(4) Employee.allInstances() >forAll(e|not(e.role.oclIsUndefined())
In what follows, we will refer to the constraint (1) as oneBoss, (2) as noSelf- Super,
(3) as roleSuper, and (4) as allRole. Also, we will denote by Empl1 the refined version of
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(a) Instance 1 (b) Instance 2
Figure 4.7: Two instances of EmplBasic
EmplBasic that includes as invariants the constraints oneBoss, noSelfSuper, roleSuper,
and allRole. Notice that these four constraints evaluate to true in Instance 4.7a of
EmplBasic (Figure 4.7), and therefore we say that this instance is a valid instance of
Empl1. On the other hand, since noSelfSuper and roleSuper evaluate to false in In-
stance 4.7b of EmplBasic (Figure 4.7), we say that this other instance is a not a valid
instance of Empl1.
In Figure 4.8 we show a SecureUML model, named Empl. This model specifies a basic
FGAC policy for accessing the employees’ information modeled in Empl1. Permissions are
assigned to users depending on their roles, which can beWorker or Supervisor. Also, users
with role Supervisor inherit all the permissions granted to users with role Worker, since
Supervisor is a subrole of Worker. Finally, permissions are constrained by authorization
constraints: namely,
1. A worker is granted permission to read an employee’s salary, provided that it is its
own salary, as specified by the authorization constraint caller = self.
2. A supervisor is granted unrestricted permission to read an employee’s salary, as
specified by the authorization constraint true.
3. A supervisor is granted permission to update an employee’s salary, provided that it
supervises this employee, as specified by the authorization constraint self.supervisedBy
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Figure 4.8: Empl: a SecureUML model for accessing employees’ information.
= caller.
Example 19 Consider the value of Auth(S, r, act) in the following cases:
Auth(Empl, Worker, update(salary)) = false,
by the rule “denying by default”.
Auth(Empl, Supervisor, update(salary)) = (self.supervisedBy = caller or false),
by the combination of the rules “denying by default”, “role hierarchies”, and “disjunction
of authorization constraints”.
Auth(Empl, Worker, read(salary)) = (caller = self).
Auth(Empl, Supervisor, read(salary)) = (caller = self or true),
by the combination of the rules “denying by default”, “role hierarchies”, and “disjunction
of authorization constraints”. ut
In what follows, when a data model D contains invariants expr1, . . . , exprn, we will
consider that o2fdata(D) includes also the formulas
Sn
i=1 o2ftrue(expr i).
Example 20 Consider the following question about the model Empl1: Is there a valid
instance in which someone is supervised by one of its own supervisees? Let us formalize
the property that no employee is supervised by their own supervisees as follows:
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Employee.allInstances() >forAll(e|e.supervises >excludes(e.supervisedBy)).
We will refer to this expression as noMixSuper. Then, according to Remark 1, the answer
to our question is ‘Yes’ since
o2fdata(Empl1) [ {¬(o2ftrue(noMixSuper))}.
is satisfiable. Indeed, consider, for example, an instance of Empl1 with just four employees,
e1, e2, e3, and e4, such that e1 is linked through the association-end supervisedBy with
e4, and similarly e3 with e2, and e2 with e3. Suppose also that e1 is of role Worker, and
e2, e3, and e4 are of role Supervisor. This instance is certainly a valid one, since all
the invariants evaluate to true. However, the expression noMixSuper evaluates to false
because e2 is linked through supervisedBy with e3, but at the same time e2 is also linked
through the association-end supervises with e3 (since e3 is linked through supervisedBy
with e2). ut
4.3.3 Analyzing fine-grained access control policies
As discussed by [13], SecureUML models have a rigorous semantics. In particular,
let S be a SecureUML model and let I be an instance of its underlying data model.
Also, let u be a user, with role r, and let act be an action, with arguments args. Then,
according to the semantics of SecureUML, S authorizes u to execute act in I if and
only if [Auth(S, r, act)](u,args) evaluates to true in I, where [Auth(S, r, act)](u,args) is the
expression that results from replacing in Auth(S, r, act) the keyword caller by u, and
the keywords self, value, and target by the corresponding values in args.
In what follows, given a SecureUML model S, we use the term scenario to refer to any
valid instance of S’s underlying data model in which a user requests permission to execute
an action. For the sake of simplicity, we will assume that neither the user requesting
permission nor the resource upon which the action will be executed can be undefined.
Next, we will explain, and illustrate with examples, how one can use our mapping
from OCL to MSFOL to reason about SecureUML models. Unless stated otherwise, all
our examples refer to the SecureUML model Empl Recall that this model’s underlying
data model is the model Empl1, which includes the invariants oneBoss, noSelfSuper,
roleSuper, and allRole.
We organize our examples in blocks or categories. In the first block, we are interested
in knowing if there is any scenario in which someone with role r will be allowed to execute
an action act . Notice that, by Remark 1, the answer will be ‘No’ if and only if the following
set of formulas is unsatisfiable:
o2fdata(D) [ {9(caller)9(self )9(target)9(value)
(o2ftrue(caller .role = r) ^ o2ftrue(Auth(S, r, act)))}.
Example 21 Consider the following question: Is there any scenario in which someone
with role Worker is allowed to change the salary of someone else (including itself)? Recall
that
Auth(Empl, Worker, update(salary))= false.
According to Remark 1, the answer to this question is ‘No’, since the following set of
formulas is clearly unsatisfiable:
o2fdata(Empl1) [ {9(caller)9(self )
(o2ftrue(caller .role = Worker) ^ o2ftrue(false))},
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(Note that o2ftrue(false) returns ?.) Indeed, there is no scenario in which the expression
false can evaluate to true. ut
Example 22 Consider the following question: Is there any scenario in which someone
with role Supervisor is allowed to change the salary of someone else (including itself)?
Recall that
Auth(Empl, Supervisor, update(salary)) = (self.supervisedBy = caller or false).
According to Remark 1, the answer to this question is ‘Yes’, since the following set of
formulas is satisfiable:
o2fdata(Empl1) [ {9(caller)9(self )(o2ftrue(caller .role = Supervisor)
^ o2ftrue(self .supervisedBy =caller or false))}.
(Note: o2ftrue(self .supervisedBy = caller) returns supervisedBy(self) = caller). Consider,
for example, a scenario with just two employees, e1 and e2, such that e1 is linked with e2
through the association-end supervisedBy. Suppose also that e1 has roleWorker and e2 has
role Supervisor. Clearly, for caller = e2 and self = e1, the expression self .supervisedBy =
caller evaluates to true in this scenario. ut
Example 23 Consider the following question: Is there any scenario in which someone
with role Supervisor is allowed to change its own salary? Notice that in any scenario in
which someone is requesting to change its own salary, the values of self (i.e., the employee
whose salary is to be updated) and caller (i.e., the employee who is updating this salary) are
the same. According to Remark 1, the answer to this question is ‘No’, since the following
set of formulas is unsatisfiable:
o2fdata(Empl1) [ {9(caller)9(self )(o2ftrue(caller .role = Supervisor)
^ o2ftrue(self = caller and (self .supervisedBy = caller or false)))}.
Indeed, notice that, in every valid scenario the invariant noSelfSuper evaluates to true,
which implies that there are no values for caller and self such that the expressions self =
caller and self .supervisedBy = caller both evaluate to true. ut
Example 24 Consider the following question: Is there any scenario in which someone
with role Supervisor is allowed to change the salary of someone who has no supervisor at
all? Notice that in any scenario in which someone (caller) is requesting to change the
salary of someone (self) who has no supervisor at all, the value of self.supervisedBy must
be null. According to Remark 1, the answer to this question is ‘No’, since the following set
of formulas is unsatisfiable:
o2fdata(Empl1) [ {9(caller)9(self )(o2ftrue(caller .role = Supervisor)
^ o2ftrue(self .supervisedBy = null and (self .supervisedBy = caller or false)))}.
ut
Indeed, notice that, by assumption, caller is always a defined object, i.e., it can not be
null, and therefore, if the expression self .supervisedBy = null evaluates to true, then the
expression self .supervisedBy = caller evaluates to false.
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In our second block of examples, we are interested in knowing if there is any scenario
in which someone with role r will not be allowed to execute an action act . Notice that, by
Remark 1, the answer will be ‘No’ if and only if the following set of formulas is unsatisfiable:
o2fdata(D) [ {9(caller)9(self )9(target)9(value)
(o2ftrue(caller .role = r) ^ o2ftrue(¬(Auth(S, r, act))))}.
Example 25 Consider the following question: Is there any scenario in which someone
with role Supervisor is not allowed to change the salary of someone else (including itself)?
According to Remark 1, the answer to this question is ‘Yes’, since the following set of
formulas is satisfiable:
o2fdata(Empl1) [ {9(caller)9(self )(o2ftrue(caller .role = Supervisor) ^
¬(o2ftrue(self .supervisedBy = caller or false)))}.
Consider, for example, a scenario with just three employees, e1, e2, and e3 such that e1 is
linked with e2 through the association-end supervisedBy, and similarly e2 with e3; but e1
is not linked with e3 through the association-end supervisedBy. Suppose that e2 and e3
have role Supervisor and e1 has role Worker. Clearly, for caller = e3 and self = e1, the
expression self .supervisedBy = caller evaluates to false in this scenario. ut
In our third block of examples, we are interested in knowing if there is any scenario
in which nobody with role r will be allowed to execute an action act. Notice that, by
Remark 1, the answer will be ‘No’ if and only if the following set of formulas is unsatisfiable:
o2fdata(D) [ {9(self )9(target)9(value)8(caller)
(o2ftrue(caller .role = r)) ¬(o2ftrue(Auth(S, r, act))))}.
Example 26 Consider the following question: Is there any scenario in which nobody
with role Supervisor is allowed to change the salary of someone else (including itself)?
According to Remark 1, the answer to this question is ‘Yes’, since the following set of
formulas, is satisfiable:
o2fdata(Empl1) [ {9(self )8(caller)(o2ftrue(caller .role = Supervisor))
¬(o2ftrue(self .supervisedBy = caller or false)))}.
Indeed, consider, for example, a scenario with just two employees, e1 and e2, such that
e1 is linked with e2 through the association-end supervisedBy. Suppose that e1 has role
Worker and e2 has role Supervisor. Clearly, for self = e2, for every value for caller , the
expression self .supervisedBy = caller evaluates to false. ut
In our fourth block of examples, we are interested in knowing if, in every scenario,
there is at least one object upon which nobody with role r will be allowed to execute an
action act. Notice that, by Remark 1, the answer will be ‘Yes’ if and only if the following
set of formulas is unsatisfiable:
o2fdata(D) [ {8(self )9(target)9(value)9(caller)
(o2ftrue(caller .role = r) ^ o2ftrue(Auth(S, r, act)))}.
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Example 27 Consider the following question: In every scenario, is there at least one
employee whose salary can not be changed by anybody with role Supervisor? According
to Remark 1, the answer to this question is ‘Yes’, since the following set of formulas is
unsatisfiable:
o2fdata(Empl1) [ {8(self )9(caller)(o2ftrue(caller .role = Supervisor) ^
o2ftrue(self .supervisedBy = caller or false))}.
Indeed, notice that in every valid scenario the invariant oneBoss evaluates to true, which
means that there is one employee in the scenario who has no supervisor. In other words,
for every valid scenario, we can find a value for self such that no value for caller can be
found such that the expression self .supervisedBy = caller evaluates to true. ut
Finally, we want to illustrate the importance of taking into account the invariants
of the underlying data model when reasoning about FGAC policies. Let Empl2 be the
data model that results from adding to the model EmplBasic the invariants noSelfSuper,
roleSuper, allRole, plus the following invariant:
5. Everybody has one supervisor.
This invariant, which we will refer to as allSuper, can be formalized in OCL as follows:
Employee.allInstances() >forAll(e|not(e.supervisedBy.oclIsUndefined())).
Example 28 Consider the security model Empl, but this time with Empl2 as its under-
lying data model. Consider again the question that we asked ourselves in Example 26:
namely, is there any scenario in which nobody with role Supervisor is allowed to change
the salary of someone else (including itself)? According to Remark 1, the answer to this
question is di↵erent from Example 26, namely, ‘No’, since the set of formulas is now unsat-
isfiable. Indeed, notice that in every valid scenario the invariants allSuper and roleSuper
both evaluate to true, which means that, for each value for self , we can find a value for
caller such that the expressions self.supervisedBy = caller and caller .role = Supervisor
aboth evaluate to true. ut
Finally, let Empl3 be the data model that results from removing from Empl2, the
invariant roleSuper.
Example 29 Consider the security model Empl, but this time with Empl3 as its underly-
ing data model. Consider, once again, the question that we asked ourselves in Example 26:
namely, is there any scenario in which nobody with role Supervisor is allowed to change
the salary of someone else (including itself)? According to Remark 1, the answer to this
question is now di↵erent from Example 28, namely, ‘Yes’, since the set of formulas is now
satisfiable. Indeed, consider a scenario with three employees e1, e2, and e3, such that e1 is
linked with e2 through the association-end supervisedBy, and similarly e2 with e3 and e3
with e1. Suppose also that e2 and e3 have role Supervisor, but e1 has role Worker. (No-
tice that, since roleSuper is not included in Empl3, nothing prevents e1 from not having
the role Supervisor, despite the fact that it is linked with e3 through the association-end
supervises.) Clearly, for self = e3, for every caller of role Supervisor, namely, e2 and
e3, the expression self .supervisedBy = caller evaluates to false. ut
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We briefly report here on our experience using the Z3 SMT solver [30] to automatically
obtain the answers to the questions posed in the examples in Section 4.3.3. Table 4.1 below
summarizes the results of our experiments. For each example, we show the time it takes
Z3 to return an answer (in all cases, less than 1 second); the answer that it returns (in all
cases, the expected one); and the first-order model that it generates when the answer is
sat, i.e., when it finds that the input set of formulas is satisfiable. Each model represents a
scenario (not necessarily the one discussed in Section 4.3.3 for the corresponding example),
and here we simply indicate the number of employees that it contains, which employees are
linked through the association-end supervisedBy, which employees have the role Worker,
which employees have the role Supervisor, which employee is the one requesting permission
to change the salary (caller), and which employee is the one whose salary will be changed
(self) if permission is granted. We ran our experiments on a laptop computer, with a
2.66GHz Intel Core 2 Duo processor and 4GB 1067 MHz memory, using Z3 version 4.3.2
9d221c037a95-x64-osx-10.9.2. Finally, the input for Z3 has been generated using our tool
SecProver [89]
4.3.4 Concluding remarks
We have presented a novel, tool-supported methodology for reasoning about fine-
grained access control policies (FGAC). We have also reported on our experience using
the Z3 SMT solver for automatically proving non-trivial properties about FGAC policies.
The key component of our methodology is our mapping from OCL to first-order logic,
which allows one to transform questions about FGAC policies into satisfiability problems
in first-order logic. Although this mapping does not cover the complete OCL language, our
experience shows that the kind of OCL expressions typically used for specifying invariants
and authorization constraints are covered by our mapping. More intriguing is, however,
the issue about the e↵ectiveness of SMT solvers for automatically reasoning about FGAC
policies. Ultimately, we know that there is a trade-o↵ when using SMT solvers. On the
one hand, they are necessarily incomplete and their results depend on heuristics, which
may change. In fact, we have experienced (more than once) that two di↵erent versions
of Z3 may return ‘sat’ and ‘unknown’ for the very same problem. This is not surprising
(since two versions of the same SMT solver may implement two di↵erent heuristics) but it
is certainly disconcerting. On the other hand, SMT solvers are capable of checking, in a
fully automatic and very e cient way, the satisfiability of large sets of complex formulas.
In fact, we have examples, involving more than a hundred non-trivial OCL expressions,
which are checked by Z3 in just a few seconds.
4.4 Analyzing privacy models
4.4.1 Facebook: posting and tagging
Nowdays many people consider themselves as “Internet natives” (and many others
are happy “Internet immigrants”): when they need information, they naturally open a
browser and search for it; when they want to share information, they naturally post it on
a social network. At the same time, privacy-related issues are a growing concern among
users of social networking sites and among their regulators.
On December 21, 2011, the O ce of the Irish Data Protection Commissioner (DPC)
announced the results of its “thorough and detailed audit of Facebook’s practices and
policies” [101], which includes, among many others, the following recommendations and
findings [45] (see [46] for a DPC’s follow-up review):
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Example Time Answer Interpretation
21 0.078s unsat —–
22 0.107s sat
#employees = 3
supervisedBy = {(e3, e2), (e1, e2)}
Worker = {e1, e3}
Supervisor = {e2}
caller = e2, self = e1
23 0.041s unsat —–
24 0.042s unsat —–
25 0.306s sat
#employees = 6
supervisedBy = {(e1, e2), (e2, e3), (e4, e2), (e5, e3), (e6, e3)}
Worker = {e1, e4, e5, e6}
Supervisor = {e2, e3}
caller = e3, self = e1
26 0.078s sat
#employees = 1
supervisedBy = ;
Worker = {e1}
Supervisor = ;
self = e1
27 0.485s unsat —–
28 0.060s unsat —–
29 0.506s sat
#employees = 15
supervisedBy = {(e1, e2), (e2, e4), (e3, e4), (e4, e6), (e5, e4),
(e6, e12), (e7, e4), (e8, e14), (e9, e4), (e10, e4), (e11, e15),
(e12, e13), (e13, e4), (e14, e4), (e15, e4)}
Worker = all
Supervisor = ;
self = e2
Table 4.1: Automatic reasoning over the examples 21-29 introduced in Section 4.3.3.
Facebook must work towards:(i) simpler explanations of its privacy policies;
(ii) easier accessibility and prominence of these policies during registration and
subsequently; (iii) an enhanced ability for users to make their own informed
choices based on the available information.
Many policies and procedures that are in operation are not formally docu-
mented. This should be remedy.
We recommend that Facebook introduce increased functionality to allow a
poster to be informed prior to posting how broad an audience will be to view
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their post and that they be notified should the setting on that profile be sub-
sequently change to make a post that was initially restricted available to a
broader audience.
To Facebook’s credit, over the past years, users have been equipped with new tools
and resources which are designed to give them more control over their so-called Facebook
experience, including: an easier way to select your audience when making a new post;
inline privacy control on all your existing posts; the ability to review tags made by others
before they appear on your profile; a tool to view your profile as someone else would see
it; and more privacy education resources. Despite all these e↵orts, many users are still
concerned about how to maintain their privacy or —in Mark Zuckerberg’s own words—
“rightfully questions how their information was protected” [102]. In our opinion, there are
at least three reasons for this:
Facebook’s privacy policy is hardly trivial to understand. For example, when default
policies and privacy settings for posting and tagging conflict to each other (which
happens very often) the solution will depend (sometimes in a convoluted way) on
the existing relationships among all the users involved: the owner of the timeline,
the creator of the post, the creators of the tags, and the reader of the post.
Facebook’s privacy policy has been in a constant state of flux over the past few
years [72], and it is prompted to change again in the future.
Facebook’s privacy policy is only informally and partially described in a collection of
privacy education resources and blogs, which cannot provide a coherent and complete
account of this policy.
As a consequence, even advanced Facebook users may find di cult to understand the
actual visibility of a post.
To illustrate our point, we recall first the answers given in Facebook’s 2013 Frequently
Asked Questions (FAQ) [35] regarding the policy for posting and tagging:
If I post something on my friend’s timeline, who gets to see it?
When you post something on a friend’s timeline, who else gets to see it will depend
on the privacy settings your friend has selected. If you want to write something to
your friend privately, don’t post it.
What does the ‘Only Me’ privacy setting mean?
Sometimes you might want certain posts visible only to you. Post with the ‘Only
Me’ audience will appear on your timeline and in your news feed but won’t be visible
to anyone else. If you tag someone in an ‘Only Me’ post, they will be able to see the
post.
When I share something, how do I choose can see it?
Before you post, look at the audience selector. Use the dropdown menu to choose
who want to share a post with.
- Public
- Friends (+ friends of anyone tagged)
- Only Me
- Custom (Includes specific groups, friends lists or people you’ve specified to
include or exclude)
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Remember: anyone you tag in a post, along their friends may see the post. (...)
Note: When you post to another person’s timeline, that person controls what audi-
ence can view your post.
What is tagging and how does it work?
A tag is a special kind of link. When you tag someone, you create a link to their
timeline. The post you tag the person in is also added to the person’s timeline. For
example, you can tag a photo to show who’s in the photo or post status update and
say who you’re with. (..)
When you tag someone, they’ll be notified. Also, if you or a friend tags someone in
your post and it’s set to ‘Friends’ or more, the post could be visible to the audience
you selected plus friends of the tagged person.
When someone adds a tag of you to a post, your friends may be able to see this.
The tagged post also goes on your timeline.
Now, suppose that Bob, Alice, Ted, and Peter have Facebook profiles: Bob is a friend
of Alice and Ted; Ted is a friend of Peter; Ted is not a friend of Alice; Peter is not a friend
of Alice or Bob; and none of them has blocked to another.
To appreciate the challenge of understanding the actual visibility of a post, consider
the scenarios S1–S4 below and try to justify (based on the previously recalled Facebook’s
policy) our answers to the given questions.3
S1 Alice posts a photo of herself, Bob and Ted in her timeline, and sets its audience to
‘Friends’. Then, Alice tags Bob in this photo. Question: Can Bob see the photo in
Alice’s timeline? The answer is Yes.
S2 Alice has set to ‘Only Me’ the default audience for posts made by her friends in her
timeline. Bob posts a photo in Alice’s timeline. Question: Can Bob see this photo
in Alice’s timeline? The answer is Yes.
S3 Alice posts a photo of herself, Bob and Ted in her timeline, and set its audience to
‘Friends’. Then, Bob tags Ted in this photo. Question: Can Peter see this photo in
Alice’s timeline? The answer is Yes.
S4 Bob posts a photo of himself, Ted and Alice in Alice’s timeline. Alice has setting by
default ‘Only Me’. Then, Bob tags Ted in this photo. Question: Can Peter see this
photo in Alice’s timeline? The answer is No.
Clearly, as was explicitly requested in the DPC audit, Facebook should provide sim-
pler explanations of its privacy policies. Even better, it should formally document these
policies.
4.4.2 Modeling Facebook privacy policy
Data model
Facebook is a social network that “helps you connect and share with the people in
your life.” Each user has a profile that, basically, contains his/her personal information
(name, surname, email, birthday, gender, and relationship status) and preferences (about
music, television, movies, and games). Moreover, each user’s timeline can displays posts
3These answers were obtained in 2013 on real Facebook scenarios.
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Figure 4.9: Modeling Facebook’s data model (partial).
or stories, status updates, tags on status updates, comments to posts or stories, photos,
comments to photos, and tags on photos.
We now introduce our data model for Facebook’s profiles, timelines, posts, and tags.
We do not intend to model these features in full, but rather those aspects that will play a
role when modeling Facebook’s policy for posting and tagging.
In Figure 4.9 we show how we can model, using a UML class diagram, profiles, time-
lines, posts, and tags. The following explanations highlight our main modeling decisions.
Each profile, timeline, post, and tag, is modeled, respectively, as an instance of the
classes Profile, Timeline, Post, and Tag.
The method addPost(@post) adds the post @post to the given timeline.
The method removePost(@post) removes the post @post from the given timeline.
The method readPost(@post) read the post @post in the given timeline.
Each photo is a type of post.
Each profile is linked to exactly one timeline via timeline. This is the profile’s
timeline.
Each profile is linked to those who are friends of him or her via friends.
Each profile is linked to those that he or she has blocked via blocks.
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Figure 4.10: Modeling a Facebook scenario.
Each profile has two attributes, namely, tagReview and contributors. The attribute
tagReview holds the setting chosen by the profile’s owner for Tag Review. The
attribute contributors holds the setting chosen by the profile’s owner for posting on
its timeline.
The method switchTagReview() switches on/o↵ the Tag Review on the given profile.
The method setContributors(@selection) set to @selection the intended post con-
tributors to a given profile’s timeline.
Each post is linked to exactly one timeline via posted. This is the timeline on which
the post is posted.
Each post has two attributes, namely, creator and audience. These attributes hold,
respectively, the post’s creator and the post’s selected audience.
The method setAudience(@selection) set to @selection the intended audience for
a given post.
The method addTag(@profiling) adds a tag of a profile @profiling to a given post.
The method removeTag(@tag) removes a tag @tag from a given post.
The method forbidTag(@profiling) adds a profile @profiling to the list of profiles
that can not be tagged on a given post.
Each tag is linked to exactly one post via post. This is the post on which the tag
appears.
Each tag is linked to exactly one profile via profiling. This is the tag’s target.
Each tag has one attribute, namely, creator, that holds the tag’s creator.
Each post is linked to those profiles that can not be tagged in the post via forbidens.
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We show in Figure 4.10 an instance of our data model for Facebook. It represents the
following Facebook scenario: Bob, Alice and Ted have Facebook profiles. Bob is a friend
of Alice, and Ted is a friend of Bob but not a friend of Alice. Alice’s timeline has a photo
that was posted by Bob in her timeline. Bob has tagged Ted in this photo.
Next we show how we can formalize queries about the Facebook scenario represented
in Figure 4.10 using OCL. In particular,
To query about Bob’s friends, we can use the OCL expression:
Bob.friends.
This expression evaluates to Set{Alice, Ted} in our sample scenario.
To query about friends of Alice’s friends, we can use the OCL expression:
Alice.friends.friends >asSet().
This expression evaluates to Set{Ted, Alice} in our sample scenario (Alice is certainly
a friend of any of her friends).
To query about friends of Alice and their friends, but not including Alice herself, we
can use the OCL expression:
Alice.friends >union(Alice.friends.friends) >excluding(Alice).
This expression evaluates to Set{Bob, Ted} in our sample scenario.
To query about whether Ted is tagged in any of the posts appearing on Alice’s
timeline, we can use the OCL expression:
Alice.timeline.posts.tags.profiling >includes(Ted).
This expression evaluates to true in our sample scenario.
Privacy Policy
We are now ready to model, using SecureUML, the Facebook’s 2013 policy for posting
and tagging.4 A word of caution: given the lack of a formal documentation, our under-
standing of this policy is based not only on the o cial information available at [35] (which
is not always complete or coherent) but also on our own experiments using Facebook on
“precooked” scenarios.
In what follows, for each method in our data model for Facebook, after describing the
policy for executing this method, we will formally specified, using OCL, the corresponding
authorization constraint.
4 For the sake of simplicity, we have omitted some features, including: who is notified (and how) when
a tag is added to a post; how (and by whom) a post’s audience can be customized; how (and by whom)
a post on which someone is tagged can be reviewed before it appears on his or her profile; how (and by
whom) the maximum audience for posts appearing in someone’s profile because he or she is tagged on
them can be selected by default; how (and by whom) a tag can be added to a post di↵erent from a photo;
how (and by whom) something di↵erent from a user can be tagged.
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Method: switchTagReview() The next clause describes the policy for executing the
method switchTagReview:
anybody can turn on/o↵ the option of reviewing any tag that anybody else wants to
add to any post published in his or her timeline before they are actually published.
More formally, the permission to execute the method switchTagReview() has the fol-
lowing authorization constraint: caller = self.
Method: setContributors(@audience) The following clause describes the policy for
executing the method setContributors:
anybody can choose between not allowing anybody (except him or herself) to post
on his or her timeline or allowing also their friends to post on his or her timeline.
More formally, the permission to execute the method setContributors(@audience) has
the following authorization constraint: caller = self.
Method: setAudience(@audience) The following clause describes the policy for ex-
ecuting the method setAudience:
anybody can select the audience for any post that is posted on his or her timeline.
More formally, the permission to execute the method setAudience(@audience) has
the following authorization constraint: caller = self.posted.profile.
Method: addPost(@post) The following clauses describe the policy for executing the
method addPost:
anybody can add a post on his or her timeline.
anybody can add a post on any of his or her friends’ timelines, if the owner of this
timeline has its preferences for posting set to ‘Friends’.
More formally, the permission to execute the method addPost(@post) has the following
authorization constraint:
caller = self.profile or (self.profile.contributors = ’Friends’
and self.profile.friends >includes(caller)).
Method: removePost(@post) The following clause describes the policy for executing
the method removePost:
anybody can remove a post that he or she has posted on a timeline.
More formally, the permission to execute the method removePost(@post) has the
following authorization constraint: caller = @post.creator.
4.4. Analyzing privacy models 95
Method: addTag(@profiling) The following clauses describe the policy for executing
the method addTag:
anybody can add a tag of him or herself, or of any of his or her friends, on a post
that is posted on his or her timeline, unless this friend has previously untagged him
or herself from this post.
anybody can add a tag of him or herself, or of any of his or her friends, on a post
that is posted on a timeline, unless the owner of the timeline has switched ‘On’ the
tag review preferences and he or she is not the owner of the timeline, or unless this
friend has previously untagged him or herself from this post.
More formally, the permission to execute the method addTag(@profiling) has the fol-
lowing authorization constraint:
((caller=@profiling or caller.friends >includes(@profiling))
and caller=self.posted.profile and self.forbidens >excludes(@profiling))
or ((caller=@profiling or caller.friends >includes(@profiling))
and self.posted.profile.tagReview=false and self.forbidens >excludes(@profiling)).
Method: removeTag(@tag) The following clauses describe the policy for executing
the method removeTag:
anybody can remove any tag of him or her on a post.
anybody can remove any tag from a post that he or she has posted on a timeline.
anybody can remove any tag that he or she has added to a post.
More formally, the permission to execute the method removeTag(@tag) has the following
authorization constraint:
caller = @tag.profiling or caller = @tag.post.creator or caller = @tag.creator.
Method: forbidTag(@profiling) The following clause describes the policy for execut-
ing the method forbidTag:
anybody can forbid anybody else to tag him or her again on a post.
More formally, the permission to execute the method forbidTag(@profiling) has the
following authorization constraint: caller = @profiling.
Method: readPost(@post) The following clauses describe the policy for executing
the method readPost:
anybody can read any post that is posted on his or her timeline.
anybody can read any post that was posted by him or her on a timeline, unless he
or she is blocked by the owner of the timeline.
anybody can read any post that has its audience selected to ‘Friends’, if he or she is
a friend of the owner of the timeline.
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anybody can read any post that has its audience selected to ‘FriendsOfFriends’, if
he or she is a friend of the owner of the timeline, or a friend of a friend of the owner
of the timeline, unless he or she is blocked by the owner of the timeline.
anybody can read any post that has its audience selected to ‘Public’, unless he or
she is blocked by the owner of the timeline.
anybody can read any post, if he or she is tagged on this post, unless he or she is
blocked by the owner of the timeline.
anybody can read any post that has its audience selected to ‘Friends’ and was created
by the owner of the timeline, if he or she is a friend of somebody tagged on the post,
unless he or she is blocked by the owner of the timeline.
More formally, the permission to execute the method readPost(@post) has the follow-
ing authorization constraint:
caller = self.profile
or (caller= @post.creator and self.profile.blocks >excludes(caller))
or (@post.audience = ’Friends’ and self.profile.friends >includes(caller))
or (@post.audience = ’FriendsOfFriends’
and (self.profile.friends >includes(caller)
or self.profile.friends.friends >includes(caller))
and self.profile.blocks >excludes(caller))
or (@post.audience = ’Public’ and self.profile.blocks >excludes(caller))
or (@post.tags.profiling >includes(caller) and self.profile.blocks >excludes(caller))
or (@post.audience = ’Friends’ and @post.creator = self.profile
and @post.tags.profiling.friends >includes(caller)
and self.profile.blocks >excludes(caller)).
Next we validate our modeling of the policy for executing the method readPost, using
the scenarios S1–S4 that we introduced in Section 4.4.1. Clearly, if our model is correct,
the answers obtained in our real experiments about the visibility of the posts in these sce-
narios should correspond to the results of evaluating the method readPost’s authorization
constraint on the corresponding instances of our data model for Facebook.
Recall that Bob is a friend of Alice and Ted; Ted is a friend of Peter; Ted is not a
friend of Alice; Peter is not a friend of Alice or Bob; and none of them has blocked to
another.
S1 Alice posts a photo of herself, Bob and Ted in her timeline, and sets its audience to
‘Friends’. Then, Alice tags Bob in this photo. Question: Can Bob see the photo in
Alice’s timeline? The answer is Yes, because Alice has set her default audience to
‘Friends’ and Bob is a friend of Alice. Indeed, the readPost’s authorization constraint
evaluates to true in this scenario, since
(@post.audience = ’Friends’ and self.profile.friends >includes(caller))
evaluates to true when replacing @post by Alice’s photo, caller by Bob, and self by
Alice’s timeline.
4.4. Analyzing privacy models 97
S2 Alice has set to ‘Only Me’ the default audience for posts made by her friends in
her timeline. Bob posts a photo in Alice’s timeline. Question: Can Bob see this
photo in Alice’s timeline? The answer is Yes, because Bob is the person who posted
the photo and Bob is not blocked by Alice. Indeed, the readPost’s authorization
constraint evaluates to true in this scenario, since
(caller = @post.creator and self.profile.blocks >excludes(caller))
evaluates to true when replacing @post by Alice’s photo, caller by Bob, and self by
Alice’s timeline.
S3 Alice posts a photo of herself, Bob and Ted in her timeline, and set its audience to
‘Friends’. Then, Bob tags Ted in this photo. Question: Can Peter see this photo
in Alice’s timeline? The answer is Yes. because the audience selected by Alice is
‘Friends’ and, therefore, after Bob tags Ted the audience is extended to Ted and
his friends. Indeed, the readPost’s authorization constraint evaluates to true in this
scenario, since
(@post.audience = ’Friends’ and @post.creator = self.profile
and @post.tags.profiling.friends >includes(caller)
and self.profile.blocks >excludes(caller)).
evaluates to true when replacing @post by Alice’s photo, caller by Peter, and self by
Alice’s timeline.
S4 Bob posts a photo of himself, Ted and Alice in Alice’s timeline. Alice has setting by
default ‘Only Me’. Then, Bob tags Ted in this photo Question: Can Peter see this
photo in Alice’s timeline? The answer is No, because the audience selected by Alice
by default is ‘Only Me’, and Peter is neither the person who posted the photo, nor the
person who is tagged in the photo. Indeed, the readPost’s authorization constraint
evaluates to false in this scenario, when replacing @post by Alice’s photo, caller by
Peter, and self by Alice’s timeline.
Next, we show how we can adjust our model to changes. Facebook’s privacy policy
has been in a constant state of flux over the past years [72]. This is certainly the case for
Facebook’s policy for tagging and posting, which is now explained in its 2014 FAQ [36] as
follows:
When someone adds a tag to a photo or post I shared, who can see it?
When someone adds a tag to something you shared, it’s visible to: 1. The audience
you chose for the post or photo. 2. The person tagged in the post, and their friends.
If you’d like, you can adjust this visibility. You can select Custom, and uncheck the
Friends of those tagged box.
Clearly, the possibility of not sharing a post with friends of those tagged in the post was
not an option in 2013. In fact, if we consider again the scenarios S1–S4, we notice that our
answers to the questions about the visibility of the posts in these scenarios remain valid,
except for scenario S3: according to the new Facebook’s policy for tagging and posting,
the question about whether Peter can see or not the photo in Alice’s timeline depends on
whether Alice has checked or not the box ‘Friends of those tagged’ in her photo.
To adjust our SecureUML model of Facebook’s privacy policy to this latest change,
we need first to modify our data model for Facebook in order to represent whether or not
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a post will be visible also to the tagged profile’s friends. We do so by adding to the class
Post a new Boolean attribute audExt. Then, we modify accordingly the readPost(@post)’s
authorization constraint. In particular, we need to replace the last clause in the previous
description of the policy for executing the method readPost by the following clause:
anybody can read any post that has its audience selected to ‘Friends’ and was created
by the owner of the timeline, if he or she is a friend of somebody tagged on the post,
unless he or she is blocked by the owner of the timeline or the owner has unchecked
the box ‘Friends of those tagged’.
More formally, the permission to execute the method readPost(@post) will now have the
following authorization constraint:
(caller = self.profile)
or (caller = @post.creator and self.profile.blocks >excludes(caller))
or (@post.audience = ’Friends’ and self.profile.friends >includes(caller))
or (@post.audience = ’FriendsOfFriends’ and (self.profile.friends >includes(caller)
or (self.profile.friends.friends >includes(caller) and self.profile.blocks >excludes(caller))
or (@post.audience = ’Public’ and self.profile.blocks >excludes(caller))
or (@post.tags.profiling >includes(caller) and self.profile.blocks >excludes(caller))
or (@post.audience = ’Friends’ and @post.creator = self.profile
and @post.tags.profiling.friends >includes(caller)
and self.profile.blocks >excludes(caller)
// the following conjunct is new
and @post.audExt).
4.4.3 Analyzing Facebook privacy policy
SecureUML has a well-defined semantics that supports formal reasoning about its
models. In particular, given a SecureUML model M , we can check that nobody, for which
a given property P holds, will be allowed to execute a certain method X. Notice that this
corresponds to proving that there is no valid instance of the underlying data model for
which both the method X’s authorization constraint and the property P evaluate to true.
As explained before, we can automatically transform this type of problems into first-order
satisfiability problems, and then use automated SMT solver tools to attempt to solve
them.
We have applied this methodology to prove, as an example, that nobody will be allowed
to read a post in a timeline if this person is blocked by the timeline’s owner. First, we
have formalized, using OCL, the properties that every valid instance of our data model
for Facebook will have to satisfy, for example:
If someone is blocked by someone else, then the former can not remain friend of the
latter. Formally,
Profile.allInstances() >forAll(p, q|
p.blocks >includes(q) implies p.friends >excludes(q)).
Nobody can be blocked by itself. Formally,
Profile.allInstances() >forAll(p|p.blocks >excludes(p)).
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Second, we have formalized, using OCL, the property of being blocked by the timeline’s
owner as follows:
self.profile.blocks >includes(caller),
where caller refers to the person who wants to read the post and self refers to the timeline
where the posted is posted.
Finally, after generating the corresponding satisfiability problem, we have used the
SMT solver Z3 [30] to automatically prove the desired property, i.e., that nobody will be
allowed to read a post in a timeline if this person is blocked by the timeline’s owner.
4.4.4 Concluding remarks
To the best of our knowledge, no previous attempts have been made to rigorously for-
malize the Facebook privacy policy and, in particular, its policies for posting and tagging.
There are, at least, two good reasons for this. First, as the DPC audit [45] has pointed
out, “many policies and procedures that are in operation [in Facebook] are not formally
documented.” Second, the Facebook privacy policy has significantly changed over the
past few years [72], in ways not always well-explained, as Zuckerberg has to admit in his
blog [102]: “I’m the first to admit that we’ve made a bunch of mistakes. In particular (...)
poor execution as we transitioned our privacy model two years ago.”
Now, assuming that the Facebook privacy policy is formally documented, what will be
the challenges for modeling this policy? Basically, as [90] discussed in detail, for modeling
social networking privacy it is crucial to use a language able to formalize fine-grained
access control policies. In other words, a basic role-based access control language, as
proposed in [54], will only do part of the job. Thanks to its tight-integration with OCL,
the language SecureUML [11] can deal with fine-grained access control policies, as we have
shown in our case study. Of course, there are other options, but not many when having a
formal semantics becomes a hard requirement. For example, XACML [63], which can be
considered the standard choice for describing privacy policies, lacks of a formal semantics.
In fact, due to this limitation, [90] uses the language Z [94] for specifying fine-grained access
control policies. Although an interesting option, we prefer to use SecureUML instead of
Z because SecureUML already has “built-in” the notions of role, permission, methods,
resources, and authorization constraints, which, would have to be “encoded” (more or
less, naturally) along with the policies, if we were to use Z. Furthermore, SecureUML is
designed to support model-driven security [12].
4.5 Checking data invariants preservation
Data-management applications are focused around so-called CRUD actions that create,
read, update, and delete data from persistent storage. These operations are the building
blocks for numerous applications, for example dynamic websites where users create ac-
counts, store and update information, and receive customized views based on their stored
data. Typically, the application’s data is required to satisfy some properties, which we
may call the application’s data invariants.
We introduce here a tool-supported, model-based methodology for proving that all
the actions possibly triggered by a data-management application will indeed preserve
the application’s data invariants. Moreover, we report on our experience applying this
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Figure 4.11: EHR: a sample data model.
methodology on the same application for managing medical records that we introduced in
in Section 4.1.5
In a nutshell, our approach consists of the following three steps. Suppose that we are
interested in checking whether a sequence A = hact1, . . . , actn 1i of data actions preserves
an invariant   of an application’s data model D. We proceed as follows: (Step 1) From the
data model D, we automatically generate a new data model Film(D, n) for representing
all sequences of n states of D. Notice that some of these sequences will correspond to
executions of A, but many others will not. (Step 2) We constrain the model Film(D, n)
in such a way that it will represent exactly the sequences of states corresponding to
executions of A. We do so by adding to Film(D, n) a set of constraints Execute(D, act i, i)
capturing the execution of the action act i upon the i-th state of a sequence of states, for
i = 1, . . . , n   1. (Step 3) We prove that, for every sequence of states represented by the
model Film(D, n) constrained by Sn 1i=1 Execute(D, act i, i), if the invariant   is satisfied in
the first state of the sequence then it is also satisfied in the last state of the sequence.
4.5.1 Modeling sequences of states
A data model provides a data-oriented view of a system, the idea being that each
state of a system can be represented by an instance of the system’s data model. Here we
introduce a special data model: one whose instances do not represent states of a system
but instead sequences of states of a system.
Example 30 Consider the data model EHR shown in Figure 4.11. It consists of three
classes: Patient, Department, and Doctor.
Patient It represents patients. The doctor treating a patient is set in the attribute doc
and the department where a patient is treated is set in the attribute dept.
Department It represents departments. The doctors working in a department are linked
to the department through the association-end doctors.
Doctor It represents doctor’s information. Departments where a doctor works are linked
to the doctor’s information through the association-end doctorDepts.
ut
Example 31 Consider the object model Inst EHR shown in Figure 4.12. It represents an
instance of the data model EHR shown in Figure 4.11. In particular, Inst EHR represents
a state of the system in which there are only two departments, namely, Cardiology and
Digestive; one doctor, namely, J Smith, working for both departments; and one patient,
M Perez, treated by doctor J Smith in the department of Cardiology. ut
5For the sake of simplicity, however, the underlying data model in this case does not make use of class
inheritance.
4.5. Checking data invariants preservation 101
Figure 4.12: Inst EHR: a sample object model.
Example 32 Suppose that the following data invariants are specified for the data model
EHR in Figure 4.11:
1. Each patient is treated by a doctor.
Patient.allInstances() >forAll(p|not(p.doc.oclIsUndefined()))
2. Each patient is treated in a department.
Patient.allInstances() >forAll(p|not(p.dept.oclIsUndefined()))
3. Each patient is treated by a doctor who works in the department where the patient
is treated.
Patient.allInstances() >forAll(p|p.doc.doctorDepts >includes(p.dept))
Clearly, the object model Inst EHR in Figure 4.12 is a valid instance of EHR with
respect to the data invariants (1)–(3), since they evaluate to true in Inst EHR. ut
Next, we introduce the notion of filmstrips to model sequences of states of a system.
Given a data model D, a D-filmstrip model of length n, denoted by Film(D, n), is a new
data model which contains the same classes as D, but now:
To represent that an object may have di↵erent attribute values and/or links in
each state, each class c contains n di↵erent “copies” of each of the attributes and
association-ends that c has in D. The idea is that, in each instance of a filmstrip
model, the value of the attribute at (respectively, association-end as) for an object
o in the i-th state of the sequence of states modelled by this instance is precisely the
value of the i-th “copy” of at (respectively, as).
To represent that an object may exist in some states, but not in others, each class c
contains n “copies” of a new boolean attribute st. The idea is that, in each instance
of a filmstrip model, an object o exists in the i-th state of the sequence of states
modelled by this instance if and only if the value of the i-th “copy” of st is true.
A formal definition of filmstrip models is given here:6
6For the sake of simplicity, we are not considering here multiplicities or generalizations.
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Figure 4.13: Film(EHR,3): a filmstrip model of length 3 of EHR.
Definition 8 (Filmstrip models) Let D be a data model, D = hC,AT ,AS ,ASOi. Let
n be a positive number. We denote by Film(D, n) the model of the sequences of length n
of D-object models. Film(D, n) is defined as follows:
Film(D, n) = hC, (n⇥{st}) [ (n⇥AT ), (n⇥AS ), (n⇥ASO)i
where
(n⇥{st}) = {(st i)(c,Boolean) | c 2 C ^ 1  i  n}.
(n⇥AT ) = {(at i)(c,t) | at (c,t) 2 AT ^ 1 in}.
(n⇥AS ) = {(as i)(c,c0) | as(c,c0) 2 AS ^ 1 in}.
(n⇥ ASO) = {((as i)(c,c0), (as 0 i)(c0,c)) | (as(c,c0), as 0(c0,c)) 2 ASO ^ 1 in}.
Example 33 In Figure 4.13 we show the filmstrip model Film(EHR, 3). Consider now
the three instances of EHR shown in Figure 4.14. The first instance (Inst#1 EHR) cor-
responds to a state where there are two departments, Cardiology and Digestive, and one
doctor, J Smith, working in Digestive. The second instance (Inst#2 EHR) is like the first
one, except that now J Smith also works in Cardiology and, moreover, there is a patient,
M Perez, who is treated in Cardiology, but has no doctor assigned yet. Finally, the third
instance (Inst#3 EHR) is like the second one, except that it does not contain any doctor.
In Figure 4.15 we show how the sequence hInst#1 EHR, Inst#2 EHR, Inst#3 EHRi can be
represented as an instance of Film(EHR, 3). ut
Finally, we introduce a function Project(), which we will use when reasoning about
filmstrip models. Let D be a data model and let   be an expression. Project(D, , i)
“projects” the expression   so as to refer to the i-th state in the sequences represented by
the instances of Film(D, n), for n   i.
A formal definition of Project() is given here:
Definition 9 (Project) Let D = hC,AT ,AS ,ASOi be a data model. Let n be positive
number. Let   be a D-expression. For 1  i  n, Proj(D, , i) is the Film(D, n)-expression
that “projects” the expression   so as to refer to the i-th state in the sequences represented
by the instances of Film(D, n). Proj(D, , i) is obtained from   by executing the following:
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(a) Inst#1 EHR (b) Inst#2 EHR (c) Inst#3 EHR
Figure 4.14: Three instances of EHR.
For every class c 2 C, replace every occurrence of c.allInstances() by c.allInstances()
 >select(o|o.st (i)).
For every attribute at (c,t) 2 AT, replace every occurrence of .at by .at (i).
For every link as(c,c0) 2 AS, replace every occurrence of .as by .as (i).
Example 34 Consider the data invariants (1) and (3) presented in the Example 32.
Then,
Project(EHR, (1), 1) =
Patient.allInstances() >select(p|p.st 1) >forAll(p|not(p.doc 1.oclIsUndefined()))
Project(EHR, (3), 1) =
Patient.allInstances() >select(p|p.st 1)
 >forAll(p|p.doc 1.doctorDepts 1 >includes(p.dept 1))
Recall that Patient.allInstances() >select(p|p.st 1) refers to the instances of the entity
Patient which exist in the first state of the sequences of states modelled by Film(EHR, 3),
while .doc 1 and .doctorDepts 1 refer, respectively, to the value of the attribute doc and
the links through the association-end doctorDepts of the instances of the entity Patient
also in the first state of the aforementioned sequences of states. ut
4.5.2 Modeling sequences of data actions
As explained before, given a data model D and a positive number n, the instances
of the filmstrip model Film(D, n) represent sequences of n states of the system. Notice,
however, that, in the sequence of states represented by an instance of Film(D, n), the
(i + 1)-th state does not need to be the result of executing an atomic data action upon
the i-th state.
104 Chapter 4. Application domains
Figure 4.15: An instance of Film(EHR, 3).
Let D be a data model and let act be a CRUD data action. In this section we introduce
a set of boolean OCL expressions, Execute(D, act , i), which capture the relations that hold
between the i-th and (i+1)-th states of a sequence, if the latter is the result of executing the
action act upon the former. We provide first the expressions that capture the di↵erences
between the two states, (i + 1)-th and i-th, and afterwards the expressions that capture
their commonalities.
As expected, we define Execute(D, act , i) by cases. We consider the following atomic
data actions: create or delete an object of an entity; read the value of an attribute of an
object; and add or remove a link between two objects. 7
Action create. For act the action of creating an instance new of an entity c, the di↵er-
ence between the states (i + 1)-th and i-th can be captured by the following expressions
in Execute(D, act , i):
new .st i = false.
new .st (i+ 1) = true.
new.at (i+ 1) = null, for every attribute at of the entity c.
new.as (i+ 1) >isEmpty(), for every association-end as of the entity c.
Action delete. For act the action of deleting an instance o of an entity c, the di↵erence
between the states (i + 1)-th and i-th can be captured by the following expressions in
Execute(D, act , i):
o.st i = true.
o.st (i+ 1) = false.
o.at (i+ 1) = null, for every attribute at of the entity c.
7The tool supports also conditional data actions, where the conditions are boolean OCL expressions.
Notice that, when act is a conditional data action, we must also include in Execute(D, act , i), the expression
that results from “projecting” its condition, using the function Project(), so as to refer to the i-th state in
the sequence.
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o.as (i+ 1) >isEmpty(), for every association-end as of the entity c.
c0.allInstances().as 0 (i+ 1) >excludes(o) for every entity c0, and every association-
end as 0 between c0 and c.
Action update. For act the action of updating an attribute at of an instance o of an
entity c with a value v, the di↵erence between the states (i+1)-th and i-th can be captured
by the following expression in Execute(D, act , i):
o.at (i+ 1) = v.
Action add. For act the action of adding an object o0 to the objects that are linked
with an object o through an association-end as (whose opposite association-end is as 0),
the di↵erence between the states (i + 1)-th and i-th can be captured by the following
expressions in Execute(D, act , i):
o.as (i+ 1) = (o.as i) >including(o0).
o0.as 0 (i+ 1) = (o0.as 0 i) >including(o).
Action remove. For act the action of removing an object o0 to the objects that are
linked with an object o through an association-end as (whose opposite association-end is
as 0), the di↵erence between the states (i+1)-th and i-th can be captured by the following
expressions in Execute(D, act , i):
o.as (i+ 1) = (o.as i) >excluding(o0).
o0.as 0 (i+ 1) = (o0.as 0 i) >excluding(o).
Finally, we list below the expressions in Execute(D, act , i) that capture the commonal-
ities between the states (i+1)-th and i-th, for the case of the action updating an attribute
at of an instance o of and entity c; the expressions for the other cases are entirely similar.
d.allInstances() >select(x|x.st (i+ 1)) = d.allInstances() >select(x|x.st i), for every
entity d.
d.allInstances() >select(x|x.st i) >forAll(x|x.at 0 (i+ 1) = x.at 0 i), for every entity d
and every attribute at 0 of d, such that at 0 6= at .
c.allInstances() >select(x|x.st i) >excluding(o) >forAll(x|x.at (i+ 1) = x.at i).
d.allInstances() >select(x|x.st i) >forAll(x|x.as (i + 1) = x.as i) for every entity d,
and every association-end as of d.
4.5.3 Checking data invariants preservation
Invariants are properties that are required to be satisfied in every system state. Recall
that, in the case of data-management applications, the system states are the states of the
applications’ persistence layer, which can only be changed by executing the sequences of
data actions associated to the applications’ GUI events. We can now formally define the
invariant-preservation property as follows:
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Definition 10 (Invariant preservation) Let D be a data model, with invariants  . Let
A = hact1, . . . , actn 1i be a sequence of data actions. We say that A preserves an invariant
  2   if and only if
8F 2 JFilm(D, n), n 1[
i=1
Execute(D, act i, i)K .(4.1)
JProject(D, ^
 2 
( ), 1) implies Project(D, , n)KF = true,
i.e., if and only if, for every A-valid instance F of Film(D, n) the following holds: if all
the invariants in   evaluate to true when “projected” over the first state of the sequence
of states represented by F , then the invariant   evaluates to true as well when “projected”
over the last state of the aforementioned sequence.
By Remark 1, we can reformulate Definition 10 as follows: Let D be a data model,
with invariants  . Let A = hact1, . . . , actn 1i be a sequence of data actions. We say that
A preserves an invariant   2   if and only if the following set is unsatisfiable:
o2fdata(Film(D, n)) [ {o2ftrue( ) |   2
n 1[
i=1
Execute(D, act i, i)}(4.2)
[ o2ftrue(not(Project(D,
^
 2 
( ), 1) implies Project(D, , n))).
In other words, using our mapping from OCL to first-order logic, we can transform an
invariant-preservation problem (4.1) into a first-order satisfiability problem (4.2). And by
doing so, we open up the possibility of using SMT solvers to automatically (and e↵ectively)
check the invariant-preservation property of non-trivial data-management applications, as
we will report in the next section.
Case Study
In this section we report on a case study about using SMT solvers —in particular,
Z3 [30]— for proving the invariant-preservation property. All the proofs have been ran on
a machine with an Intel Core2 processor running at 2.83 GHz with 8GB of RAM, using
Z3 versions 4.3.1 and 4.3.2. The Z3 input files are available at [96] where we also indicate
which files are to be ran with which version.
The data-management application for this case study is the eHealth Record Man-
agement System (EHRM) developed, using ActionGUI, within the European Network of
Excellence on Engineering Secure Future Internet Software Services and Systems (NES-
SoS) [62]. The EHRM application consists of a web-based system for electronic health
record management. The data model contains 18 entities, 40 attributes, and 48 association-
ends. It also contains 86 data invariants. For the sake of illustration, we can group the
EHRM’s data invariants in the following categories:
G1. Properties about the population of certain entities. E.g., There must be at least a
medical center.
MedicalCenter.allInstances() >notEmpty().
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Sequences Acts. Conds.
Invariants Time
af
fe
ct
ed
pr
es
er
ve
d
vi
ol
at
ed
min. max. avge.
Create an administrative 8 9 18 18 0 0.03s 0.20s 0.05s
Create a nurse 10 11 22 22 0 0.03s 0.22s 0.06s
Create a doctor 11 12 25 24 1 0.03s 27.00s 0.07s
Reassign a doctor 2 6 2 2 0 6.88s 11.10s 8.94s
Reassign a nurse 2 6 2 1 1 0.10s 17.01s 8.55s
Register patient 30 6 28 26 2 0.03s 0.20s 0.05s
Move a patient 2 3 3 3 0 0.03s 0.03s 0.03s
Total 100 96 4
Figure 4.16: EHRM case study: summary.
G2. Properties about the definedness of certain attributes. E.g., The name of a profes-
sional cannot be left undefined.
Professional.allInstances() >forAll(p|not(p.name.oclIsUndefined())).
G3. Properties about the uniqueness of certain data. E.g.: There cannot be two di↵erent
doctors with the same licence number.
Doctor.allInstances() >forAll(d1,d2|d1<>d2 implies d1.licence<>d2.licence).
G4. Properties about the population of certain association-ends. E.g., Every medical
center should have at least one employee.
MedicalCenter.allInstances() >forAll(m|m.employees >notEmpty()).
G5. Other properties: E.g., A patient should be treated in a department where its assigned
doctor works.
Patient.allInstances()
 >forAll(p|p.doctor.doctorDepartments >includes(p.department)).
In our case study, we have checked the invariant-preservation property for seven non-
trivial sequences of data actions: namely, those that create a new admin sta↵, a new nurse,
or a new doctor; those that reassign a doctor or a nurse to another department; and those
that register a new patient, and move a patient to a di↵erent ward. The result of our case
study is shown in Figure 4.16. In particular, for each of the aforementioned sequences of
actions, we indicate:
The number of data actions (and conditions) in the sequence.
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The number of data invariants (potentially) a↵ected by the actions in the sequence,
indicating how many of them we have proved to be preserved by the sequence and
how many to be violated.8
The minimum, maximum, and average time taken for proving that the sequence
preserves (or violates) each of the (potentially) a↵ected invariants.
4.5.4 Concluding remarks
There are two main lessons that we can learn from this case study. The first lesson is
that, when modelling non-trivial data-management applications, it is indeed not di cult
to make errors, or at least omissions. In fact, the four violated invariants showed in
Figure 4.16 arise because the EHRM’s modeler inadvertently omitted some conditions
for the execution of the corresponding sequence of actions. As an example, for the case
of creating a doctor, the invariant that is violated is “Every doctor has a unique licence
number”, and it is so because the modeler omitted a condition for checking that the
licence number of the doctor to be created must be di↵erent from the licence numbers
of the doctors already in the system. As another example, for the case of reassigning a
nurse, the invariant that is violated is “There should be at least one nurse assigned to each
department”, and this is produced because the modeler omitted a condition for checking
that the department where the nurse to be reassigned currently works must have at least
two nurses working in it.
The second lesson that we have learned is that, using our methodology, and, in par-
ticular, using Z3 as the back-end prover, the invariant-preservation property can indeed
be e↵ectively checked for non-trivial data-management applications. As reported in Fig-
ure 4.16, we are able to automatically prove that, for each of the sequences of actions under
consideration, all the a↵ected invariants are either preserved or violated. This means that
Z3 does not return “unknown” for any of the 100 checks that we have to perform (corre-
sponding to the total number of a↵ected invariants), despite the fact that in all these checks
there are (many) quantifiers involved. Moreover, regarding performance, Figure 4.16 shows
that, in most of the cases we are able to prove the invariant-preservation property in less
than 100ms (worst case: 27s). This great performance is achieved even though, for each
case, Z3 needs to check the satisfiability of a first-order theory containing on average 190
declarations (of function, predicate and constant symbols), 20 definitions (of predicates),
and 550 assertions. Overall, these results improve very significantly those obtained in a
preliminary, more simple case study reported in [29], where some checks failed to terminate
after several days, and some others took minutes before returning an answer. However,
we should take these new results with a grain of salt. Indeed, we are very much aware
(even painfully so) that our current results depend on the (hard-won) interaction between
(i) the way we formalize sequences of n states, OCL invariants, actions’ conditions, and
actions’ executions, and (ii) the heuristics implemented in the verification back-end we
use, namely Z3. This state-of-a↵airs is very well illustrated by the fact that, as indicated
before, we have had to use two di↵erent versions of Z3 (4.3.1 and 4.3.2) to complete our
case study for the following reason: there are some checks for which one of the versions
returns “unknown”, while the other version returns either “sat” or “unsat”; but there are
some other checks for which precisely the opposite occurs.
8Interestingly, when an invariant is violated, Z3 returns also an instance of the given filmstrip model
responsibly for this violation. This counterexample can then be used to fix accordingly the given sequence
of actions.
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To facilitate the presentation, we will divide this chapter into four sections. First, we
will discuss work related to our mapping from OCL queries to the procedural language
extensions of SQL (SQL-PL). Secondly, we will discuss work related to our mapping from
OCL constraints to many-sorted first-order logic. Finally, we will discuss work related
to two of our applications domains, namely, analyzing security models and checking data
invariants preservation. (The related work for the other three applications domains is less
substantial and was already discussed when presenting the corresponding domains.)
5.1 Mapping OCL as a query language
There have been several interesting attempts to map OCL into SQL, each with its
own limitations and shortcomings. [91] supports only OCL class invariants and, partially,
the operators forAll, select, and exists. [92] generates SQL code from OCL as a part of
Enterprise Architect, but only for simple expressions; in particular, it cannot with deal
with OCL iterator expressions or sequences. [7] explores a model transformation approach
from UML to CWM and from OCL to a patterns metamodel, but the idea has not been
further developed. [19] introduces a di↵erent strategy for query translation. Instead
of a compile time translation, it proposes a runtime query translation from model level
languages like EOL, to persistent query languages like SQL. Each EOL query is splitted
up into subexpressions that are handled by the appropriate implementation classes. The
idea has not yet applied for translating OCL to SQL. [14] explores how participation
constraints defined on binary associations, e.g. ‘xor’ constraint, can be expressed at two
di↵erent levels, in OCL as a constraint language and as triggers in SQL. No mapping from
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Level 1 size, +, -, *, max, min, -(unary), abs, floor, round, size, and,
or, xor, implies, not, <=, <,>, <>, concat.
Level 2 mod y div.
Level 3 toInteger, toReal y toString.
Level 4 toBoolean, toUpper, toLower, substring.
Table 5.1: Support of OCL2SQL for primitive operators
OCL to SQL expressions has been proposed yet. [21] proposes OCL transformations rules
to SQL for some simple OCL expressions. Complex expressions are not covered yet. [73]
proposes a translation from OCL to a logic called Event-Dependency Constraints (EDC).
From EDC it generates SQL statements with a pattern-based approach. No information
is provided regarding the subset of the OCL language supported by the translation.
The most interesting comparison can be done, however, with the mapping OCL2SQL
presented in [87, 31, 32]. OCL2SQL only supports boolean OCL expressions. The main
idea behind OCL operators is the following: given a context, all elements of the query that
do not satisfy the defined condition are returned. The tansformation rules are described
in [87]. Basically, it use a generic OCL pattern to map the expression into a generic
MySQL pattern.
OCL pattern
context: Class
inv: OCL boolean expression
MySQL pattern
select *
from Class
where not OCL2SQL(OCL boolean expression)
The mapping proposed there does not faithfully represent some key properties of the
evaluation semantics of OCL. In particular, by relying on the SQL in operator, it erro-
neously removes duplicates from bag-collections. In our case, to preserve the evaluation
semantics of OCL, we use SQL left joins instead of the in operator.
In particular, in the implementation of the OCL2SQL tool, we have found we have
found that there are for level of supported OCL operators:
Level 1: are supported by the OCL2SQL parser and the code generated is correct
with respect to the semantics of the OCL operators,
Level 2: are supported by the OCL2SQL parser and the code generated is not correct
with respect to the semantics of the OCL operators, or it is not syntactically correct
in MySQL,
Level 3: are supported by the OCL2SQL parser but no code is generated,
Level 4: are not supported by the OCL2SQL parser.
Tables 5.1 and 5.2 summarize the operators over primitive types and the operators on
sets and multi-sets that are currently in each level.
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Level 1 includes, excludes, isEmpty, notEmpty.
Level 2 excludesAll, includesAll, symmetricDi↵erence, intersection,
union(set,bag.), =(set,bag.).
Level 3
Level 4 including y excluding
Table 5.2: Support of OCL2FOL for operators over collections
Sorted sets and sequence types are not supported by OCL2SQL. With respect to the
iterators, we have noticed that there are some implementation problems: for example, they
do not generate code for source >collect(p|p) or source >collect(p|p.atr) expressions.
Also, if the body of an iterator contains a comparison involving the iterator variable,
and that variable occurs on the right side of the comparison, only an incomplete query is
obtained.
To the best of our knowledge the idea of mapping OCL iterators to stored procedures
was first proposed in [87], but it was not developed afterwards.1.
Finally, [22] seems to be the only work dealing with the translation from SQL to OCL
up to date. It is motivated by the concern of expressing database integrity constraints as
business rules in a more abstract language. In the process of business rules identification,
it describes the mapping between SQL SELECT statements and certain type of PL blocks,
and the equivalent OCL expressions. The mapping focuses in handling SQL projections,
joins, conditions, functions, group by and having clauses.
5.2 Mapping OCL as a constraint language
With the goal of providing support for UML/OCL reasoning, di↵erent mappings from
OCL to other formalisms have been proposed in the past. In each case, the chosen target
formalism imposes a di↵erent trade-o↵ between expressiveness, termination, automation,
and completeness. In particular, most proposals have disregarded OCL undefinedness in
order to more easily map OCL to a two-valued formalism.
In Table 5.3 we summarize the di↵erent mappings from UML/OCL to other formalism.
They are grouped as follows. The first group (G1) includes mappings that do not not
support OCL constraints. FiniteSAT [56] uses constrained generalization sets for reasoning
about finite satisfiability of UML class diagrams. DL [8] encodes the problem of finite
model reasoning in UML classes as a constraint satisfaction problem (CSP). MathForm [95]
formalizes UML class diagrams using set and partial functions.
The second group (G2) includes mappings that support OCL constraints, but that do
not consider OCL undefinedness. UMLtoCSP [17] translates UML class diagrams and
OCL constraints into CSP. EMFtoCSP [41] is an evolution of UMLtoCSP, which supports
EMF models; AuRUS [78, 85] supports verifying and validating UML/OCL conceptual
1 “Das Ergebnis des hier vorgestellten Abbildungsmusters kann fu¨r einen Teilausdruck nicht direkt in
das Abbildungsergebnis eines anderen Teilausdrucks eingesetzt werden. Die Kombinationstechnik wird
nicht formal beschrieben.” [87, pag.59] [. . . ] “Es ist in dieser Arbeit nicht gelungen, eine u¨bersichtliche und
vollsta¨ndig formale Darstellung fu¨r die prozeduralen Abbildungsmuster zu finden.” [87, pag.112].
In our own translation: “The result of the mapping model presented here may not apply a part of the
expression directly into the result of another subexpression.The combination technique is not formally
described.” [. . . ] “This work did not succeed to find a concise and complete formal representation for
procedural mapping patterns.”
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Mapping Target formalism
G1
FiniteSAT [56] System of Linear Inequalities
DL [8] Description Logics, CSP
MathForm [95] Mathematical Notation
G2
UMLtoCSP [17] CSP
EMFtoCSP [41] CSP
AuRUS [78] FOL
OCL2FOL [20] FOL
OCL-Lite [77] Description Logics
BV-SAT [93] Relation Logic
PVS [79] HOL
CDOCL-HOL [3] HOL
KeY [2] Dynamic Logic
Object-Z [82] Object-Z
UML-B [57] B
G3
UML2Alloy [4] Relation Logic
USE [39] Relation Logic
G4
HOL-OCL [16] HOL
OCL2FOL+ [26] FOL
Table 5.3: Other mappings from UML/OCL to other formalism.
schemes using first-order logic; OCL2FOL [20] also maps UML/OCL class diagrams to
first-order logic. OCL-Lite [77] maps a fragment of OCL to DL, ensuring termination. BV-
SAT [93] encodes UML/OCL into bit vectors, and solves UML/OCL verification problems
based on Boolean satisfiability. PVS [79] and CDOCL-HOL [3] uses higher-order logic:
in particular, they map UML/OCL to the specification languages of the theorem provers
PVS and Isabelle, respectively. KeY [2] uses dynamic logic, a multi modal extension of
first-order logic; Object-Z [82] maps UML/OCL into Object-Z; and finally UML-B [57]
maps UML/OCL to the B formal specification.
The third group (G3) includes mappings that support OCL constraints and consider
null-related undefinedness, but not invalid-related undefinedness. UML2Alloy [4] and USE
[39, 51] map UML/OCL to relational logic and use the SAT-based constraint solver Kod-
Kod for solving UML/OCL verification problems.
The fourth group (G4) includes mappings that support OCL constraints and OCL
undefinedness. OCL2MSFOL belongs to this group. OCL-HOL [16] embeds UML/OCL
in the specification language of the interactive theorem provers Isabelle. It supports the full
OCL language, but it requires advanced user interaction to solve UML/OCL verification
problems. OCL2FOL+ [26] maps UML/OCL to first-order logic and uses SMT solvers to
attempt to solve automatically UML/OCL verification problems.
Next, we compare more closely OCL2MSFOL with the mappings in groups G3 and
G4, and, in particular, with USE and HOL-OCL, from a practical point of view.
With regard to HOL-OCL, there are two significant di↵erences. On the one hand,
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HOL-OCL uses an interactive theorem prover, Isabelle, for UML/OCL reasoning, which
requires advanced knowledge (and possibly time) from the part of the user. OCL2MSFOL,
on the contrary, uses SMT solvers with finite model finding capabilities, which, as we have
shown, e ciently support automated UML/OCL reasoning. On the other hand, HOL-
OCL supports the full OCL language (in fact, it can be considered as providing ’de facto’
formal semantics for OCL), while OCL2MSFOL has a number of limitations, as we have
discussed before, in supporting the OCL language.
With regards to USE, the di↵erence, from a practical point of view, is that its mapping
is designed for using SAT-based constraint solvers, while ours targets SMT-solvers. In
practice, this means that while USE-based proofs are only valid for instances up to a given
size, our proofs are valid for all possible instances. This is indeed the key advantage of
using SMT-solvers instead of SAT-based constraint solvers for reasoning about UML/OCL
models.
5.3 Analizing security models
Many proposals exist for reasoning about RBAC policies, each one using a di↵erent
logic or formalism, including the so-called “default” logic [99], modal logic [59], higher-
order logic [5], C-Datalog [9], first-order logic [49, 15], and description logic [100]. To
the best of our knowledge none of these proposals has been properly extended to cope
with fine-grained access control (FGAC) policies. In recent years, however, there has
been a growing interest in finding appropriate formalisms and frameworks for specifying
and analysing FGAC policies. [42] have proposed an interesting framework for specifying
and reasoning about FGAC policies, called Lithium. It is based on a decidable fragment
of (multi-sorted) first-order logic. Di↵erently from OCL, this logic does not consider
undefined values, which, based on our experience, is something crucial when formalizing
properties of the system states. We are not aware of case studies that have been carried
out using Lithium. [52, 53] propose a domain-specific language for specifying role-based
policies which is based on UML and OCL. For the purpose of analyzing these policies,
they propose to use SAT solvers, and, in particular the one implemented in Alloy [47].
Di↵erently from SMT solvers, Alloy requires the search space to be bounded. In the
context of XACML [65], there exists a XACML profile for the specification of RBAC
policies [64]. However, no methods have been proposed for reasoning about policies written
with this profile. Also, it is unclear whether this profile can be extended to cope with fine-
grained access control policies. To address the first concern, [44] propose an extension
of the XACML profile for RBAC based on OWL. This approach supports the use of an
OWL-DL reasoner for deciding about RBAC policies within XACML. More interestingly,
[80] have recently proposed a new syntax and semantics for XACML, for the purpose
of supporting formal reasoning about XACML policies. One of the challenges here is to
formalize the di↵erent algorithms for enforcing policy rules which are available in XACML.
[80] formalize the majority of these algorithms, and propose two new algorithms (one of
which is very close to the semantics of SecureUML.) Another challenge is to formalize the
concepts of obligations and advices in XACML, but they are not covered by [80]. Finally,
with respect to methods for reasoning about XACML policies, [80] propose to explore the
use of SMT solvers, but no experiments are reported yet.
In a nutshell, our proposal di↵ers from other approaches in that: (i) we use Secure-
UML for modeling FGAC policies, and (ii) we use a mapping from OCL to first-order for
reasoning about these policies. In our opinion, our approach has two main advantages:
(i) the reasoning about FGAC policies can take into account the properties of the system
114 Chapter 5. Related work
states, since OCL is the language that we use both for specifying the invariants in the
data model and the authorization constraints in the security model; and (ii) the reasoning
about FGAC policies can be done automatically (although sometimes may fail to find a
result), since the mapping that we use for translating OCL into first-order logic supports
the e↵ective application of SMT solvers over the generated formulas.
5.4 Checking data invariants preservation
In the past decade, there has been a plethora of proposals for model-based reasoning
about the di↵erent aspects of a software system. For the case of the static or structural
aspects of a system, the challenge lies in mapping the system’s data model, along with its
data invariants, into a formalism for which reasoning tools may be readily available. On the
other hand, for the case of model-based reasoning about a system’s dynamic aspects the
main challenge lies in finding a suitable formalism in which to map the models specifying
how the system can change over time. To this extent, it is worthwhile noticing the di↵erent
attempts made so far to extend OCL with temporal features (see [50] and references). In
our case, however, we follow a di↵erent line of work, one that is centered around the
notion of filmstrips [33, 97]. A filmstrip is, ultimately, a way of encoding a sequence of
snapshots of a system. Interestingly, when this encoding uses the same language employed
for modelling the static aspects of a system, then the tools available for reasoning about
the latter can be used for reasoning about the former. This is precisely our approach, as
well as the one underlying the proposals presented in [48] and [40]. However, the di↵erence
between our approach and those are equally important. It has its roots in our di↵erent way
of mapping data models and data invariants (OCL) into first-order logic [20, 26], which
allows us to e↵ectively use SMT solvers for reasoning about them, while [40] and [48]
resort to SAT solvers. As a consequence, when successful, we are able to prove that all
possible executions of a given sequence of data actions preserve a given data invariant.
On the contrary, [40] can only validate that a given execution preserves a given invariant,
while [48] can prove that all possible executions of a given sequence of data action preserve
a given invariant, but only if these executions do not involve more than a given number of
objects and links. Finally, [93] proposes also the use of filmstrip models and SMT solvers
for model-based reasoning about the dynamic aspects of a system. This proposal, however,
at least in its current form, lacks too many details (including non-trivial examples) for us
to be able to provide a fair comparison with our approach.
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In the work presented here we have defined two key, novel mappings for dealing with
UML models (or UML-like models) that use OCL as a constraint and query language.
Moreover, we have discussed the applicability and benefits of our mappings with a number
of non-trivial benchmarks and case studies.
The first mapping we have introduced is a code-generator from OCL queries to the
procedural language extensions of SQL (SQL-PL), which generates queries that can be
e ciently executed in the target language. Our mapping follows the seminal ideas pre-
sented in our previous work [34, 25], with three substantial changes that greatly increase
its applicability:
Each OCL expression is mapped to a single stored procedure, which can afterwards
be executed by a single call-statement.
When needed, temporary tables are used within store procedures to hold intermedi-
ate values.
The three-valued evaluation semantics of OCL is considered.
Moreover, the definition of our mapping makes it now easier to target di↵erent relational
database management systems, both open source and proprietary.
The second mapping we have presented here is a translation from OCL constraints to
many-sorted first-order logic, which generates logical expressions whose satisfiability can
be e ciently checked using Satisfiability Module Theories (SMT) solvers. This mapping
follows seminal ideas presented in our previous work [20, 26], but successfully overcomes
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the limitarjtions encountered in our previous proposals. First, it accepts as input a sig-
nificantly larger subset of the UML/OCL language; in particular, it supports UML gen-
eralization, along with the generalization-related OCL operators. Secondly, it generates
as output a class of satisfiability problems that are amenable to checking by using SMT
solvers with finite model finding capabilities. This second point has proven to be key
in practice, since pure SMT solvers would often return unknown when used along our
mappings, as a consequence of two facts: first, that non-trivial OCL constraints contain
expressions that are naturally mapped to quantified formulas (since they refer to all the
objects in a class, for example), and, secondly, that techniques for dealing with quantified
formulas in SMT are generally incomplete.
There are many interesting lines of work that we would like to pursue from here.
As for our mapping from OCL to SQL-PL, we plan to integrate it with CASE tools
supporting the development life-cycle in the context of UML-like models, as to ease the
work of developers and architects. Moreover, we plan to use our mapping as a starting
point to address the backward traceability from SQL to OCL, which has been hardly
studied so far. Finally, we plan to study the feasibility of mapping OCL to NoSQL
databases. Yet, we are aware of the di culty of such a mapping, given the lack of a
common standard among the di↵erent NoSQL databases.
Regarding our mapping from OCL to many-sorted first-order logic, we would like to
emphasize that our results ultimately depend on the (hard-won) positive logical interaction
between (i) our formalization of UML/OCL in MSFOL, and (ii) the heuristics implemented
in the SMT solver. This means, in particular, that changes in the SMT solver’s heuristics
may have consequences (hopefully positive) in the applicability of our mapping. It also
means that a deeper understanding from our part of the SMT solver’s heuristics may lead
us to redefine our mapping in the future. As for the current limitations of our mapping
from OCL to many-sorted first-order logic, we would like to comment the following. The
key limitation of OCL2MSFOL comes from the fact that expressions defining collections
are mapped, as we have explained, to predicates. Although these new predicates are
defined so as to capture the property that distinguishes the elements belonging to the
given collection, this is not su cient for reasoning about the size of this collection, or
about the multiplicity or the ordering of its elements. Because of this, OCL2MSFOL
cannot support, in general, size-expressions or expressions of collection types di↵erent
from set types. Fortunately, we are not finding this limitation hindering the applicability
of our mapping. Other limitations of OCL2MSFOL are mostly due to time constraints,
and will be soon corrected, including the current lack of support for attributes of type
Boolean and for multiplicities of the form [n..m], where n, m are natural numbers. In
the first case, the corresponding terms t of type Boolean would be replaced by formulas
of the form t = >. In the second case, the data model would be extended with the
corresponding invariants. Notice that it is also fairly trivial to extend our mapping to
support n-ary associations.
Finally, in the area of application domains, we plan to define, following our method-
ology for analyzing security policies, formal mappings between the FGAC languages and
frameworks supported by commercial DBMS (e.g., Oracle, IBM/DB2, Microsoft SQL
Server and Teradata) and SecureUML. These mappings will allow us to apply our method-
ology also when reasoning about FGAC policies in commercial DBMS. Also, building upon
our methodology for analyzing privacy policies, we envision the design and development of
new, more powerful privacy tools which, as requested by the DPC audit to Facebook[45],
will provide an “enhanced ability for users to make their own informed choices based on
the available information”. These tools will help to carry out, among other things, the rig-
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orous comparisons between privacy policies of di↵erent social networking sites. Finally, we
plan to extend our methodology for checking data invariants preservation to deal also with
complex, non-atomic data action. The idea is to model the execution of these complex
actions using OCL, as we have done for the case of CRUD actions. A more challenging
goal, however, is to extend our methodology to deal with iterations over collection of
data elements. The idea here is to integrate in our methodology the notion of iteration
invariant, taking advantage of the fact that the collection over which the sequence of data
actions must be iterated can be also specified using OCL.
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